China

An NPT nuclear-weapon state with standing to hold weapons under the regime, making it a rule-author rather than a rule-taker — but like France it acceded only in 1992, well after the order was built by others. It shapes the regime from inside the NWS club yet did not author its founding terms.

How the field was judged across the 12NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.

Sits among the structurally-advantaged with guaranteed Board influence under the Art VI rule for the most atomic-advanced states, a hand on the IAEA inspection lever rather than a subject of it. A major and expanding civil-nuclear power, it co-controls the safeguards machinery alongside Russia.

How the field was judged across the 12Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.

Holds blocking power over the successor regime by refusing to join a strategic-arms treaty: with New START expired, China's refusal denies the US the China-inclusive deal it demands, shaping the order through obstruction. Real agenda power, exercised as a veto rather than as authorship.

How the field was judged across the 12New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.

Extends no formal extended-deterrence guarantee: China shelters no state under a treaty umbrella within this frame, so on the protection question it is a non-provider. Its weight lies elsewhere; on who-protects-whom it scores at the floor.

How the field was judged across the 12Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.

Extracts no terms within this frame: China converts no protection relationship into basing or cost-sharing over the states scored here, so on the price-of-protection lever it sets nothing. It scores at the floor.

How the field was judged across the 12Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.

Outside the Western provision network entirely. China is scored as a rival-network hub only in the narrow sense that its centrality belongs to a different pattern than the US-anchored system measured here — not because it operates a provision network of its own. It extends no formal extended-deterrence guarantees and anchors no named alliance bloc, so it is not the author or center of any protection network. That absence is exactly why it sits below Russia (20 vs 25): Russia at least formalizes a treaty bloc (CSTO) it leads, whereas China provides no comparable standing guarantee. China registers here as a hub of a rival pattern, but as a rule-taker on protection provision rather than a provider.

How the field was judged across the 12Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.

The sole contender, but still a rule-taker at the straits. Beijing is building blue-water reach precisely because the Malacca dilemma leaves its energy imports hostage to a chokepoint it does not command — the PLAN contests the SE Asia approaches but commands no strait. It is moving to escape another's denial, not yet able to offer or withhold passage itself.

How the field was judged across the 12Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.

A provider, but pointedly outside the US-led structure. Beijing runs its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force rather than joining the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces — provision of route security on its own terms, signalling refusal to be a contributor inside an American-commanded coalition. Real provision, but parallel and self-standing, not woven into the dominant regime.

How the field was judged across the 12Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.

A top-tier rule-setter. China sits in IMO Council Category A among the states with the largest shipping interest, giving it a seat at the top tier where the world's maritime ground rules are authored — the structural register of route control, distinct from its still-junior position at the straits themselves.

How the field was judged across the 12IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.

Co-driver of the rival UN Cybercrime Convention and a Budapest non-party. Where Russia supplied the diplomatic engine that opened the competing authorship venue (UNGA res 79/243, opened for signature in Hanoi, Oct 2025), China supplied the coalition weight and substantive drafting positions that gave the alternative regime its shape and its developing-world backing — it is contesting the Western rulebook by helping write a second one, not sheltering under either. That is structural rule-setting at a competing table: authoring a regime rather than adopting one. It ranks just below Russia because it amplified and co-steered a venue Russia initiated rather than originating the alternative itself.

How the field was judged across the 12Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).

Provider of an alternative protective model to its own sphere. China exports a surveillance-and-security stack — the protective architecture authoritarian partners adopt — offering an alternative to the Western cyber-defence framework. It shelters others on its own terms within its sphere, the rival face of provision rather than a non-provider.

How the field was judged across the 12Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.

China holds the single most exercised non-substitutable chokepoint inside the set: rare-earth refining, where its control of the processing step (not the ore) gives it provision power over inputs everyone else's production depends on. It scores highest of the 12, though still bounded because the leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints lie outside the set.

How the field was judged across the 12China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.

Despite SMIC's volume, China sits near zero at leading-edge process: it neither supplies the EDA tools nor the advanced WFE that the frontier method requires, and must obtain both from gatekeepers abroad. The low score marks a fab-capacity holder that controls none of the indispensable process — capability without method-control.

How the field was judged across the 12US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.

China is the other actor exercising production-input denial at scale, using rare-earth and processed-input export controls to cut off or threaten downstream producers. Its high score reflects a denial capability genuinely wielded — the refining chokehold converted into exclusion power.

How the field was judged across the 12US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).

China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited adoption at the frontier; outside its own market it produces by methods others set. The low score marks a method-taker that writes standards the world does not adopt — authorship without reach.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.

China holds rising lead-firm power — its firms increasingly govern their supplier networks — but the dictation is more state-directed than firm-autonomous, so China sets terms within its orbit without yet authoring the dispersed cross-border supplier governance Western lead firms exercise. A real governor, but a partial one.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.

China holds genuine chokepoints in refining and rare-earth processing nodes through which much of the chain must pass, giving it real denial power over downstream access — second only to the US, though concentrated in the input-processing end rather than the design end.

How the field was judged across the 12Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).

China authors standards within its own orbit — BYD/CATL sourcing rules, GB national standards, and growing BRI-linked reach — but down-chain players outside its bloc still largely meet others' codes, so it is a domestic-plus author rather than a global one.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.

China imposes adjustment through its commanding processing position — suppliers and downstream assemblers must reorganize around its midstream scale, absorbing volatility China passes on — which lets it tie Japan and edge above Germany. It remains more exposed than the US to demand set elsewhere, but its chokehold on chain-midstream capacity makes it a strong imposer rather than an absorber.

How the field was judged across the 12US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.

China holds a large and growing outward stock, but at 50 its relocation power is bounded: much of it is recent and state-directed rather than firm-led exit-threat. Its champions move plant where the state steers them, so the leverage over labour is real but mediated, not the autonomous corporate exit-threat US or Japanese firms command.

How the field was judged across the 12Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.

China's host-state bargaining is real but state-mediated, placing it at 45. Its firms extract terms abroad largely through state-to-state deals and financing packages rather than autonomous corporate leverage, so the bargaining power flows through the state channel rather than the treaty-network firm channel the US commands.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.

China organizes a substantial but subordinate share of the cross-border mode, scoring 48. Many of its firms still execute production organized by foreign lead firms rather than authoring their own intra-firm networks at scale, so it shapes the mode partially rather than dictating how it is structured across borders.

How the field was judged across the 12US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.

China is the rising challenger at 55: its outward control stock has grown fast and is now substantial, giving its firms real grip on production sited abroad. But it remains well below the advanced-economy leaders, and much of that control is recent and state-steered rather than the deep firm-held stock of the US.

How the field was judged across the 12Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.

China is a rising rule-shaper rather than a rule-taker: it leverages its accession commitments and plurilateral participation to bend multilateral terms toward its interests, exercising real if not yet dominant agenda power. It writes into the system from a position of growing weight without yet authoring the core terms, placing it second behind the US.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.

China is building a rising template through RCEP and the Belt and Road framework, offering an alternative model that some partners adopt. It is a challenger template-author gaining traction rather than the benchmark others default to, placing it mid-pack.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.

China commands a large import market and uses access to it as explicit leverage, conditioning or threatening entry to extract concessions from partners. That exercised denial capability over a market others need places it just behind the US near the top.

How the field was judged across the 12Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.

China captures enormous volume but largely accepts the surplus-capture terms set at the frontier rather than authoring them — a margin-taker on IP, design, and platform rents written elsewhere. Its mid-score reflects rising but still partial ability to set who-keeps-the-value, not the assembly volume it commands.

How the field was judged across the 12US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.

China is rising in adjustment-imposition through bilateral creditor leverage — lending terms that can force debtor adjustment — but lacks the structure-wide system the US wields. Its mid-score marks emerging, channel-specific ability to shift cost, not authorship of the global adjustment regime.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.

China's demand scale lets it shape benchmark prices across commodities and intermediates, giving it real influence over the relative prices that allocate gains — second only to the US. It is a price-regime shaper through buying power even where it does not invoice or author standards.

How the field was judged across the 12Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).

China sets the price of its own paper but almost none of anyone else's. Its domestic yield curve anchors onshore renminbi credit, yet with a sub-1% share of international debt issuance the world does not price external credit off Chinese sovereign yields. China is a price-setter at home, not a benchmark-author for global credit (10).

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.

The PBoC runs an extensive bilateral renminbi swap network, giving China real outward liquidity provision — more than any non-reserve-currency peer (18). But renminbi lines are not a crisis-grade backstop for the dollar-based system, and China sits outside the Fed's standing swap network rather than providing the system's backstop.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.

China home-supervises 4 G-SIBs and holds a Basel/FSB seat, but on the global prudential bargain it adopts the Basel framework rather than shaping it — a rule-taker more than a rule-author (35). It is bound to a rulebook others wrote and complies with it; its standing comes from participation in the regime's governance bodies, not from authorship of the terms the world's banks obey.

How the field was judged across the 12Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).

The renminbi carries 3.1% of international payments and reaches #2 in trade finance at 8.0%, a real but still-minor settlement role largely confined to China's own bilateral trade rather than a unit third parties must use. China is building an alternative rail, not yet authoring one others cannot avoid; its 18 marks an emerging provider whose currency the world is not obliged to denominate in.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.

Despite its trade weight, the renminbi carries a sub-1% share of cross-border debt issuance and prices no major commodity, leaving China a taker on both rails of this component. Its 8 reflects an actor that borrows and buys in others' currencies while it works, slowly, to denominate even its own commodity purchases — provision it does not yet supply.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.

Despite a quota near 6%, China remains sub-threshold and therefore cannot veto a single major decision of the IMF or World Bank. Its weight buys relational bargaining power inside someone else's framework; it is a participant in reform debates, not a state that can block them.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.

China holds a large quota but is fundamentally a programme TAKER, not a designer of the conditionality others impose — and rather than author from within, it has built rival institutions like the AIIB outside this framework. Its low score reflects a rejecter/outsider posture: high capability, no authorship of the IMF/World Bank's conditionality, and a deliberate exit to construct alternatives.

How the field was judged across the 12US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.

China governs its own dollar-independent clearing layer through CIPS, a state-built RMB-clearing rail of genuine cross-border reach — but one still mid-tier in the settlement universe it is trying to escape. It owns and sets terms for that rail, yet the world's settlement overwhelmingly passes through dollar rails China does not control, so it provides a secondary rather than primary clearing layer.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.

China can deny access to its own CIPS rail but holds no power to exclude others from the dollar and euro clearing the world actually settles through, so its exclusion reach is near-nil at the layer that matters. Its very low score reflects an actor on the receiving end of US exclusion power, building an escape rail rather than wielding the denial itself.

How the field was judged across the 12Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.

China runs the only real state-backed alternative to US-controlled settlement — CIPS, reaching roughly 5,100 banks across 126 countries via 194 direct and 1,597 indirect participants by March 2026. It is the single actor providing genuine capacity to route around the dollar rail, which is why it leads this provision-of-escape component despite being a taker on the mainstream rails.

How the field was judged across the 12Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.

China cannot unilaterally exclude others from the system everyone must use; it is building CIPS as an alternative precisely because it is shaped by, not author of, the dollar chokepoint. Its low score reflects an outsider seeking to route around an exclusion lever it does not control rather than a state that can wield one.

How the field was judged across the 12Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.

China has effectively no capacity to make third parties conform to its sanctions; its measures bind actors within its own jurisdiction but cannot compel a foreign bank in a third country to comply. Its near-floor score marks it as an actor with no extraterritorial compliance lever of its own, structurally on the receiving end of others' reach rather than an author of induced conformity.

How the field was judged across the 12Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.

China runs a large asset-management industry, but its AUM is domestically bound — it allocates Chinese savings into Chinese firms rather than authoring placement decisions across the integrated global capital market. It is a self-contained allocator, not a provider of the world's allocation service, so it scores modestly despite scale.

How the field was judged across the 12US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.

China owns its own champions through state holdings and domestic funds — a self-contained ownership bloc that owns inward rather than holding the residual claim on the world's critical firms. It controls who owns China's strategic firms but does not own the global set, so it scores modestly: ownership power that is bounded, not provided.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.

Despite a large domestic market, China is only a moderate destination for the world's cross-border equity savings. Capital controls and a partly-closed market mean global savings do not route into China the way they route into the US, and its own outbound reach is contained — China opts out of the open allocative system rather than serving as a hub within it.

How the field was judged across the 12US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.

The standout structural fact in this lever. SAC has risen to second on both secretariat-holding and convenorship, moving China from a participant that adopted others' standards to a pen-holder that co-authors them. It now sits in the top tier beside the US and Germany, a position no other rising power approaches.

How the field was judged across the 12Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.

Rising second-tier. China's RFC authorship has grown markedly and it increasingly proposes protocol-level changes, moving it up the shaping ranks — but it remains a contributor to, not a custodian of, the foundational stack the US anchors. Influence on volume of authorship, not on the root.

How the field was judged across the 12US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.

Second, as a sovereign-walled parallel sphere. China gatekeeps its own market through super-apps, HarmonyOS, and domestic cloud — a complete alternative platform stack it controls access to — but this gatekeeps the China market rather than globally gatekeeping others. Owner of a walled platform sphere, not yet a setter of rules the world must route through.

How the field was judged across the 12Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.

China is the clear and fast-rising number two, having moved frontier-model origination to near-parity with the US rather than merely copying it. It now originates leading-edge work in several domains rather than only building on others' breakthroughs, making it the only state that genuinely contests the US as a source — though still a step behind on breadth of frontier creation.

How the field was judged across the 12US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.

China scores high on both the scale of its R&D spend and a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline built explicitly to channel defence innovation into commercial dominance. It is the only state with both the resources and the institutional machinery to rival the US spillover engine — though its conversion efficiency still trails, keeping it second despite its spend lead.

How the field was judged across the 12US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.

China is the only state that authors frontier models at near-US scale, having closed the quality gap on major benchmarks from double digits in 2023 to near-parity, so its near-ceiling score is earned on the author side: it produces leading-edge models others adopt, not merely access. The one qualifier on its primacy is compute — US export controls limit its access to the most advanced chips — but that constraint sits atop a genuine frontier-origination position, which is why it ranks second only to the US rather than among the takers.

How the field was judged across the 12US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.

China sits low here because this lever scores authorship of the WESTERN denial regime, and China is a non-member of Wassenaar and the principal target of the entity/chip lists rather than their author. It is not a rule-taker that complies, though — it is the outsider that has built its OWN counter-denial regime through rare-earth and gallium export controls. That genuine denial capacity is real but lives in indispensable-input-control on the Production side, not in authorship of the technology-export regime measured here, so the score stays modest.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.

China has built counter-enforcement machinery — its own export-control law and an unreliable-entity list — so it is not a pure rule-taker that simply complies; it is an outsider pushing back. But that apparatus has limited extraterritorial bite: it cannot make third parties enforce its denial the way the FDPR does, so its enforcement reach is modest. The score reflects real but contained counter-enforcement, not author-grade extraterritorial power.

How the field was judged across the 12US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.

China scores modest here despite being the principal target, because the question is what IT can withhold non-substitutably. Its advanced-technology denial capacity is limited, but it now wields genuine bite through rare-earth, gallium and germanium export controls — non-substitutable inputs where it is the dominant processor. That is a real counter-denial, so it sits above most others; but that criticality belongs structurally to indispensable-input-control on the Production side, which caps its score on this technology-denial lever.

How the field was judged across the 12US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.

China outranks the access-to-medicines contesters here because it has moved past defensive resistance into active norm-shaping from inside the regime: it builds out its own patentability and enforcement apparatus at scale and pushes to set terms others must reckon with, rather than merely lobbying for carve-outs to rules written elsewhere. It did not author the TRIPS architecture it joined on WTO accession, so it is not yet a regime-setter on par with the US or the EU bloc, but its capacity to bend what is globally patentable and enforceable toward its own model is what lifts it above India, Canada, and the purely defensive bloc.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.

China scores notably here because its enforcement reach has grown beyond its borders: its courts have issued anti-suit injunctions and moved to set global FRAND licensing rates, a genuine counter-reach that lets it project IP-enforcement power outward rather than merely policing its own market. That rising extraterritorial capacity places it alongside the strong European enforcers.

How the field was judged across the 12US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.

China scores high for a counter-paradigm because it is the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale — state-led development and 'Chinese modernization' as a rival account of how a society should organize growth and authority. It authors ideas, not merely receives them. The discount from the top tier reflects that this paradigm is adopted more by dependency and circumstance than by voluntary intellectual conviction, so its authority is real but narrower than the US default.

How the field was judged across the 12Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.

China scores modestly despite rising universities because it remains a net credential importer on this lever. Mandarin is not a lingua franca others must adopt to participate globally, and the country sends large student flows outward to be certified in foreign systems. It is increasingly building capacity, but others do not yet have to operate in its language or credentials, so its provision is limited.

How the field was judged across the 12The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.

China is the genuine alternative-norm pole. It transmits development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms that are actually adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South, offering a value-set that competes with the liberal default. That is real belief-transmission rather than mere reach, which places it solidly in the middle as the leading counter-norm provider.

How the field was judged across the 12Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.

China is the clearest rejecter-builder here: it is constructing rival indexing infrastructure (CNKI, its own journal hierarchy) to escape Western channel-dependency, but its own researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing for legitimacy. That dual posture — building a parallel channel while remaining dependent on the incumbent one — earns it a rising but mid-low score, above pure content-producers but far below the channel-owners.

How the field was judged across the 12US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.

China is the clear #2 orbital channel-provider: BeiDou delivers full global PNT coverage and its rising constellations give it an independent data channel that does not depend on US infrastructure. It is one of the few states that provides rather than merely consumes the orbital channel, though it sits below the US default.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.

China is the principal rising challenger in channel rule-setting: growing ITU influence, a sovereign data-governance model it exports, and the BeiDou standard give it real authorship over how channels are governed. It is moving from rule-taker toward co-author, contesting the spectrum, orbital, and data rules rather than simply accepting them.

How the field was judged across the 12US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.