India

An outsider that rejected the regime entirely: India never joined the NPT, refusing the bargain that would classify it as a non-nuclear-weapon state, and built weapons outside the order. By staying out it neither authors the who-may-hold rule nor is bound by it — a rejecter, not a taker. Its low standing in the regime's own terms reflects that it refused the order rather than complied with it; outside the framework, it forced accommodation rather than accepting subjection.

How the field was judged across the 12NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.

Holds no permanent designated standing on the IAEA Board, reaching it only via rotating elected seats; as an NPT outsider it is more inspection subject than inspection authority. It does not control the safeguards lever that the Art VI-designated powers command.

How the field was judged across the 12Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.

An NPT outsider that sits apart from the bilateral strategic-arms regime and its successor talks; it neither sets nor blocks those terms. Whatever leverage its arsenal gives is relational, not structural agenda power over the treaty order — minimal.

How the field was judged across the 12New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.

A non-aligned outsider to the guarantee system: India neither extends nor formally receives an extended-deterrence commitment, standing apart from both the Western umbrella and rival blocs. Authoring no protection relationship, it scores at the floor.

How the field was judged across the 12Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.

Extracts no terms: India's non-aligned posture means it neither provides protection nor exacts a basing or alignment price for it. With no terms to set, it scores at the floor.

How the field was judged across the 12Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.

Peripheral and non-aligned: India stands outside the integrated provision network, anchoring no alliance command and keeping deliberate distance from the blocs. As a non-aligned outsider it scores at the floor on network centrality.

How the field was judged across the 12Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.

A regional Indian-Ocean presence astride the routes between Hormuz and Malacca, but command of no chokepoint. New Delhi can patrol and watch its near seas, yet the terms of passage at the straits its trade depends on are still set by others — it is a rising regional actor, not a strait-commander.

How the field was judged across the 12Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.

Provides sea-lane security both as a CMF contributor and through its own independent Indian-Ocean-region patrols. New Delhi polices routes others depend on in its near seas — real provision — but at regional scale and not as the coalition's command center.

How the field was judged across the 12Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.

A second-tier rule-setter. India holds an IMO Council Category B seat among states with the largest interest in seaborne trade, a genuine hand on the maritime regime that transport must conform to, one tier below the Category A shipping-service bracket.

How the field was judged across the 12IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.

Near the floor, and below clean adopters, because India authors nothing and has not even settled which rulebook to live under. It is a Budapest non-party that has spent years 'reconsidering' accession without acceding, while leaning toward — but not driving — the rival UN process. That leaves it weaker than a country like Germany or the UK that at least cleanly adopts the dominant Budapest regime, and weaker than Brazil, which has actually acceded to Budapest while also working the UN track. India has neither helped write a digital-domain framework nor committed to operating within one; its distinctive position is sustained non-commitment, sitting outside both pens and shaped by rules it had no hand in setting and has not even chosen to accept.

How the field was judged across the 12Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).

A recipient, not a provider. India depends on partner cyber-defence cooperation and standards rather than supplying protection others rely on. Structurally it sits inside frameworks others provide — sheltered rather than sheltering (Strange 1994, p.45).

How the field was judged across the 12Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.

India controls no refining or materials chokepoint at scale and must obtain the indispensable inputs from foreign suppliers; it neither refines nor sets terms on the scarce inputs. Its score sits at the floor of the input-control lever.

How the field was judged across the 12China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.

India holds no leading-edge process or tooling gatekeeping position and must source the indispensable equipment and chemistry abroad. Its score sits at the floor — no control of the method's process.

How the field was judged across the 12US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.

India wields essentially no production-input denial leverage: it neither supplies the tooling and processed inputs others depend on nor exercises export controls over frontier inputs at scale. It is not a party to the Wassenaar Arrangement that coordinates the relevant dual-use controls, so it sits outside that order rather than inside it as a compliant participant — an outsider to the denial regime, not a subject of it. The floor-level score marks near-absence from the exclusion lever.

How the field was judged across the 12US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).

India authors no production method others must adopt and designs by methods set abroad. Its floor-level score marks a pure method-taker.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.

India is largely a chain participant rather than a chain governor — its firms execute production to terms set by foreign lead firms more than they dictate supplier networks abroad, so it scores low on exercised lead-firm governance.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.

India controls virtually no critical chain nodes others depend on, leaving it without meaningful denial power and near the floor on this lever.

How the field was judged across the 12Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).

India largely adopts the supplier standards others write to qualify for export chains rather than authoring its own, so it is a standards-taker on this lever, low score.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.

India largely absorbs adjustment imposed from above, eating the cost of terms set by lead firms rather than forcing the burden onto chain partners — a low but non-trivial score reflecting that its sheer market scale lets it resist some imposed cost rather than eat all of it.

How the field was judged across the 12US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.

At 12 India is overwhelmingly a host, not a relocator: its firms hold little outward control stock and rarely wield an exit threat over foreign labour. Indian production is sited at home and increasingly absorbs others' plant — India is on the receiving end of the relocation lever, not its author.

How the field was judged across the 12Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.

At 10 India scores low because its own firms extract little from host governments abroad — that is the lever measured here, and Indian multinationals barely wield it. India's capacity to set conditions on inbound investors at home is a different lever and lies outside this metric; on outward corporate bargaining over hosts, India is a marginal actor.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.

At 15 India largely supplies into production modes organized by foreign lead firms rather than structuring its own across borders. Its IT-services firms are an exception, but in goods production India joins others' intra-firm networks rather than authoring how the cross-border mode is organized.

How the field was judged across the 12US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.

India scores 20: its outward-control stock is small and rising slowly, so its firms govern relatively little production sited abroad. India remains primarily a host of others' controlled production rather than a controller of foreign plant.

How the field was judged across the 12Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.

India is a defensive blocker rather than an author: it wields agenda power chiefly to obstruct terms it opposes — on agriculture and development-flexibility — rather than to write the affirmative rulebook others adopt. That blocking capacity is real structural power over what cannot pass, which is why it scores above the EU member-state fractions despite authoring little affirmatively.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.

India largely adopts others' agreement templates rather than authoring a model others copy; its negotiated deals follow externally-set chapter architectures rather than setting the benchmark. With little template-export power it scores near the floor as a template-taker.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.

India's import market confers limited denial leverage: it is large in aggregate but not the indispensable market others cannot do without, so its capacity to shut partners out and dictate terms is modest. It conditions access defensively rather than wielding denial as dominant leverage.

How the field was judged across the 12Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.

India sits low: it is largely a margin-taker performing services and assembly on surplus-capture terms authored elsewhere, with limited ability to set who retains value across the production structure. Its scale of activity is realized outcome, not authorship of the allocating arrangements.

How the field was judged across the 12US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.

India scores very low: it is structurally an adjustment-bearer, historically pushed to absorb the cost of external imbalances rather than able to impose it on others. Its position is the developing-country burden-bearer Strange identifies (1994, p.81), not a setter of who adjusts.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.

India has growing but still limited ability to shape the relative prices that allocate gains; as a large buyer in select markets it gains some leverage, but it remains largely a price-taker on the terms others set. Its modest score reflects emerging demand-side influence short of regime-shaping.

How the field was judged across the 12Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).

India's sovereign curve prices domestic rupee credit and has effectively no benchmark role beyond its own borders; the world does not discount global credit against Indian yields (4). It is a price-taker on the global curve, setting terms only inside its own market.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.

India has no Fed swap line and provides no meaningful outward lender-of-last-resort function; the RBI backstops its own banks domestically but cannot rescue others' (4). It is a recipient-class actor in the global backstop layer, not a provider.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.

India holds an FSB seat nominally but home-supervises no G-SIBs and contributes negligible authorship to the global prudential rulebook (12). It is at the table as a rule-taker, adopting Basel standards rather than shaping the terms others write.

How the field was judged across the 12Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).

The rupee is barely used for cross-border settlement, leaving India a taker in the trade-denomination order: it invoices and settles its own trade overwhelmingly in currencies others issue. Its 6 reflects the near-total absence of a structural role in authoring or providing the medium world trade must run on.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.

The rupee carries a negligible share of cross-border debt and prices no commodity, so India borrows internationally in currencies others issue and sources commodities priced in them. Its 3 marks a taker on both rails, with no structural role in authoring debt or pricing denomination.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.

India's quota gives it a modest relational voice on the board and no veto. As a large economy still far below the blocking threshold, it bargains within the existing framework rather than controlling its terms.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.

India is peripheral to the design of IMF/World Bank conditionality — its quota buys a voice in debates, but the programme template is authored elsewhere. It is closer to a recipient/outsider to programme leadership than a co-author of the discipline the institutions impose.

How the field was judged across the 12US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.

India authors no clearing rail the wider world must settle through; its systems serve the rupee and domestic flows, not a global settlement layer. Its near-floor score reflects own-currency control with no structural hold on the rails cross-border money routes through, which remain dollar rails New Delhi does not govern.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.

India holds no power to deny a counterparty access to the global settlement rails — that denial sits with the dollar and the EU bloc. Its very low score reflects a state that neither authors nor wields exclusion at the layer that matters, settling on terms set elsewhere.

How the field was judged across the 12Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.

India provides no established rail that lets others route around US-controlled settlement. Its low score reflects an actor with, at most, early and partial capacity rather than a real alternative — nothing that yet escapes the dollar order.

How the field was judged across the 12Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.

India has effectively no capacity to deny others access to the financial rails; at a near-floor score it is a participant in a system it did not build and cannot gatekeep. Rather than wielding an exclusion lever it works to insulate its own trade from the dollar chokepoint, marking it an outsider routing around denial it cannot control, not an author of it.

How the field was judged across the 12Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.

India cannot force any third party to conform to its sanctions; it has no extraterritorial mechanism and instead works to shield its own trade from others' secondary reach. Its floor score marks it as an actor navigating around induced compliance, not generating it.

How the field was judged across the 12Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.

India's asset-management industry allocates a fast-growing but almost entirely domestic savings pool; it does not provide a globally-allocating function and sits near the bottom of the manager-domicile slicing, a taker into externally-governed capital markets.

How the field was judged across the 12US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.

India's capital owns its own domestic firms but holds almost no residual claim on the world's strategic firms — its cross-border equity ownership is negligible, placing it near the bottom as a non-holder in the global ownership structure.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.

India is a disclosed CPIS gap and not a destination the world's equity savings route into; its market draws portfolio inflows under managed access rather than serving as a hub, leaving it near the bottom of cross-border allocation reach — a taker into externally-governed channels.

How the field was judged across the 12US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.

Lower-mid. BIS is an active and growing participant in ISO/IEC, but India still holds few secretariats or convenorships relative to its size — it conforms to and feeds into standards the top poles pen, with authorship ambition outpacing current rule-writing authority.

How the field was judged across the 12Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.

Lower-mid. India's RFC authorship is growing and it participates in IETF work, but its share of shaping the foundational protocols remains modest — a rising contributor that interoperates with a stack authored and governed elsewhere.

How the field was judged across the 12US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.

Market-gatekeeper over its own territory. India exercises real access-denial — app bans, data-localization mandates, court-ordered platform actions — that compels foreign platforms to conform on Indian terms. It sets and enforces access rules for its market without owning the platforms or projecting those rules globally.

How the field was judged across the 12Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.

India scores low on origination: substantial human capital and a growing research base, but very few frontier origins that others must adopt. It is overwhelmingly an adopter of the leading edge rather than a creator of it, and the score reflects genuine origination scarcity, not a measurement gap.

How the field was judged across the 12US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.

India has a growing defence-research effort but thin conversion into commercial dominance; the spillover pipeline is nascent rather than effective. It scores low-mid as a state building military R&D capacity that has yet to translate into the commercial frontier others adopt.

How the field was judged across the 12US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.

India has near-zero frontier-model presence and no compute gatekeeping; it accesses the AI frontier entirely on terms set elsewhere. Its low score is a genuine absence of frontier control, not a measurement gap — it is a taker dependent on the stack others govern.

How the field was judged across the 12US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.

India authors its own national export controls and is not a Wassenaar founding insider but a later adherent, so it is better read as an outsider that built a parallel national regime than as a taker of the Western one. Its controls are oriented to its own strategic posture rather than coordinated frontier-tech denial, and it holds no chokepoint technology to write rules around, so the score stays low — capability outside the regime, not authorship within it.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.

India enforces its own national export controls within its jurisdiction but exercises no extraterritorial reach and compels no third party to enforce denial. As an outsider running a parallel national regime rather than a node in the allied enforcement chain, its reach is minimal — domestic licensing only, scored near the bottom.

How the field was judged across the 12US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.

India commands essentially no non-substitutable frontier technology to withhold; as an outsider building its own capacity rather than holding a chokepoint, it has little denial bite. Its criticality score is near the bottom — nothing it could deny would meaningfully constrain another frontier holder.

How the field was judged across the 12US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.

India is a rejecter-style contester rather than a taker. Bound into TRIPS through WTO membership, it led the defensive push for TRIPS flexibilities and access-to-medicines carve-outs, using mechanisms like its patentability standards to resist the maximalist regime others wrote. That is a genuine but defensive agenda — shaping the rules at the edges from outside the author bloc — which lifts it modestly above pure takers.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.

India's IP-enforcement reach is confined to its domestic market and is comparatively weak even there as an exclusion instrument: its courts do not bar rivals from third markets or set global licensing terms, and it has no extraterritorial mechanism comparable to US import exclusion or the worldwide-rate jurisdiction asserted by UK and Chinese courts. Its very low score reflects the absence of any outward projection of IP-denial power, independent of its rule-setting posture.

How the field was judged across the 12US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.

India is a rising civilizational voice rather than a paradigm-author. It increasingly projects ideas about development and order on its own terms, but those framings are not yet widely accepted as authoritative beyond its own sphere, leaving it as an emergent idea-originator whose conferred authority is still modest.

How the field was judged across the 12Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.

India scores low here despite very high English use because English is an inherited operating language, not one India authored or controls — and the country is a pronounced credential importer, sending large student flows abroad to be certified. It operates in the anglophone system rather than providing one, which is a taker position on this lever.

How the field was judged across the 12The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.

India transmits some civic and civilizational norms within its own sphere, but these are not yet widely adopted as authoritative beyond it. It is an emerging value-voice whose norm-diffusion is real but modest, placing it in the lower-middle band rather than among the genuine norm-providers.

How the field was judged across the 12Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.

India scores near the floor: it is a large content-producer whose researchers are wholly routed through Western indexing (WoS/Scopus) to gain recognition, with no indigenous channel that decides which findings count. It is a channel-taker, dependent on machinery it has no hand in authoring.

How the field was judged across the 12US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.

India operates a regional PNT system, not a global orbital channel others depend on. It provides for its own region and reduces its dependency, but on the global channel it remains largely a consumer rather than a provider others cannot substitute.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.

India participates in ITU spectrum and orbital processes, giving it some rising authorship over the channels, but it sits among the lower-weight participants who largely work within rules authored by the leading powers and blocs. It is closer to a rule-taker than a setter on the global channel rules, with influence growing from a low base.

How the field was judged across the 12US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.