Russia

A rule-author, not a rule-taker: as successor to the USSR, Russia is one of three NPT depositary governments and an original nuclear-weapon state. It co-wrote and sustains the regime deciding who may hold weapons, and others lodge accession with it — structural authorship of the nuclear order, slightly below the US only as primary depositary/architect.

How the field was judged across the 12NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.

Holds permanent IAEA Board influence under the Art VI designation of the most atomic-advanced states, giving it standing over the inspection lever others submit to. A major civil and military nuclear power, it co-controls the safeguards machinery — below the US but firmly inside the structurally-advantaged group.

How the field was judged across the 12Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.

A co-principal of the lapsed bilateral regime now diminished: after New START expired, Russia offered to keep observing limits voluntarily but was rebuffed, leaving it shaping the successor from a weakened position. Residual agenda power below the US, holding terms it can no longer impose.

How the field was judged across the 12New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.

A rival provider, not a recipient: Russia extends formal extended-deterrence guarantees through the CSTO, but those beneficiaries lie outside the twelve countries scored here. It authors protection for its own clients, which earns it a provider's standing above the pure recipients, yet that umbrella reaches none of the states in this set, capping the score.

How the field was judged across the 12Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.

Extracts basing terms, but outside this set: Russia exacts the price of protection through basing arrangements within the CSTO, mirroring the provider-extracts-terms logic, yet those hosts fall outside the twelve countries scored. The terms it sets touch none of this set, so it scores low.

How the field was judged across the 12Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.

A hub of a rival network: Russia is central to its own CSTO-centred provision structure, not the Western one scored here, so its centrality is real but oriented against this network. It scores as a rival hub rather than a node inside the provision system measured.

How the field was judged across the 12Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.

No command over any of the world's primary maritime chokepoints. Russia holds no standing naval command at the straits others must transit; it falls in the bucket of states that cannot offer or deny passage at the arteries world trade and oil depend on, and so sits outside the structure of route control on this lever — a rule-taker accepting a passage regime others set.

How the field was judged across the 12Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.

Absent from the cooperative provision of sea-lane security. Russia is not part of the US-led Combined Maritime Forces and offers no contribution to the multinational policing of global shipping lanes — outside the structure of route provision entirely.

How the field was judged across the 12Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.

Structurally excluded from the rule-setting table. Russia was voted off the IMO Council after 2022 — a rare instance of expulsion from the body that writes the maritime ground rules. It went from rule-setter to outsider, denied the seat where the terms of passage are authored, the sharpest security-structure datapoint in the metric.

How the field was judged across the 12IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.

Principal driver of the rival authorship venue. Russia never joined Budapest and instead led the push for the competing UN Convention against Cybercrime (UNGA res 79/243, adopted 24 Dec 2024, opened for signature in Hanoi 25 Oct 2025), a deliberate alternative to the Western-authored regime. It authors rules — just at a competing table — so it scores as a rule-setter contesting the dominant framework, not a rule-taker.

How the field was judged across the 12Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).

Provider of an alternative model to its sphere. Russia extends cyber-protection and a security architecture to aligned states, offering a counter-framework to the Western model. It shelters others on its own terms within a narrower sphere — the rival face of provision, below China's reach.

How the field was judged across the 12Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.

Russia holds raw-mineral inputs but, critically, not the refining step that converts them into the non-substitutable processed input — so its chokepoint power is shallow. The score reflects possession of ore without control of the method that makes it indispensable, a recurring gap between raw stock and refined-input provision.

How the field was judged across the 12China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.

Russia controls no advanced WFE, EDA, or precursor-chemistry process step and is locked out of the frontier method entirely; it cannot provide or deny the process to anyone. The floor-level score reflects total absence from process gatekeeping.

How the field was judged across the 12US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.

Russia can attempt raw-material denial but holds no leverage over the processed inputs and advanced tooling that matter most at the frontier of the method. Its denial reach is shallow because the chokepoints it could threaten are upstream ore, not the non-substitutable refined inputs or equipment others actually gate on. The low score reflects an actor with marginal exclusion power over the production method, well below the US and China who wield input denial at scale.

How the field was judged across the 12US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).

Russia sets no frontier production method others adopt and produces, where it can, by methods authored elsewhere. The floor score reflects absence from method-authorship.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.

Russia exercises almost no lead-firm governance over global supplier networks; its firms participate in chains as input feeders rather than dictating what dispersed suppliers produce or where, placing it near the bottom.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.

Russia's chokepoint power is confined to raw-input nodes where it can deny access — a real but narrow leverage limited to the input end of chains rather than the processing or design nodes that govern downstream production.

How the field was judged across the 12Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).

Russia authors essentially no private chain standards others adopt; it complies with or is excluded from the codes others write, leaving it at the bottom of authorship.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.

Russia's low foreign value added reflects isolation rather than governance leverage, so on the governance reading it cannot impose adjustment on a chain it is partly cut off from — scored down as an outsider, not an imposer.

How the field was judged across the 12US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.

Russia scores 8: its corporate base is resource-extractive and territorially fixed, with little firm-led outward production to move. Russian firms cannot credibly relocate production abroad to threaten labour; on this lever Russia is an absent actor, not a wielder of the exit threat.

How the field was judged across the 12Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.

Russia scores 12: its firms have scant capacity to extract terms from host governments abroad, and the export-market reach they might bargain from is thin. Whatever leverage Russia exercises runs through state energy deals rather than autonomous corporate bargaining over hosts, leaving it a minor actor on this lever.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.

Russia scores 8: its resource-extractive economy organizes almost no cross-border intra-firm production mode. It feeds commodities into chains structured by others rather than authoring how production is organized across frontiers.

How the field was judged across the 12US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.

At 10 Russia's grip on foreign production is minimal: a small outward-control stock means Russian firms govern little production sited in others' territory. On this lever Russia sits near the floor, a host of foreign-controlled plant far more than a controller of plant abroad.

How the field was judged across the 12Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.

Russia has minimal individual authorship of multilateral trade terms, participating in coalitions without shaping or blocking the core agenda. Marginalized within the system and lacking the market leverage to dictate terms, it sits near the floor as a near-pure rule-taker.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.

Russia authors no agreement template that others adopt, working within Eurasian arrangements of limited external diffusion. It is a template-taker with negligible model-export power, sitting at the floor.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.

Russia's import market is too small and substitutable to deny others meaningful access or dictate terms; it cannot lock partners out of a market they need. With weak denial leverage it scores low.

How the field was judged across the 12Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.

Russia's position is that of a commodity exporter earning rents it does not author — prices and surplus-capture terms are set by buyers and benchmark regimes outside its control. Rent received is not terms-authorship, which is precisely why its score is low.

How the field was judged across the 12US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.

Russia can impose narrow, coercive adjustment via energy supply and bilateral leverage, but sanctions and exclusion from core financial arrangements cap its structure-wide imposition power. Its low-mid score reflects situational coercion outside, not authorship of, the adjustment regime.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.

Russia, despite a high terms-of-trade index from commodity exports, scores low because that is a favorable outcome, not authorship — prices are set by external benchmarks and buyers, not by Russia. The metric scores who shapes the price regime, and Russia is a price-taker within it.

How the field was judged across the 12Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).

Russia sets no global benchmark and, post-sanctions, prices even its own external paper at a deep isolation discount with no international reference function (3). It is wholly outside the price-setting layer of global credit.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.

Russia has no access to the Fed network and, cut off post-sanctions, provides no outward LOLR and cannot draw crisis liquidity from the dollar system (4). It is excluded from the global backstop entirely.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.

Russia has no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook, and is further isolated post-sanctions from the bodies that set prudential terms (6). It is effectively excluded from the government-bank bargain at the global level — neither author nor active participant.

How the field was judged across the 12Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).

The ruble is almost absent from cross-border settlement and, since sanctions, increasingly excluded from the dollar- and euro-denominated rails entirely. Russia is neither author nor accepted provider here — a 4 marks an actor denied the denomination order rather than shaping it, forced into workaround currencies it does not control.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.

The ruble has negligible cross-border debt denomination and no commodity-pricing role despite Russia's standing as a major energy exporter — its oil and gas are still priced against dollar benchmarks it does not set. The 3 reflects an outsider that cannot impose its own unit even on the commodities it sells, denied the denomination rails rather than authoring them.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.

Russia's voting weight is small and sub-threshold, leaving it without any blocking power over IMF or World Bank decisions. Its influence is relational and marginal, exercised inside a framework it cannot author or veto.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.

Russia is marginal to programme design and has no role in authoring the conditionality the institutions impose. Estranged from the institutions' leadership, it is effectively an outsider to the agent function rather than a director of it.

How the field was judged across the 12US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.

Russia's clearing-rail control is minimal at the global layer — it settles domestically through its own systems but governs no rail the outside world must route through, and exclusion from dollar and euro clearing has confined it further. Its very low score reflects a state cut off from the rails it cannot author, holding only a domestic substitute.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.

Russia is the archetypal target of this component rather than a holder of it: cut off from SWIFT and dollar clearing by US and EU exclusion, it can deny access to nothing the outside world must use. Its very low score reflects an excluded state forced to build a substitute rail, not an author of denial.

How the field was judged across the 12Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.

Russia runs SPFS, a domestic messaging-and-settlement substitute built under exclusion pressure, giving it the second-largest alternative-rail capacity after China's CIPS. Its score reflects a real but minor escape route — a genuine state-built workaround, far short of CIPS's reach.

How the field was judged across the 12Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.

Russia is the archetypal target of the exclusion lever, not a wielder of it — the 2022 SWIFT cut-off demonstrated it cannot route around the chokepoint others control. Its near-floor score marks it as the excluded party scrambling for workarounds, structurally on the receiving end of denial rather than authoring it.

How the field was judged across the 12Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.

Russia has no ability to make third parties conform to its measures — it is the prototypical object of secondary sanctions, with foreign banks conforming to US designations against it. Its floor score reflects a target of extraterritorial compliance pressure, structurally unable to project any of its own.

How the field was judged across the 12Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.

Russia is effectively absent from the global allocation function — sanctions and isolation have severed its managers from the integrated capital market, so it neither provides nor meaningfully participates in where the world's investable capital is placed; it scores lowest as an excluded outsider.

How the field was judged across the 12US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.

Russian capital has been cut out of the equity registers of the world's strategic firms by sanctions and forced divestment; it neither holds nor can build a residual claim on the global set, scoring lowest as an excluded outsider rather than a quiet co-owner.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.

Russia's cross-border equity reach has collapsed to near-zero under sanctions and market closure. It is neither a destination for the world's savings nor a participant with outbound reach — cut out of the integrated allocative system entirely, an excluded outsider scored lowest.

How the field was judged across the 12US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.

Low. GOST/Rosstandart participates in ISO/IEC but holds very little secretariat or convenor weight — Russia is a participant and standards-taker in the international bodies, not a codifier of the rules others adopt.

How the field was judged across the 12Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.

Low. Russia's RFC-authorship footprint is small and it does not shape the foundational stack — it interoperates with protocols set abroad, and its sovereign-internet posture is a defensive walling-off rather than a claim to author the global protocols.

How the field was judged across the 12US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.

Sovereign-walled-minor. Russia asserts access control over its own market through platform blocking, sovereign-internet measures, and localization mandates — defensive gatekeeping of its territory — but it neither owns globally relevant platforms nor sets rules others must adopt.

How the field was judged across the 12Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.

Russia retains pockets of deep scientific capability but produces few commercial frontier origins others draw from; its strength is legacy and defence-adjacent rather than leading-edge creation. It sits mid-low as a state with capacity but little current frontier authorship in the technologies others now adopt.

How the field was judged across the 12US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.

Russia scores above its overall research rank specifically on the military side, with genuinely strong defence R&D — but its commercial spillover is weak, so military innovation rarely converts into commercial dominance. It is the clearest case of strong defence origination decoupled from a working commercial pipeline.

How the field was judged across the 12US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.

Russia has minimal frontier-model presence and is largely cut off from the leading compute stack by export controls and isolation. It is neither an author nor a gatekeeper here — an outsider to the current frontier, reliant on what it can develop or acquire under constraint.

How the field was judged across the 12US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.

Russia is a Wassenaar member on paper but has no frontier technology left to deny, which hollows out any regime-authorship role — membership without leverage. It is effectively an outsider to the live denial dynamic, neither writing the binding lists nor commanding anything others would need licensed access to, so its authorship score is near the floor despite formal participation.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.

Russia has essentially no enforcement reach in this regime: with no frontier technology to deny and a position outside the live Western denial chain, it can neither compel allies nor reach third parties. Its score sits near the floor — a nominal member with no instrument to make anyone enforce anything.

How the field was judged across the 12US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.

Russia's denial criticality is low: it has lost frontier-technology positions and what it could withhold is largely substitutable, so its denial does not bite in the technology layer. The modest score reflects residual niche materials rather than any genuine chokepoint — withholding power without non-substitutable weight.

How the field was judged across the 12US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.

Russia exercises almost no authorship over the global IP regime: it adopted the TRIPS framework on WTO accession and has neither led rule-setting nor mounted the kind of organized TRIPS-flexibilities challenge the access-to-medicines bloc did. Its posture is passive convergence at best, and its standing in WIPO and TRIPS forums carries little weight in shaping what is globally patentable or enforceable, leaving it at the floor of this provision lever.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.

Russia enforces IP only within its own jurisdiction and projects no extraterritorial exclusion. Since 2022 its enforcement posture toward foreign rights-holders has weakened sharply, with measures stripping compensation for patent use by unfriendly-state owners, so its capacity to deny rivals market access through IP enforcement abroad is effectively nil, leaving it near the bottom.

How the field was judged across the 12US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.

Russia's ideational position is that of a spoiler-narrator. It does not author a constructive paradigm others adopt by conviction; it propagates a counter-narrative aimed at contesting the dominant order. That is influence by negation rather than belief-conferral, so it scores low as a rejecter-voice rather than an idea-author.

How the field was judged across the 12Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.

Russia retains some inbound students into its own institutions, mainly from neighboring and aligned states, but it does not provide a language or credential system the wider world operates in. Russian functions within a regional bloc, so its conferral of lingua-franca authority is low and largely affinity-based.

How the field was judged across the 12The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.

Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity, not authority — states already inclined to contest the liberal order echo its framings rather than adopting them through conferred legitimacy. That is influence by alignment rather than belief-transmission, which keeps it low as a counter-norm voice rather than a value-provider.

How the field was judged across the 12Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.

Russia is largely an outsider-producer here — sanctioned and increasingly cut off from Western indexing channels, yet without a globally accepted rival index of its own. Its low score reflects exclusion from the agenda channel rather than authorship of an alternative; it neither sets the rules nor commands a substitute that others accept.

How the field was judged across the 12US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.

Russia provides GLONASS, a genuinely global PNT channel, which keeps it a real orbital provider rather than a dependent — but the system is degraded, weakening the dependency it can impose on others. It scores as a substitutable-channel provider whose leverage is eroding.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.

Russia is an ITU member that authors around the GLONASS standard and pushes a sovereign-internet data-governance model, giving it residual rule-setting capacity on the channels. It is a partial author and rejecter of Western internet-governance norms rather than a compliant taker, though its weight is constrained.

How the field was judged across the 12US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.