US

Primary architect and a depositary government of the NPT: the US both authored the regime that decides who may and may not hold weapons and remains one of the three governments with which instruments of accession are lodged. As an original nuclear-weapon state (tested before the 1967 cutoff) it sits inside the rule, not under it — the top hand on the order Strange describes as holders setting the rails for everyone else.

How the field was judged across the 12NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.

Controls the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever from the top: as the regime leader with the largest combined civil and military nuclear base, the US sits permanently on the Board under the Art VI designation rule reserving seats for the most atomic-advanced states. It is the dominant hand on the inspection machinery others must submit to — Strange's technology-and-materials lever exercised.

How the field was judged across the 12Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.

Sets the terms of the contested successor regime: with New START expired (5 Feb 2026), there is no live strategic-arms treaty, and the US is the party shaping what replaces it — conditioning any future deal on China's inclusion. Highest residual agenda power, but suppressed in absolute terms because no live regime exists to set the terms of.

How the field was judged across the 12New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.

The principal protector in the system: the US anchors NATO's Article 5 (an armed attack on any one of 32 members is an attack on all, North Atlantic Treaty 1949), holds the 1960 bilateral umbrella over Japan, and is the nominal hemispheric guarantor under the Rio Treaty. In Strange's terms it is the state that provides security to others and thereby sets the range of choices available to the protected, earning the top score as the author of the guarantee, not merely a holder of force.

How the field was judged across the 12Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.

The net extractor of terms: the US converts the protection it provides into forward basing in Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK plus cost-sharing arrangements, which is precisely the price Strange says the protector exacts in return for security. It is the only state that turns its umbrella into Status-of-Forces access and burden-sharing across multiple hosts, so it scores at the top as the author of the terms.

How the field was judged across the 12Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.

The indispensable hub of the provision network: SACEUR is always a US officer, and the US anchors NATO's integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes simultaneously. Strange treats the geometry of state-state relations as itself a structural variable, and the US occupies the center of that pattern, so its centrality scores at the top regardless of any summed allied force.

How the field was judged across the 12Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.

The author of passage at the chokepoints others cannot avoid. Standing naval command from Bahrain — the 5th Fleet — sets the terms of transit at Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb, the arteries through which the world's oil must thread, and the 7th Fleet projects across the Southeast Asian approaches without commanding the Malacca Strait itself. That combination of outright command over the Gulf chokepoints and persistent projection elsewhere leaves the US alone among the 12 able to offer or deny passage where there is no alternative route. This is Strange's security structure exactly: not the largest fleet, but the power to set the terms of passage where the geography binds.

How the field was judged across the 12Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.

The provider and hub of route security itself. The US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces from Bahrain — a US officer commands, five task forces police roughly 3.2 million square miles of the world's key shipping lanes. This is provision in Strange's strict sense: the US supplies the protection others depend on over the routes, the structural power to police the arteries rather than merely sail them.

How the field was judged across the 12Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.

A top-tier author of the maritime ground rules. The US holds an IMO Council Category A seat — the tier for states with the largest shipping interest — placing it in the highest rule-setting band where the terms transport must conform to are written. This is Strange's structure over relational sea power: a hand on the rules of passage, not just tonnage.

How the field was judged across the 12IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.

Lead author of the digital domain's dominant rulebook. The US was a founding drafter of the Council of Europe's Budapest Convention (CETS-185, 2001) — the first and still dominant cybercrime treaty, with roughly 81 parties — shaping its text from the outset and then acceding to it as a non-Council-of-Europe state under the Convention's open accession provision. This is structural power in Strange's exact sense: designing the international regime of rules others operate within (Strange 1994, p.25), not merely possessing cyber capability.

How the field was judged across the 12Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).

The primary provider of cyber-protection others depend on. The US anchors NATO's cyber-defence pledge, exports CISA-origin standards, and supports allied CERTs — supplying the digital-defence shelter under which partners operate. This is Strange's provision test for the security structure directly: the framework of power created by providing security for others (Strange 1994, p.45), the protective face of offer-or-deny protection (Strange 1994, p.90).

How the field was judged across the 12Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.

The US sits high but not dominant here: it controls indispensable upstream tooling and inputs that others cannot reproduce, giving it provision power over the method even where it holds no fab. Its score is capped because the most acute non-substitutable chokepoints — leading-edge foundry and lithography — sit with TW/KR/NL outside the set, so no actor in the 12 monopolizes the apex input.

How the field was judged across the 12China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.

The US overwhelmingly controls the indispensable production process: EDA design software (>85% share) plus wafer-fabrication-equipment leadership mean almost no advanced chip can be designed or built without passing through US-controlled tooling. This is the apex gatekeeping position of the metric — provision power over the process itself.

How the field was judged across the 12US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.

The US is the foremost wielder of production-input denial: through semiconductor export controls and entity lists it actively cuts targeted actors off from the tooling and chips they need, exercising the denial-of-access lever at scale. Its top score reflects denial power actually used, not merely held.

How the field was judged across the 12US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).

The US authors the dominant production methods others must build by: the EDA Big-3 (>85% share with ~95% lock-in) plus design-rule and WFE methods via Synopsys and Applied Materials, with US firms accounting for over half of global design/sales. This is rule-authorship of the method itself — the apex position on the lever.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.

US brand and platform lead firms dictate to dispersed suppliers what to produce, where to locate, and on what terms, exercising exactly Strange's lead-firm power to 'pick the location for new plant' and bargain down the chain. Backed by the deepest outward FDI footprint, this is governance exercised over others' production, not merely a roster of large firms, which is why it sits at the top.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.

The US can deny access to critical chain nodes it controls — design, tooling, and high-end equipment chokepoints that suppliers downstream cannot route around — which is the exercised denial power Strange describes when whoever can 'deny the access of others' to a sought capability wields special structural power. That makes it the dominant chokepoint holder.

How the field was judged across the 12Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).

The US authors the dominant private chain standards — Apple and Walmart supplier codes, UL certification, the platform and retail rules others must meet to supply at all — making it the writer of the rules the chain operates under rather than an adopter of them. This rule-authorship over down-chain compliance is the core of the lever and places the US first.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.

The US forces the burden of adjustment onto others in the chain — its demand-side leverage and lead-firm position let it pass cost and disruption downstream while keeping its own input dependence low for governance reasons, the textbook case of Strange's adjustment burden falling on others. It is the chief imposer of adjustment.

How the field was judged across the 12US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.

US lead firms hold the deepest outward footprint and the credible exit threat: they author the location decision, choosing to expand, contract, or relocate plant across borders while labour stays put. This is the exit-threat-over-labour lever in its purest form, and at 90 the US is its principal wielder.

How the field was judged across the 12Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.

At 85 the US is dominant: it pairs the world's largest firms with authorship of the investment-treaty network those firms invoke, so US capital extracts terms from host governments on rules the US itself helped write. This is the bargaining face of structural power — not just big firms, but firms negotiating inside an order their home state authored.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.

At 88 the US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode of production: the Apple, automotive, and pharmaceutical networks route a vast share of world trade through transactions between branches of the same US transnational. This is Strange's mode-of-production lever — the US firm decides how production is organized across frontiers, and the rest of the chain conforms.

How the field was judged across the 12US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.

At 92 the US holds the dominant share of world outward-control stock — its firms control more production sited in others' territory than any other state's. This is the grip-on-foreign-production lever at its peak: US capital governs plant abroad on a scale no rival approaches.

How the field was judged across the 12Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.

The US is the dominant author of multilateral trade terms and, crucially, the dominant blocker: by paralyzing the WTO Appellate Body from 2019 it unilaterally rewrote the dispute-settlement architecture, and it now drives the agenda toward plurilaterals on its own terms. Setting and denying the terms others must negotiate within is the core of agenda power, earning it the ceiling score.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.

The US authors the high-standard agreement template that others benchmark against: NAFTA/USMCA and the TPP text established the modern templates for IP, labour, ISDS, and digital-trade chapters that subsequent agreements copy. Being the model others adopt — not merely a party to many deals — is template authorship in its purest form, earning the top score.

How the field was judged across the 12US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.

The US holds the dominant market-access denial lever: a vast import market others need, weaponized through Section 301 and Section 232 actions and tariff threats to dictate terms to partners. The ability to shut others out of the market and extract concessions is the denial power Strange describes (1994, p.30) at full strength, earning the ceiling score.

How the field was judged across the 12Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.

The US authors the terms that decide who keeps the surplus: IP rents, platform economics, and design-margin capture are written into arrangements US firms and US law set, so assembly elsewhere yields thin margins while value accrues to the term-setter. This is provision of the surplus-allocation rules, not merely a large realized take.

How the field was judged across the 12US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.

The US can push the cost of adjustment onto others structure-wide: its IMF veto and the dollar system mean others must absorb the burden when imbalances resolve, while the US adjusts on its own terms or not at all. This is provision of the arrangements that decide who bears the cost, the defining structural power here.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.

The US shapes the relative prices that allocate gains between producers: its demand scale sets benchmark prices and USD invoicing frames the terms on which trade gains are split. This is authorship of the price regime, not a favorable terms-of-trade outcome the US happens to enjoy.

How the field was judged across the 12Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).

The US authors the world's risk-free rate: the US Treasury curve is the benchmark off which global credit is priced, and with the dollar carrying 45.7% of international debt issuance, no rival approaches its price-setting reach. When the world creates credit, it discounts against the UST curve — this is the operational core of setting the terms on which credit is priced, and the US holds it near-exclusively (95).

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.

The Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort. Its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system's dollar funding in 2008 and again in 2020 — the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies, where the structural power is the ability to rescue not only one's own banks but others'. No other state provides a crisis-grade global backstop (95).

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.

The US both leads authorship of the Basel/FSB prudential rulebook the world's banks adopt and home-supervises 8 of the 29 G-SIBs — the most of any state. It is the dominant author of the government-bank bargain Strange places at the centre of credit creation: it writes the prudential terms and supervises the most globally-systemic balance sheets, though not exclusively (90).

How the field was judged across the 12Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).

The dollar is the denomination rail the rest of the world must transact across: 50.5% of international payments and 80.7% of trade finance run in USD, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin. The US does not merely participate in this market — it authors the unit that other states are obliged to invoice and settle in, the asymmetry Strange identifies as structural rather than possessory. A 95 reflects rule-authorship over the world's trade-payment medium.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.

The dollar accounts for 45.7% of international debt issuance and is the pricing currency for oil and metals — the dual lock this component is built around. The US authors both rails at once: cross-border debt is written in its unit and the world's core commodities are quoted in it, so other states must hold and source dollars to borrow and to buy energy. A 95 reflects this constitutive grip over how global debt and pricing are denominated.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.

The US is the sole member above the ~15% threshold in both the IMF and the IBRD, making it the only state that can unilaterally block any major reform or change to either institution. This is structural authorship in Strange's exact sense — "without whose say-so no reform or change has ever been made since 1943" — it does not merely influence the agenda, it holds a veto over the framework itself.

How the field was judged across the 12US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.

The US sets the template for IMF conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention, making the institutions its instruments — Strange's "schoolmaster and government inspector" disciplining on the dominant state's behalf. Its preferences are the ones encoded in programme design; it directs the agent rather than being subject to it.

How the field was judged across the 12US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.

The US owns the layer the world settles dollars through: CHIPS clears roughly $1.8tn a day under The Clearing House's US governance, and Fedwire moves $1,148tn a year through the Fed itself. Anyone settling dollars routes through rails the US authors and supervises, leaving no alternative for the dominant settlement currency. This is the Lloyds logic of payments — to settle dollars you must go along with US-controlled clearing — and it is why the US holds the commanding share of this provision.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.

The US holds overwhelming power to deny a counterparty access to dollar settlement, and it exercises that denial with full extraterritorial reach — OFAC/SDN designations and SWIFT de-designation bind third-country banks far beyond US borders, because compliance is the price of continued dollar access. This is Strange's allow-or-deny logic at the settlement layer: the US can switch the rail off for others, the defining structural asset of this component.

How the field was judged across the 12Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.

The US scores low here by design — it does not run an alternative rail because it IS the mainstream rail every alternative is built to escape. Its near-floor score is not weakness but the inverse of its dominance elsewhere: there is nothing for the US to route around, so it provides none of the escape capacity this component measures.

How the field was judged across the 12Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.

The US alone can unilaterally deny access to the dollar-clearing and SWIFT chokepoint that no counterparty can route around — it authored the exclusion lever and exercised it against Iran in 2012 and Russia in 2022. This is provision of denial at near-total command: the issuer of the inescapable settlement currency decides who is cut off, and the cut-off cannot be appealed or bypassed.

How the field was judged across the 12Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.

The US is uniquely extraterritorial: through secondary sanctions and dollar-clearing leverage it forces third-country banks and firms — not just its own nationals — to conform to its designations or lose access to the system. This is the structural maximum of induced compliance: the Poland case Strange cites, where US reach made a third party's rescue impossible, is the type, and OFAC's modern secondary-sanctions enforcement is its full expression.

How the field was judged across the 12Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.

The US is the provider of the world's allocation function: its asset-management complex governs the majority of global investable capital, with North-American managers holding roughly 63% of top-500 AUM and the Big-Three (BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street) sitting at the commanding nodes. Where the world's allocation decisions get made is, structurally, a US question — this is provision, not mere possession.

How the field was judged across the 12US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.

US capital holds the residual claim on most of the world's strategic firms: the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders across global champions, and even the foundries others depend on resolve substantially to US owners. This is the D18 attribution made concrete — the physical chokepoints sit in Taiwan and the Netherlands, but the equity claim on the firms that run them sits largely in New York, which is why their structural power resolves to the US capital complex.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.

The US market is the destination the world's savings route into: it is the deepest equity market on earth and the default home for cross-border portfolio capital. The CPIS portfolio-equity picture understates this only because the US series is vintage-stale (2011); the structural fact is that whose market the world's savings flow toward is, overwhelmingly, the American one — this is the provision of the destination function.

How the field was judged across the 12US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.

Top-tier rule-pen. The US leads convenorship in ISO/IEC technical committees — steering working-level drafting where the actual text of standards others conform to is written — and holds a deep stock of secretariats. It is one of the three poles (with Germany and China) that author the technical rules the rest of the field adopts.

How the field was judged across the 12Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.

Overwhelmingly dominant — the structural author of the foundational protocol stack. US-based authors lead RFC authorship by a wide margin over the next country, and beyond raw count the US holds the historical and custodial position: the IETF's origin, the IANA functions and ICANN, and root governance all trace to US hands. It shapes the protocols everyone else must interoperate with.

How the field was judged across the 12US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.

The structural platform gatekeeper. The US owns and sets the access rules for the app stores, cloud infrastructure, and mobile operating systems the world must route through — it can admit or expel from these platforms — and layers export-control-linked access denial on top. This is gatekeeping in Strange's exact sense: controlling access to the system others must use.

How the field was judged across the 12Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.

The US is the origination frontier itself: the leading edge in AI, biotech, the internet's foundational protocols, and space is created here first and then adopted elsewhere. On this lever it is the source others draw from rather than a participant — it authors the breakthroughs that define what the frontier even is, which is why it scores near the ceiling.

How the field was judged across the 12US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.

The US runs the world's most effective defence-to-commercial spillover engine — the DARPA archetype that converts military R&D into commercial dominance, from the internet's origins onward. It does not merely spend on defence research; it operates the pipeline that turns that research into the technologies the commercial world then adopts, which is why it sits at the top.

How the field was judged across the 12US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.

The US controls the current frontier's chokepoints: the top frontier-model labs plus the chip-design and cloud layers it can deny others access to. This is the gatekeeping position in its purest form — it does not just lead on AI, it can determine on what terms everyone else reaches the frontier — which places it at the ceiling.

How the field was judged across the 12US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.

The US authors the binding denial lists the rest of the system reacts to — the entity list, the foreign-direct-product chip rules, the licensing thresholds that define what counts as a frontier export. Wassenaar functions as the multilateral frame for what Washington wants coordinated. It is the regime author, not a participant, which is why it scores at the ceiling: when the US writes a forbidden-export list, others rewrite their own controls to match it.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.

The US holds a near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement: the Foreign Direct Product Rule lets it reach any product made anywhere with US tools, software or IP, and its market-access leverage forces allies and third parties to comply with denial they did not author. This is the defining provision of the lever — Washington can make others enforce its lists — and it scores at the ceiling because no other actor can compel third-party compliance at this scale.

How the field was judged across the 12US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.

The US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints in the system — electronic-design-automation software, leading-edge GPU/accelerator design, and key semiconductor-manufacturing equipment — so when it withholds, there is no near-term replacement and the denial genuinely bites. This is what makes its denial structurally decisive rather than symbolic, and it scores at the ceiling on criticality.

How the field was judged across the 12US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.

The US is the principal architect of the global IP regime: it drove the TRIPS agreement into the WTO settlement and continues to author the rules others must adopt through ongoing instruments like the Special 301 watch-list and TRIPS-plus provisions written into its bilateral and regional trade agreements. It does not adopt others' IP rules; it writes the patentability and enforcement standards the rest of the system converges on, which is why it sits at the top of this provision lever.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.

The US holds a near-unique capacity to enforce IP extraterritorially and exclude rivals: Section 337 proceedings can bar infringing imports from the entire US market, and the size of that market turns an exclusion order into global leverage. No other actor can deny market access through IP enforcement at this reach, which is why it dominates this provision lever.

How the field was judged across the 12US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.

The US is the paradigm-author of this lever. Its economics departments, policy schools, and think-tank ecosystem originate the dominant frameworks others treat as the default starting point for legitimate economic and policy debate — the modern incarnation of Strange's Adam-Smith reframing, where a chosen idea becomes the unquestioned common sense. Others accept American-authored agendas as the terms of discussion rather than one option among many, which is conferred authority in its purest form.

How the field was judged across the 12Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.

The US is the clear provider of the system others must operate in: English as the working language of the global economy and the top tier of credential-conferring institutions that set the standard for what counts as elite training. Others come to its system to be certified; it does not go to theirs. That is the lingua-franca lever at full strength — making others operate in your language and credentials.

How the field was judged across the 12The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.

The US is the default global value-set exporter on this lever: liberal-democratic, market, and individual-rights norms that are carried through its channels and widely adopted as the baseline of legitimacy. The score reflects adoption of those norms, not media tonnage — others internalize American-authored value frames as the unmarked default, which is belief-transmission at its strongest.

How the field was judged across the 12Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.

The US owns the machinery that decides which findings count: Clarivate's Web of Science and the densest concentration of top journals and venues sit under US control. It does not merely produce knowledge — it operates the indexing and ranking infrastructure that every other country's researchers must route through to be counted, which is channel authorship at its purest.

How the field was judged across the 12US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.

The US is the dominant provider of the orbital channel everyone else depends on: GPS is the default positioning service the world is built around, and Starlink holds roughly 65% of LEO capacity. This is provision others cannot substitute — the US controls the physical data and PNT channels other states route through, the clearest form of channel power.

How the field was judged across the 12US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.

The US leads channel rule-authorship: it shapes internet governance, carries the heaviest weight in ITU spectrum and orbital-slot processes, and the GPS standard is the reference others build to. It writes the rules governing the channels — spectrum, orbital, data — rather than complying with rules set elsewhere.

How the field was judged across the 12US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.