{ "US": { "security": { "nuclear-order-setting": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "nonproliferation rule authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "1970-03-05", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "Primary architect and a depositary government of the NPT: the US both authored the regime that decides who may and may not hold weapons and remains one of the three governments with which instruments of accession are lodged. As an original nuclear-weapon state (tested before the 1967 cutoff) it sits inside the rule, not under it — the top hand on the order Strange describes as holders setting the rails for everyone else.", "fieldReason": "NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "safeguards inspection leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "Controls the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever from the top: as the regime leader with the largest combined civil and military nuclear base, the US sits permanently on the Board under the Art VI designation rule reserving seats for the most atomic-advanced states. It is the dominant hand on the inspection machinery others must submit to — Strange's technology-and-materials lever exercised.", "fieldReason": "Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "arms control agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-02-05", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "Sets the terms of the contested successor regime: with New START expired (5 Feb 2026), there is no live strategic-arms treaty, and the US is the party shaping what replaces it — conditioning any future deal on China's inclusion. Highest residual agenda power, but suppressed in absolute terms because no live regime exists to set the terms of.", "fieldReason": "New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "provision-of-protection": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "extended deterrence guarantees", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The principal protector in the system: the US anchors NATO's Article 5 (an armed attack on any one of 32 members is an attack on all, North Atlantic Treaty 1949), holds the 1960 bilateral umbrella over Japan, and is the nominal hemispheric guarantor under the Rio Treaty. In Strange's terms it is the state that provides security to others and thereby sets the range of choices available to the protected, earning the top score as the author of the guarantee, not merely a holder of force.", "fieldReason": "Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "terms of protection", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The net extractor of terms: the US converts the protection it provides into forward basing in Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK plus cost-sharing arrangements, which is precisely the price Strange says the protector exacts in return for security. It is the only state that turns its umbrella into Status-of-Forces access and burden-sharing across multiple hosts, so it scores at the top as the author of the terms.", "fieldReason": "Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "hub centrality", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The indispensable hub of the provision network: SACEUR is always a US officer, and the US anchors NATO's integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes simultaneously. Strange treats the geometry of state-state relations as itself a structural variable, and the US occupies the center of that pattern, so its centrality scores at the top regardless of any summed allied force.", "fieldReason": "Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "chokepoint-route-control": { "normalized": 77.967, "raw": 77.967, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "maritime chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 43.902, "value": null, "reason": "The author of passage at the chokepoints others cannot avoid. Standing naval command from Bahrain — the 5th Fleet — sets the terms of transit at Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb, the arteries through which the world's oil must thread, and the 7th Fleet projects across the Southeast Asian approaches without commanding the Malacca Strait itself. That combination of outright command over the Gulf chokepoints and persistent projection elsewhere leaves the US alone among the 12 able to offer or deny passage where there is no alternative route. This is Strange's security structure exactly: not the largest fleet, but the power to set the terms of passage where the geography binds.", "fieldReason": "Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "sea lane security provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The provider and hub of route security itself. The US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces from Bahrain — a US officer commands, five task forces police roughly 3.2 million square miles of the world's key shipping lanes. This is provision in Strange's strict sense: the US supplies the protection others depend on over the routes, the structural power to police the arteries rather than merely sail them.", "fieldReason": "Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "route regime rule setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "A top-tier author of the maritime ground rules. The US holds an IMO Council Category A seat — the tier for states with the largest shipping interest — placing it in the highest rule-setting band where the terms transport must conform to are written. This is Strange's structure over relational sea power: a hand on the rules of passage, not just tonnage.", "fieldReason": "IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "cyber-norms": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "cyber norm authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "Lead author of the digital domain's dominant rulebook. The US was a founding drafter of the Council of Europe's Budapest Convention (CETS-185, 2001) — the first and still dominant cybercrime treaty, with roughly 81 parties — shaping its text from the outset and then acceding to it as a non-Council-of-Europe state under the Convention's open accession provision. This is structural power in Strange's exact sense: designing the international regime of rules others operate within (Strange 1994, p.25), not merely possessing cyber capability.", "fieldReason": "Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "protective provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The primary provider of cyber-protection others depend on. The US anchors NATO's cyber-defence pledge, exports CISA-origin standards, and supports allied CERTs — supplying the digital-defence shelter under which partners operate. This is Strange's provision test for the security structure directly: the framework of power created by providing security for others (Strange 1994, p.45), the protective face of offer-or-deny protection (Strange 1994, p.90).", "fieldReason": "Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "production": { "indispensable-input-control": { "normalized": 89, "raw": 89, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Critical-input chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 71, "value": null, "reason": "The US sits high but not dominant here: it controls indispensable upstream tooling and inputs that others cannot reproduce, giving it provision power over the method even where it holds no fab. Its score is capped because the most acute non-substitutable chokepoints — leading-edge foundry and lithography — sit with TW/KR/NL outside the set, so no actor in the 12 monopolizes the apex input.", "fieldReason": "China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Process & tooling gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US overwhelmingly controls the indispensable production process: EDA design software (>85% share) plus wafer-fabrication-equipment leadership mean almost no advanced chip can be designed or built without passing through US-controlled tooling. This is the apex gatekeeping position of the metric — provision power over the process itself.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Denial / access-control leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US is the foremost wielder of production-input denial: through semiconductor export controls and entity lists it actively cuts targeted actors off from the tooling and chips they need, exercising the denial-of-access lever at scale. Its top score reflects denial power actually used, not merely held.", "fieldReason": "US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Method-standard setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US authors the dominant production methods others must build by: the EDA Big-3 (>85% share with ~95% lock-in) plus design-rule and WFE methods via Synopsys and Applied Materials, with US firms accounting for over half of global design/sales. This is rule-authorship of the method itself — the apex position on the lever.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "gvc-governance": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Lead-firm governance power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "US brand and platform lead firms dictate to dispersed suppliers what to produce, where to locate, and on what terms, exercising exactly Strange's lead-firm power to 'pick the location for new plant' and bargain down the chain. Backed by the deepest outward FDI footprint, this is governance exercised over others' production, not merely a roster of large firms, which is why it sits at the top.", "fieldReason": "US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Chokepoint control in the chain", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US can deny access to critical chain nodes it controls — design, tooling, and high-end equipment chokepoints that suppliers downstream cannot route around — which is the exercised denial power Strange describes when whoever can 'deny the access of others' to a sought capability wields special structural power. That makes it the dominant chokepoint holder.", "fieldReason": "Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Standards & governance authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US authors the dominant private chain standards — Apple and Walmart supplier codes, UL certification, the platform and retail rules others must meet to supply at all — making it the writer of the rules the chain operates under rather than an adopter of them. This rule-authorship over down-chain compliance is the core of the lever and places the US first.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US forces the burden of adjustment onto others in the chain — its demand-side leverage and lead-firm position let it pass cost and disruption downstream while keeping its own input dependence low for governance reasons, the textbook case of Strange's adjustment burden falling on others. It is the chief imposer of adjustment.", "fieldReason": "US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "transnational-firm-power": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Relocation leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "US lead firms hold the deepest outward footprint and the credible exit threat: they author the location decision, choosing to expand, contract, or relocate plant across borders while labour stays put. This is the exit-threat-over-labour lever in its purest form, and at 90 the US is its principal wielder.", "fieldReason": "Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Host-state bargaining dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "At 85 the US is dominant: it pairs the world's largest firms with authorship of the investment-treaty network those firms invoke, so US capital extracts terms from host governments on rules the US itself helped write. This is the bargaining face of structural power — not just big firms, but firms negotiating inside an order their home state authored.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Mode-of-production control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "At 88 the US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode of production: the Apple, automotive, and pharmaceutical networks route a vast share of world trade through transactions between branches of the same US transnational. This is Strange's mode-of-production lever — the US firm decides how production is organized across frontiers, and the rest of the chain conforms.", "fieldReason": "US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Outward control over foreign production", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "At 92 the US holds the dominant share of world outward-control stock — its firms control more production sited in others' territory than any other state's. This is the grip-on-foreign-production lever at its peak: US capital governs plant abroad on a scale no rival approaches.", "fieldReason": "Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "trade-rule-authorship": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Rule-writing agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US is the dominant author of multilateral trade terms and, crucially, the dominant blocker: by paralyzing the WTO Appellate Body from 2019 it unilaterally rewrote the dispute-settlement architecture, and it now drives the agenda toward plurilaterals on its own terms. Setting and denying the terms others must negotiate within is the core of agenda power, earning it the ceiling score.", "fieldReason": "US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "RTA template authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US authors the high-standard agreement template that others benchmark against: NAFTA/USMCA and the TPP text established the modern templates for IP, labour, ISDS, and digital-trade chapters that subsequent agreements copy. Being the model others adopt — not merely a party to many deals — is template authorship in its purest form, earning the top score.", "fieldReason": "US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Market-access denial capability", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US holds the dominant market-access denial lever: a vast import market others need, weaponized through Section 301 and Section 232 actions and tariff threats to dictate terms to partners. The ability to shut others out of the market and extract concessions is the denial power Strange describes (1994, p.30) at full strength, earning the ceiling score.", "fieldReason": "Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "value-capture-adjustment-burden": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Surplus-capture terms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US authors the terms that decide who keeps the surplus: IP rents, platform economics, and design-margin capture are written into arrangements US firms and US law set, so assembly elsewhere yields thin margins while value accrues to the term-setter. This is provision of the surplus-allocation rules, not merely a large realized take.", "fieldReason": "US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-burden imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US can push the cost of adjustment onto others structure-wide: its IMF veto and the dollar system mean others must absorb the burden when imbalances resolve, while the US adjusts on its own terms or not at all. This is provision of the arrangements that decide who bears the cost, the defining structural power here.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Terms-of-trade setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US shapes the relative prices that allocate gains between producers: its demand scale sets benchmark prices and USD invoicing frames the terms on which trade gains are split. This is authorship of the price regime, not a favorable terms-of-trade outcome the US happens to enjoy.", "fieldReason": "Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "finance": { "credit-markets": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "benchmark", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US authors the world's risk-free rate: the US Treasury curve is the benchmark off which global credit is priced, and with the dollar carrying 45.7% of international debt issuance, no rival approaches its price-setting reach. When the world creates credit, it discounts against the UST curve — this is the operational core of setting the terms on which credit is priced, and the US holds it near-exclusively (95).", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "lolr swap reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort. Its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system's dollar funding in 2008 and again in 2020 — the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies, where the structural power is the ability to rescue not only one's own banks but others'. No other state provides a crisis-grade global backstop (95).", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "gsib regulatory control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US both leads authorship of the Basel/FSB prudential rulebook the world's banks adopt and home-supervises 8 of the 29 G-SIBs — the most of any state. It is the dominant author of the government-bank bargain Strange places at the centre of credit creation: it writes the prudential terms and supervises the most globally-systemic balance sheets, though not exclusively (90).", "fieldReason": "Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "reserves": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Trade & payments denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The dollar is the denomination rail the rest of the world must transact across: 50.5% of international payments and 80.7% of trade finance run in USD, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin. The US does not merely participate in this market — it authors the unit that other states are obliged to invoice and settle in, the asymmetry Strange identifies as structural rather than possessory. A 95 reflects rule-authorship over the world's trade-payment medium.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Commodity & debt denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The dollar accounts for 45.7% of international debt issuance and is the pricing currency for oil and metals — the dual lock this component is built around. The US authors both rails at once: cross-border debt is written in its unit and the world's core commodities are quoted in it, so other states must hold and source dollars to borrow and to buy energy. A 95 reflects this constitutive grip over how global debt and pricing are denominated.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "institutional-influence": { "normalized": 69.491, "raw": 69.491, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Veto / blocking power", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 43.981, "value": null, "reason": "The US is the sole member above the ~15% threshold in both the IMF and the IBRD, making it the only state that can unilaterally block any major reform or change to either institution. This is structural authorship in Strange's exact sense — \"without whose say-so no reform or change has ever been made since 1943\" — it does not merely influence the agenda, it holds a veto over the framework itself.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Institution-as-agent (conditionality / programme leadership)", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US sets the template for IMF conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention, making the institutions its instruments — Strange's \"schoolmaster and government inspector\" disciplining on the dominant state's behalf. Its preferences are the ones encoded in programme design; it directs the agent rather than being subject to it.", "fieldReason": "US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "payment-systems": { "normalized": 67, "raw": 67, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "clearing rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US owns the layer the world settles dollars through: CHIPS clears roughly $1.8tn a day under The Clearing House's US governance, and Fedwire moves $1,148tn a year through the Fed itself. Anyone settling dollars routes through rails the US authors and supervises, leaving no alternative for the dominant settlement currency. This is the Lloyds logic of payments — to settle dollars you must go along with US-controlled clearing — and it is why the US holds the commanding share of this provision.", "fieldReason": "US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "exclusion designations early2026", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US holds overwhelming power to deny a counterparty access to dollar settlement, and it exercises that denial with full extraterritorial reach — OFAC/SDN designations and SWIFT de-designation bind third-country banks far beyond US borders, because compliance is the price of continued dollar access. This is Strange's allow-or-deny logic at the settlement layer: the US can switch the rail off for others, the defining structural asset of this component.", "fieldReason": "Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "alternative rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "The US scores low here by design — it does not run an alternative rail because it IS the mainstream rail every alternative is built to escape. Its near-floor score is not weakness but the inverse of its dominance elsewhere: there is nothing for the US to route around, so it provides none of the escape capacity this component measures.", "fieldReason": "Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "sanctions": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "independent exclusion", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US alone can unilaterally deny access to the dollar-clearing and SWIFT chokepoint that no counterparty can route around — it authored the exclusion lever and exercised it against Iran in 2012 and Russia in 2022. This is provision of denial at near-total command: the issuer of the inescapable settlement currency decides who is cut off, and the cut-off cannot be appealed or bypassed.", "fieldReason": "Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "extraterritorial compliance reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US is uniquely extraterritorial: through secondary sanctions and dollar-clearing leverage it forces third-country banks and firms — not just its own nationals — to conform to its designations or lose access to the system. This is the structural maximum of induced compliance: the Poland case Strange cites, where US reach made a third party's rescue impossible, is the type, and OFAC's modern secondary-sanctions enforcement is its full expression.", "fieldReason": "Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "capital-allocation-ownership": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Asset-management concentration", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US is the provider of the world's allocation function: its asset-management complex governs the majority of global investable capital, with North-American managers holding roughly 63% of top-500 AUM and the Big-Three (BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street) sitting at the commanding nodes. Where the world's allocation decisions get made is, structurally, a US question — this is provision, not mere possession.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Ownership of strategic firms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "US capital holds the residual claim on most of the world's strategic firms: the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders across global champions, and even the foundries others depend on resolve substantially to US owners. This is the D18 attribution made concrete — the physical chokepoints sit in Taiwan and the Netherlands, but the equity claim on the firms that run them sits largely in New York, which is why their structural power resolves to the US capital complex.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Cross-border equity-allocation reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2023-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US market is the destination the world's savings route into: it is the deepest equity market on earth and the default home for cross-border portfolio capital. The CPIS portfolio-equity picture understates this only because the US series is vintage-stale (2011); the structural fact is that whose market the world's savings flow toward is, overwhelmingly, the American one — this is the provision of the destination function.", "fieldReason": "US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "knowledge": { "standards-platform-control": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Standards-body authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "Top-tier rule-pen. The US leads convenorship in ISO/IEC technical committees — steering working-level drafting where the actual text of standards others conform to is written — and holds a deep stock of secretariats. It is one of the three poles (with Germany and China) that author the technical rules the rest of the field adopts.", "fieldReason": "Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Open-protocol foundation control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "Overwhelmingly dominant — the structural author of the foundational protocol stack. US-based authors lead RFC authorship by a wide margin over the next country, and beyond raw count the US holds the historical and custodial position: the IETF's origin, the IANA functions and ICANN, and root governance all trace to US hands. It shapes the protocols everyone else must interoperate with.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Platform gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The structural platform gatekeeper. The US owns and sets the access rules for the app stores, cloud infrastructure, and mobile operating systems the world must route through — it can admit or expel from these platforms — and layers export-control-linked access denial on top. This is gatekeeping in Strange's exact sense: controlling access to the system others must use.", "fieldReason": "Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technological-primacy": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Frontier-innovation origination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US is the origination frontier itself: the leading edge in AI, biotech, the internet's foundational protocols, and space is created here first and then adopted elsewhere. On this lever it is the source others draw from rather than a participant — it authors the breakthroughs that define what the frontier even is, which is why it scores near the ceiling.", "fieldReason": "US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Military-to-commercial spillover", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US runs the world's most effective defence-to-commercial spillover engine — the DARPA archetype that converts military R&D into commercial dominance, from the internet's origins onward. It does not merely spend on defence research; it operates the pipeline that turns that research into the technologies the commercial world then adopts, which is why it sits at the top.", "fieldReason": "US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Compute & frontier-model control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US controls the current frontier's chokepoints: the top frontier-model labs plus the chip-design and cloud layers it can deny others access to. This is the gatekeeping position in its purest form — it does not just lead on AI, it can determine on what terms everyone else reaches the frontier — which places it at the ceiling.", "fieldReason": "US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technology-denial-regimes": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Export-control regime leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US authors the binding denial lists the rest of the system reacts to — the entity list, the foreign-direct-product chip rules, the licensing thresholds that define what counts as a frontier export. Wassenaar functions as the multilateral frame for what Washington wants coordinated. It is the regime author, not a participant, which is why it scores at the ceiling: when the US writes a forbidden-export list, others rewrite their own controls to match it.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement / extraterritorial reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US holds a near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement: the Foreign Direct Product Rule lets it reach any product made anywhere with US tools, software or IP, and its market-access leverage forces allies and third parties to comply with denial they did not author. This is the defining provision of the lever — Washington can make others enforce its lists — and it scores at the ceiling because no other actor can compel third-party compliance at this scale.", "fieldReason": "US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Criticality of what can be denied", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints in the system — electronic-design-automation software, leading-edge GPU/accelerator design, and key semiconductor-manufacturing equipment — so when it withholds, there is no near-term replacement and the denial genuinely bites. This is what makes its denial structurally decisive rather than symbolic, and it scores at the ceiling on criticality.", "fieldReason": "US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "ip-regime-authorship": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "IP rule-setting / regime authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US is the principal architect of the global IP regime: it drove the TRIPS agreement into the WTO settlement and continues to author the rules others must adopt through ongoing instruments like the Special 301 watch-list and TRIPS-plus provisions written into its bilateral and regional trade agreements. It does not adopt others' IP rules; it writes the patentability and enforcement standards the rest of the system converges on, which is why it sits at the top of this provision lever.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement & exclusion reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US holds a near-unique capacity to enforce IP extraterritorially and exclude rivals: Section 337 proceedings can bar infringing imports from the entire US market, and the size of that market turns an exclusion order into global leverage. No other actor can deny market access through IP enforcement at this reach, which is why it dominates this provision lever.", "fieldReason": "US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "belief-ideological-authority": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Ideological / intellectual leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US is the paradigm-author of this lever. Its economics departments, policy schools, and think-tank ecosystem originate the dominant frameworks others treat as the default starting point for legitimate economic and policy debate — the modern incarnation of Strange's Adam-Smith reframing, where a chosen idea becomes the unquestioned common sense. Others accept American-authored agendas as the terms of discussion rather than one option among many, which is conferred authority in its purest form.", "fieldReason": "Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Lingua-franca & credential dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US is the clear provider of the system others must operate in: English as the working language of the global economy and the top tier of credential-conferring institutions that set the standard for what counts as elite training. Others come to its system to be certified; it does not go to theirs. That is the lingua-franca lever at full strength — making others operate in your language and credentials.", "fieldReason": "The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Belief-transmission channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US is the default global value-set exporter on this lever: liberal-democratic, market, and individual-rights norms that are carried through its channels and widely adopted as the baseline of legitimacy. The score reflects adoption of those norms, not media tonnage — others internalize American-authored value frames as the unmarked default, which is belief-transmission at its strongest.", "fieldReason": "Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "channel-control": { "normalized": 95, "raw": 95, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Knowledge-agenda channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US owns the machinery that decides which findings count: Clarivate's Web of Science and the densest concentration of top journals and venues sit under US control. It does not merely produce knowledge — it operates the indexing and ranking infrastructure that every other country's researchers must route through to be counted, which is channel authorship at its purest.", "fieldReason": "US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Orbital & data-channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US is the dominant provider of the orbital channel everyone else depends on: GPS is the default positioning service the world is built around, and Starlink holds roughly 65% of LEO capacity. This is provision others cannot substitute — the US controls the physical data and PNT channels other states route through, the clearest form of channel power.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Channel rule-setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "The US leads channel rule-authorship: it shapes internet governance, carries the heaviest weight in ITU spectrum and orbital-slot processes, and the GPS standard is the reference others build to. It writes the rules governing the channels — spectrum, orbital, data — rather than complying with rules set elsewhere.", "fieldReason": "US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } } }, "China": { "security": { "nuclear-order-setting": { "normalized": 74.333, "raw": 74.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "nonproliferation rule authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "1970-03-05", "score": 70, "value": null, "reason": "An NPT nuclear-weapon state with standing to hold weapons under the regime, making it a rule-author rather than a rule-taker — but like France it acceded only in 1992, well after the order was built by others. It shapes the regime from inside the NWS club yet did not author its founding terms.", "fieldReason": "NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "safeguards inspection leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 74, "value": null, "reason": "Sits among the structurally-advantaged with guaranteed Board influence under the Art VI rule for the most atomic-advanced states, a hand on the IAEA inspection lever rather than a subject of it. A major and expanding civil-nuclear power, it co-controls the safeguards machinery alongside Russia.", "fieldReason": "Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "arms control agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-02-05", "score": 79, "value": null, "reason": "Holds blocking power over the successor regime by refusing to join a strategic-arms treaty: with New START expired, China's refusal denies the US the China-inclusive deal it demands, shaping the order through obstruction. Real agenda power, exercised as a veto rather than as authorship.", "fieldReason": "New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "provision-of-protection": { "normalized": 10, "raw": 10, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "extended deterrence guarantees", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Extends no formal extended-deterrence guarantee: China shelters no state under a treaty umbrella within this frame, so on the protection question it is a non-provider. Its weight lies elsewhere; on who-protects-whom it scores at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "terms of protection", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Extracts no terms within this frame: China converts no protection relationship into basing or cost-sharing over the states scored here, so on the price-of-protection lever it sets nothing. It scores at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "hub centrality", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 20, "value": null, "reason": "Outside the Western provision network entirely. China is scored as a rival-network hub only in the narrow sense that its centrality belongs to a different pattern than the US-anchored system measured here — not because it operates a provision network of its own. It extends no formal extended-deterrence guarantees and anchors no named alliance bloc, so it is not the author or center of any protection network. That absence is exactly why it sits below Russia (20 vs 25): Russia at least formalizes a treaty bloc (CSTO) it leads, whereas China provides no comparable standing guarantee. China registers here as a hub of a rival pattern, but as a rule-taker on protection provision rather than a provider.", "fieldReason": "Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "chokepoint-route-control": { "normalized": 48.024, "raw": 48.024, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "maritime chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 17.073, "value": null, "reason": "The sole contender, but still a rule-taker at the straits. Beijing is building blue-water reach precisely because the Malacca dilemma leaves its energy imports hostage to a chokepoint it does not command — the PLAN contests the SE Asia approaches but commands no strait. It is moving to escape another's denial, not yet able to offer or withhold passage itself.", "fieldReason": "Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "sea lane security provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "A provider, but pointedly outside the US-led structure. Beijing runs its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force rather than joining the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces — provision of route security on its own terms, signalling refusal to be a contributor inside an American-commanded coalition. Real provision, but parallel and self-standing, not woven into the dominant regime.", "fieldReason": "Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "route regime rule setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "A top-tier rule-setter. China sits in IMO Council Category A among the states with the largest shipping interest, giving it a seat at the top tier where the world's maritime ground rules are authored — the structural register of route control, distinct from its still-junior position at the straits themselves.", "fieldReason": "IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "cyber-norms": { "normalized": 50, "raw": 50, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "cyber norm authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 63, "value": null, "reason": "Co-driver of the rival UN Cybercrime Convention and a Budapest non-party. Where Russia supplied the diplomatic engine that opened the competing authorship venue (UNGA res 79/243, opened for signature in Hanoi, Oct 2025), China supplied the coalition weight and substantive drafting positions that gave the alternative regime its shape and its developing-world backing — it is contesting the Western rulebook by helping write a second one, not sheltering under either. That is structural rule-setting at a competing table: authoring a regime rather than adopting one. It ranks just below Russia because it amplified and co-steered a venue Russia initiated rather than originating the alternative itself.", "fieldReason": "Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "protective provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "Provider of an alternative protective model to its own sphere. China exports a surveillance-and-security stack — the protective architecture authoritarian partners adopt — offering an alternative to the Western cyber-defence framework. It shelters others on its own terms within its sphere, the rival face of provision rather than a non-provider.", "fieldReason": "Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "production": { "indispensable-input-control": { "normalized": 49.25, "raw": 49.25, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Critical-input chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "China holds the single most exercised non-substitutable chokepoint inside the set: rare-earth refining, where its control of the processing step (not the ore) gives it provision power over inputs everyone else's production depends on. It scores highest of the 12, though still bounded because the leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints lie outside the set.", "fieldReason": "China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Process & tooling gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "Despite SMIC's volume, China sits near zero at leading-edge process: it neither supplies the EDA tools nor the advanced WFE that the frontier method requires, and must obtain both from gatekeepers abroad. The low score marks a fab-capacity holder that controls none of the indispensable process — capability without method-control.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Denial / access-control leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 78, "value": null, "reason": "China is the other actor exercising production-input denial at scale, using rare-earth and processed-input export controls to cut off or threaten downstream producers. Its high score reflects a denial capability genuinely wielded — the refining chokehold converted into exclusion power.", "fieldReason": "US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Method-standard setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 14, "value": null, "reason": "China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited adoption at the frontier; outside its own market it produces by methods others set. The low score marks a method-taker that writes standards the world does not adopt — authorship without reach.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "gvc-governance": { "normalized": 58.75, "raw": 58.75, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Lead-firm governance power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 58, "value": null, "reason": "China holds rising lead-firm power — its firms increasingly govern their supplier networks — but the dictation is more state-directed than firm-autonomous, so China sets terms within its orbit without yet authoring the dispersed cross-border supplier governance Western lead firms exercise. A real governor, but a partial one.", "fieldReason": "US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Chokepoint control in the chain", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 71, "value": null, "reason": "China holds genuine chokepoints in refining and rare-earth processing nodes through which much of the chain must pass, giving it real denial power over downstream access — second only to the US, though concentrated in the input-processing end rather than the design end.", "fieldReason": "Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Standards & governance authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 39, "value": null, "reason": "China authors standards within its own orbit — BYD/CATL sourcing rules, GB national standards, and growing BRI-linked reach — but down-chain players outside its bloc still largely meet others' codes, so it is a domestic-plus author rather than a global one.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 67, "value": null, "reason": "China imposes adjustment through its commanding processing position — suppliers and downstream assemblers must reorganize around its midstream scale, absorbing volatility China passes on — which lets it tie Japan and edge above Germany. It remains more exposed than the US to demand set elsewhere, but its chokehold on chain-midstream capacity makes it a strong imposer rather than an absorber.", "fieldReason": "US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "transnational-firm-power": { "normalized": 53, "raw": 53, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Relocation leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 53, "value": null, "reason": "China holds a large and growing outward stock, but at 50 its relocation power is bounded: much of it is recent and state-directed rather than firm-led exit-threat. Its champions move plant where the state steers them, so the leverage over labour is real but mediated, not the autonomous corporate exit-threat US or Japanese firms command.", "fieldReason": "Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Host-state bargaining dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "China's host-state bargaining is real but state-mediated, placing it at 45. Its firms extract terms abroad largely through state-to-state deals and financing packages rather than autonomous corporate leverage, so the bargaining power flows through the state channel rather than the treaty-network firm channel the US commands.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Mode-of-production control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 52, "value": null, "reason": "China organizes a substantial but subordinate share of the cross-border mode, scoring 48. Many of its firms still execute production organized by foreign lead firms rather than authoring their own intra-firm networks at scale, so it shapes the mode partially rather than dictating how it is structured across borders.", "fieldReason": "US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Outward control over foreign production", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 57, "value": null, "reason": "China is the rising challenger at 55: its outward control stock has grown fast and is now substantial, giving its firms real grip on production sited abroad. But it remains well below the advanced-economy leaders, and much of that control is recent and state-steered rather than the deep firm-held stock of the US.", "fieldReason": "Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "trade-rule-authorship": { "normalized": 63.667, "raw": 63.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Rule-writing agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 63, "value": null, "reason": "China is a rising rule-shaper rather than a rule-taker: it leverages its accession commitments and plurilateral participation to bend multilateral terms toward its interests, exercising real if not yet dominant agenda power. It writes into the system from a position of growing weight without yet authoring the core terms, placing it second behind the US.", "fieldReason": "US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "RTA template authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 49, "value": null, "reason": "China is building a rising template through RCEP and the Belt and Road framework, offering an alternative model that some partners adopt. It is a challenger template-author gaining traction rather than the benchmark others default to, placing it mid-pack.", "fieldReason": "US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Market-access denial capability", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 79, "value": null, "reason": "China commands a large import market and uses access to it as explicit leverage, conditioning or threatening entry to extract concessions from partners. That exercised denial capability over a market others need places it just behind the US near the top.", "fieldReason": "Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "value-capture-adjustment-burden": { "normalized": 61.333, "raw": 61.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Surplus-capture terms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 53, "value": null, "reason": "China captures enormous volume but largely accepts the surplus-capture terms set at the frontier rather than authoring them — a margin-taker on IP, design, and platform rents written elsewhere. Its mid-score reflects rising but still partial ability to set who-keeps-the-value, not the assembly volume it commands.", "fieldReason": "US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-burden imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 58, "value": null, "reason": "China is rising in adjustment-imposition through bilateral creditor leverage — lending terms that can force debtor adjustment — but lacks the structure-wide system the US wields. Its mid-score marks emerging, channel-specific ability to shift cost, not authorship of the global adjustment regime.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Terms-of-trade setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 73, "value": null, "reason": "China's demand scale lets it shape benchmark prices across commodities and intermediates, giving it real influence over the relative prices that allocate gains — second only to the US. It is a price-regime shaper through buying power even where it does not invoice or author standards.", "fieldReason": "Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "finance": { "credit-markets": { "normalized": 21.667, "raw": 21.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "benchmark", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "China sets the price of its own paper but almost none of anyone else's. Its domestic yield curve anchors onshore renminbi credit, yet with a sub-1% share of international debt issuance the world does not price external credit off Chinese sovereign yields. China is a price-setter at home, not a benchmark-author for global credit (10).", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "lolr swap reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 18, "value": null, "reason": "The PBoC runs an extensive bilateral renminbi swap network, giving China real outward liquidity provision — more than any non-reserve-currency peer (18). But renminbi lines are not a crisis-grade backstop for the dollar-based system, and China sits outside the Fed's standing swap network rather than providing the system's backstop.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "gsib regulatory control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "China home-supervises 4 G-SIBs and holds a Basel/FSB seat, but on the global prudential bargain it adopts the Basel framework rather than shaping it — a rule-taker more than a rule-author (35). It is bound to a rulebook others wrote and complies with it; its standing comes from participation in the regime's governance bodies, not from authorship of the terms the world's banks obey.", "fieldReason": "Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "reserves": { "normalized": 13, "raw": 13, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Trade & payments denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 18, "value": null, "reason": "The renminbi carries 3.1% of international payments and reaches #2 in trade finance at 8.0%, a real but still-minor settlement role largely confined to China's own bilateral trade rather than a unit third parties must use. China is building an alternative rail, not yet authoring one others cannot avoid; its 18 marks an emerging provider whose currency the world is not obliged to denominate in.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Commodity & debt denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "Despite its trade weight, the renminbi carries a sub-1% share of cross-border debt issuance and prices no major commodity, leaving China a taker on both rails of this component. Its 8 reflects an actor that borrows and buys in others' currencies while it works, slowly, to denominate even its own commodity purchases — provision it does not yet supply.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "institutional-influence": { "normalized": 15.667, "raw": 15.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Veto / blocking power", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 8.333, "value": null, "reason": "Despite a quota near 6%, China remains sub-threshold and therefore cannot veto a single major decision of the IMF or World Bank. Its weight buys relational bargaining power inside someone else's framework; it is a participant in reform debates, not a state that can block them.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Institution-as-agent (conditionality / programme leadership)", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 23, "value": null, "reason": "China holds a large quota but is fundamentally a programme TAKER, not a designer of the conditionality others impose — and rather than author from within, it has built rival institutions like the AIIB outside this framework. Its low score reflects a rejecter/outsider posture: high capability, no authorship of the IMF/World Bank's conditionality, and a deliberate exit to construct alternatives.", "fieldReason": "US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "payment-systems": { "normalized": 41.667, "raw": 41.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "clearing rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "China governs its own dollar-independent clearing layer through CIPS, a state-built RMB-clearing rail of genuine cross-border reach — but one still mid-tier in the settlement universe it is trying to escape. It owns and sets terms for that rail, yet the world's settlement overwhelmingly passes through dollar rails China does not control, so it provides a secondary rather than primary clearing layer.", "fieldReason": "US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "exclusion designations early2026", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "China can deny access to its own CIPS rail but holds no power to exclude others from the dollar and euro clearing the world actually settles through, so its exclusion reach is near-nil at the layer that matters. Its very low score reflects an actor on the receiving end of US exclusion power, building an escape rail rather than wielding the denial itself.", "fieldReason": "Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "alternative rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "China runs the only real state-backed alternative to US-controlled settlement — CIPS, reaching roughly 5,100 banks across 126 countries via 194 direct and 1,597 indirect participants by March 2026. It is the single actor providing genuine capacity to route around the dollar rail, which is why it leads this provision-of-escape component despite being a taker on the mainstream rails.", "fieldReason": "Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "sanctions": { "normalized": 6, "raw": 6, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "independent exclusion", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "China cannot unilaterally exclude others from the system everyone must use; it is building CIPS as an alternative precisely because it is shaped by, not author of, the dollar chokepoint. Its low score reflects an outsider seeking to route around an exclusion lever it does not control rather than a state that can wield one.", "fieldReason": "Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "extraterritorial compliance reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "China has effectively no capacity to make third parties conform to its sanctions; its measures bind actors within its own jurisdiction but cannot compel a foreign bank in a third country to comply. Its near-floor score marks it as an actor with no extraterritorial compliance lever of its own, structurally on the receiving end of others' reach rather than an author of induced conformity.", "fieldReason": "Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "capital-allocation-ownership": { "normalized": 29.333, "raw": 29.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Asset-management concentration", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "China runs a large asset-management industry, but its AUM is domestically bound — it allocates Chinese savings into Chinese firms rather than authoring placement decisions across the integrated global capital market. It is a self-contained allocator, not a provider of the world's allocation service, so it scores modestly despite scale.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Ownership of strategic firms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 31, "value": null, "reason": "China owns its own champions through state holdings and domestic funds — a self-contained ownership bloc that owns inward rather than holding the residual claim on the world's critical firms. It controls who owns China's strategic firms but does not own the global set, so it scores modestly: ownership power that is bounded, not provided.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Cross-border equity-allocation reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2023-12-31", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "Despite a large domestic market, China is only a moderate destination for the world's cross-border equity savings. Capital controls and a partly-closed market mean global savings do not route into China the way they route into the US, and its own outbound reach is contained — China opts out of the open allocative system rather than serving as a hub within it.", "fieldReason": "US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "knowledge": { "standards-platform-control": { "normalized": 67, "raw": 67, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Standards-body authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 91, "value": null, "reason": "The standout structural fact in this lever. SAC has risen to second on both secretariat-holding and convenorship, moving China from a participant that adopted others' standards to a pen-holder that co-authors them. It now sits in the top tier beside the US and Germany, a position no other rising power approaches.", "fieldReason": "Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Open-protocol foundation control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "Rising second-tier. China's RFC authorship has grown markedly and it increasingly proposes protocol-level changes, moving it up the shaping ranks — but it remains a contributor to, not a custodian of, the foundational stack the US anchors. Influence on volume of authorship, not on the root.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Platform gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 60, "value": null, "reason": "Second, as a sovereign-walled parallel sphere. China gatekeeps its own market through super-apps, HarmonyOS, and domestic cloud — a complete alternative platform stack it controls access to — but this gatekeeps the China market rather than globally gatekeeping others. Owner of a walled platform sphere, not yet a setter of rules the world must route through.", "fieldReason": "Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technological-primacy": { "normalized": 82, "raw": 82, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Frontier-innovation origination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 78, "value": null, "reason": "China is the clear and fast-rising number two, having moved frontier-model origination to near-parity with the US rather than merely copying it. It now originates leading-edge work in several domains rather than only building on others' breakthroughs, making it the only state that genuinely contests the US as a source — though still a step behind on breadth of frontier creation.", "fieldReason": "US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Military-to-commercial spillover", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 83, "value": null, "reason": "China scores high on both the scale of its R&D spend and a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline built explicitly to channel defence innovation into commercial dominance. It is the only state with both the resources and the institutional machinery to rival the US spillover engine — though its conversion efficiency still trails, keeping it second despite its spend lead.", "fieldReason": "US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Compute & frontier-model control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 85, "value": null, "reason": "China is the only state that authors frontier models at near-US scale, having closed the quality gap on major benchmarks from double digits in 2023 to near-parity, so its near-ceiling score is earned on the author side: it produces leading-edge models others adopt, not merely access. The one qualifier on its primacy is compute — US export controls limit its access to the most advanced chips — but that constraint sits atop a genuine frontier-origination position, which is why it ranks second only to the US rather than among the takers.", "fieldReason": "US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technology-denial-regimes": { "normalized": 21.333, "raw": 21.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Export-control regime leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 15, "value": null, "reason": "China sits low here because this lever scores authorship of the WESTERN denial regime, and China is a non-member of Wassenaar and the principal target of the entity/chip lists rather than their author. It is not a rule-taker that complies, though — it is the outsider that has built its OWN counter-denial regime through rare-earth and gallium export controls. That genuine denial capacity is real but lives in indispensable-input-control on the Production side, not in authorship of the technology-export regime measured here, so the score stays modest.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement / extraterritorial reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 19, "value": null, "reason": "China has built counter-enforcement machinery — its own export-control law and an unreliable-entity list — so it is not a pure rule-taker that simply complies; it is an outsider pushing back. But that apparatus has limited extraterritorial bite: it cannot make third parties enforce its denial the way the FDPR does, so its enforcement reach is modest. The score reflects real but contained counter-enforcement, not author-grade extraterritorial power.", "fieldReason": "US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Criticality of what can be denied", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "China scores modest here despite being the principal target, because the question is what IT can withhold non-substitutably. Its advanced-technology denial capacity is limited, but it now wields genuine bite through rare-earth, gallium and germanium export controls — non-substitutable inputs where it is the dominant processor. That is a real counter-denial, so it sits above most others; but that criticality belongs structurally to indispensable-input-control on the Production side, which caps its score on this technology-denial lever.", "fieldReason": "US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "ip-regime-authorship": { "normalized": 42.5, "raw": 42.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "IP rule-setting / regime authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 40, "value": null, "reason": "China outranks the access-to-medicines contesters here because it has moved past defensive resistance into active norm-shaping from inside the regime: it builds out its own patentability and enforcement apparatus at scale and pushes to set terms others must reckon with, rather than merely lobbying for carve-outs to rules written elsewhere. It did not author the TRIPS architecture it joined on WTO accession, so it is not yet a regime-setter on par with the US or the EU bloc, but its capacity to bend what is globally patentable and enforceable toward its own model is what lifts it above India, Canada, and the purely defensive bloc.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement & exclusion reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "China scores notably here because its enforcement reach has grown beyond its borders: its courts have issued anti-suit injunctions and moved to set global FRAND licensing rates, a genuine counter-reach that lets it project IP-enforcement power outward rather than merely policing its own market. That rising extraterritorial capacity places it alongside the strong European enforcers.", "fieldReason": "US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "belief-ideological-authority": { "normalized": 47.667, "raw": 47.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Ideological / intellectual leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 55, "value": null, "reason": "China scores high for a counter-paradigm because it is the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale — state-led development and 'Chinese modernization' as a rival account of how a society should organize growth and authority. It authors ideas, not merely receives them. The discount from the top tier reflects that this paradigm is adopted more by dependency and circumstance than by voluntary intellectual conviction, so its authority is real but narrower than the US default.", "fieldReason": "Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Lingua-franca & credential dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "China scores modestly despite rising universities because it remains a net credential importer on this lever. Mandarin is not a lingua franca others must adopt to participate globally, and the country sends large student flows outward to be certified in foreign systems. It is increasingly building capacity, but others do not yet have to operate in its language or credentials, so its provision is limited.", "fieldReason": "The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Belief-transmission channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 53, "value": null, "reason": "China is the genuine alternative-norm pole. It transmits development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms that are actually adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South, offering a value-set that competes with the liberal default. That is real belief-transmission rather than mere reach, which places it solidly in the middle as the leading counter-norm provider.", "fieldReason": "Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "channel-control": { "normalized": 57, "raw": 57, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Knowledge-agenda channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "China is the clearest rejecter-builder here: it is constructing rival indexing infrastructure (CNKI, its own journal hierarchy) to escape Western channel-dependency, but its own researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing for legitimacy. That dual posture — building a parallel channel while remaining dependent on the incumbent one — earns it a rising but mid-low score, above pure content-producers but far below the channel-owners.", "fieldReason": "US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Orbital & data-channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 70, "value": null, "reason": "China is the clear #2 orbital channel-provider: BeiDou delivers full global PNT coverage and its rising constellations give it an independent data channel that does not depend on US infrastructure. It is one of the few states that provides rather than merely consumes the orbital channel, though it sits below the US default.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Channel rule-setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 69, "value": null, "reason": "China is the principal rising challenger in channel rule-setting: growing ITU influence, a sovereign data-governance model it exports, and the BeiDou standard give it real authorship over how channels are governed. It is moving from rule-taker toward co-author, contesting the spectrum, orbital, and data rules rather than simply accepting them.", "fieldReason": "US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } } }, "Japan": { "security": { "nuclear-order-setting": { "normalized": 31.333, "raw": 31.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "nonproliferation rule authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "1970-03-05", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "A non-nuclear-weapon party and rule-taker: Japan accepted the NPT's bargain that it may not hold weapons and lives under the regime's constraints despite a large civil-nuclear base. It is shaped by the who-may-hold rule rather than authoring it.", "fieldReason": "NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "safeguards inspection leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 53, "value": null, "reason": "A non-weapons state but structurally advantaged on safeguards: Japan's large, advanced civil-nuclear base qualifies it under the Art VI designation of the most atomic-advanced, conferring permanent-class Board influence over the IAEA inspection lever rather than mere subjection to it.", "fieldReason": "Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "arms control agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-02-05", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "An NPT party but a non-participant in the bilateral strategic-arms regime: as a non-nuclear-weapon state Japan lobbies for disarmament yet sits outside the US-Russia treaty track and cannot set or block its terms. Minimal hand on the order of restraint, now in a void after New START's lapse.", "fieldReason": "New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "provision-of-protection": { "normalized": 6.667, "raw": 6.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "extended deterrence guarantees", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "A recipient, not a provider: Japan is protected by the 1960 US bilateral security treaty and offers no extended-deterrence guarantee to anyone. It is the archetypal consumer of the American umbrella in the Pacific, so it scores at the protected floor.", "fieldReason": "Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "terms of protection", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "A terms-taker, and the only one of these hosts sheltered under a bilateral pact rather than NATO: protection flows from the 1960 US-Japan security treaty, not Article 5, which makes Japan a single-patron spoke with no co-guarantor role and no leverage over the alliance's terms. The price it pays is concentrated in the Okinawa basing footprint the CRS basing source names for Japan, plus host-nation cost-sharing — terms set by the protector, accepted by Japan. It extracts nothing from others and authors none of the arrangement, sitting squarely on the paying side, so it scores at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "hub centrality", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "A spoke, not a hub: Japan is a critical Pacific bilateral partner but sits at the end of a US-anchored spoke rather than anchoring the network itself. As a served node, it scores at the spoke level.", "fieldReason": "Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "chokepoint-route-control": { "normalized": 37.813, "raw": 37.813, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "maritime chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 2.439, "value": null, "reason": "No chokepoint command. Japan is the most exposed of the large economies — its energy lifeline runs through Hormuz and Malacca — yet it neither commands nor polices those straits, depending wholly on the US-provided regime for passage. A rule-taker reliant on another's protection.", "fieldReason": "Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "sea lane security provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "An active participant in the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, Japan supplies escort and patrol effort to the multinational policing of key sea lanes. But provision is real and constrained: it operates inside an American-commanded structure — contributing forces to task groups others lead — rather than authoring route security or commanding the forces that deliver it. Japan is a contributor to the protection, not a provider of it on its own terms.", "fieldReason": "Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "route regime rule setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "A top-tier author of maritime rules. Japan holds an IMO Council Category A seat as a state with the largest shipping interest, placing it in the highest rule-setting tier — it helps write the regime transport must conform to even where it cannot police or command the lanes.", "fieldReason": "IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "cyber-norms": { "normalized": 53, "raw": 53, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "cyber norm authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 74, "value": null, "reason": "A founding author of the Budapest Convention, one of the few non-European states inside the drafting circle. Japan helped write the cybercrime rules others now adopt, placing it among the authors of the dominant digital-domain regime rather than its adopters — structural rule-setting in Strange's sense, not mere capability.", "fieldReason": "Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "protective provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "A regional provider. The score_basis places Japan as a regionally-bounded supplier of cyber-defence others lean on rather than a system-wide anchor like the US or UK. Its distinct position is Indo-Pacific: Japan runs the regional CERT-coordination role through JPCERT/CC's APCERT secretariat and bilateral cyber-defence cooperation with neighbours, supplying protective capacity inside its own region rather than across the whole alliance system. It provides shelter to others, but on a regional footing, which is why it sits at the provider tier without reaching the top-rank scale.", "fieldReason": "Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "production": { "indispensable-input-control": { "normalized": 48.25, "raw": 48.25, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Critical-input chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 55, "value": null, "reason": "Japan provides indispensable materials inputs — photoresists, high-purity silicon wafers — that downstream fabs cannot substitute, a genuine method-chokepoint rather than mere output. Its score reflects real but narrower input control than China's refining hold, concentrated in a few materials classes.", "fieldReason": "China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Process & tooling gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 51, "value": null, "reason": "Japan is the second strongest process-gatekeeper: Tokyo Electron's WFE position plus Shin-Etsu/JSR precursor chemistry and resists give it control of indispensable process steps others cannot replicate. Its score reflects genuine provision power over specific tooling and chemistry the frontier depends on.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Denial / access-control leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 34, "value": null, "reason": "Japan has joined US-aligned WFE export controls, co-exercising denial over advanced fabrication equipment rather than authoring it alone. Its score reflects active participation in an exclusion regime — denial power exercised in coordination, well above the EU members.", "fieldReason": "US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Method-standard setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 53, "value": null, "reason": "Japan co-authors the process-chemistry and equipment methods others must use, through Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, and JSR, making it the second strongest method-setter in the set. Its score reflects genuine authorship of specific production methods, narrower than the US's but real.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "gvc-governance": { "normalized": 63.75, "raw": 63.75, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Lead-firm governance power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 74, "value": null, "reason": "Japanese lead firms govern through the keiretsu and Toyota-style supplier-network discipline, dictating tiered suppliers' methods, quality, and just-in-time delivery terms — a deep, exercised governance over how and where suppliers produce that ranks Japan second only to the US.", "fieldReason": "US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Chokepoint control in the chain", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 53, "value": null, "reason": "Japan controls materials nodes others depend on, giving it meaningful but more narrowly-bounded denial power over specific chain points rather than the broad chokepoint reach of the US — a real but materials-end leverage.", "fieldReason": "Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Standards & governance authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 61, "value": null, "reason": "Japan co-authors supplier-governance rules through keiretsu and Toyota-production-system disciplines plus JIS standards that suppliers in its networks must meet, a real authorship role concentrated in its own industrial ecosystem.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 67, "value": null, "reason": "Japan imposes meaningful adjustment through its lead-firm position, making suppliers absorb volatility in its networks, but as a high-trade interdependent economy it also eats real adjustment itself, netting to a strong-but-not-dominant score.", "fieldReason": "US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "transnational-firm-power": { "normalized": 81.5, "raw": 81.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Relocation leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 84, "value": null, "reason": "At 80 Japan is near the top because its firms relocate production outward far more than they absorb inbound plant — they site production abroad while taking on little foreign production at home. That asymmetry is the relocation lever made structural: Japanese management authors where production goes, and the exit option over labour is permanently live.", "fieldReason": "Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Host-state bargaining dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 84, "value": null, "reason": "As a net-controller economy with major globe-spanning firms, Japan extracts favourable terms from host governments, earning 75. Japanese multinationals bargain from strength in the territories where they site production, sitting in the high net-controller tier just below the US.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Mode-of-production control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 81, "value": null, "reason": "Japan's automotive and electronics multinationals run extensive intra-firm production networks across Asia, putting it at 75. Japanese firms author how production is organized across frontiers within their sectors, a strong mirror of their outward-control position.", "fieldReason": "US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Outward control over foreign production", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 77, "value": null, "reason": "Japan controls a large stock of foreign production through its globe-spanning manufacturers, earning 75. Its firms govern plant sited in others' territory across Asia and the West, a strong outward-control position consistent with its net-relocator profile.", "fieldReason": "Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "trade-rule-authorship": { "normalized": 57, "raw": 57, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Rule-writing agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 58, "value": null, "reason": "Japan exercises agenda power as the custodian of CPTPP, stewarding a live high-standard rulebook and using that platform to shape multilateral terms beyond its own market size. That stewardship role gives it genuine, mid-tier authorship of the terms others negotiate within.", "fieldReason": "US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "RTA template authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 65, "value": null, "reason": "Japan is the steward of the CPTPP template — the surviving high-standard model after US withdrawal — and that custodianship makes its agreement architecture one others reference and join. Owning the live high-bar template gives Japan strong template authorship, above the larger but less template-defining players.", "fieldReason": "US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Market-access denial capability", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "Japan has a sizeable import market that confers moderate denial leverage, but it exercises that lever far less coercively than the dominant deniers and lacks their scale of market gravity. Its denial capability is genuine but mid-tier.", "fieldReason": "Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "value-capture-adjustment-burden": { "normalized": 59.333, "raw": 59.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Surplus-capture terms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 69, "value": null, "reason": "Japan sets meaningful surplus-capture terms where its firms hold pricing and design margin, giving it real authorship over who retains value rather than a merely large realized take. It is below the US because that term-setting is partial rather than structure-wide, placing it just above the EU brand/standards band.", "fieldReason": "US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-burden imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 53, "value": null, "reason": "Japan can transmit some adjustment cost through its creditor position and currency weight, but it is more often an adjuster within arrangements others set than an imposer of burden on the structure. The mid score reflects influence without the imposition machinery of the dollar-IMF core.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Terms-of-trade setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 56, "value": null, "reason": "Japan shapes relative prices where its demand and supply concentration set reference points, conferring partial terms-of-trade authorship below the US and China demand-scale tier the basis identifies as the price-regime shapers. The mid score reflects bounded price-shaping rather than structure-wide regime-setting.", "fieldReason": "Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "finance": { "credit-markets": { "normalized": 30, "raw": 30, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "benchmark", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 14, "value": null, "reason": "Japan's JGB curve anchors one of the world's deepest domestic bond markets, giving its sovereign yields a slightly wider reference function than China's onshore curve and earning a narrow edge (14). But the world does not discount global credit against Japanese yields; with a sub-1% international debt share, the JGB curve's price-setting reach stops largely at Japan's own paper, well short of a global benchmark role.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "lolr swap reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "The BoJ is inside the standing C6 central-bank swap network and provides the yen-liquidity backstop to that network, a genuine if currency-bounded LOLR provision (28). It backstops yen funding for others but operates within, not above, the dollar system.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "gsib regulatory control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "Japan is a full Basel/FSB member and home-supervises 3 G-SIBs, giving it real standing in the rulebook's governance (45) — a genuine co-participant in the prudential bargain, ranking just below the euro core but above the BRICS members on authorship and systemic-bank supervision.", "fieldReason": "Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "reserves": { "normalized": 16, "raw": 16, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Trade & payments denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 22, "value": null, "reason": "The yen handles roughly 3.5% of international payments and ranks #5 in FX, a credible but secondary settlement currency. Japan provides a usable unit at the margins of world trade without compelling others to invoice in it, so its 22 sits in taker-adjacent territory: a participant in the denomination order rather than its author.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Commodity & debt denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "The yen holds a low single-digit share of cross-border debt and prices no major commodity, so Japan neither authors the debt-denomination rail nor the pricing convention. Its 8-10 band marks a secondary provider whose currency funds some international issuance but compels nothing — well short of structural grip.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "institutional-influence": { "normalized": 20.167, "raw": 20.167, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Veto / blocking power", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 8.333, "value": null, "reason": "At roughly 6% voting weight Japan sits well below the blocking threshold, so it has no veto over institutional reform. Its score reflects relational board sway — the ability to bargain inside a framework it cannot author or block — not structural control.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Institution-as-agent (conditionality / programme leadership)", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "Japan carries a meaningful G7 board voice that shapes programme design at the margins, but it does not supply the institutions' leadership or author the conditionality template. It is a senior co-shaper inside the transatlantic-led management, not a principal directing the agent.", "fieldReason": "US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "payment-systems": { "normalized": 10, "raw": 10, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "clearing rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 15, "value": null, "reason": "Japan settles the yen domestically but authors no clearing rail the wider world must route through; the yen is a settlement unit, not a layer others are bound to. Its modest score reflects sovereign control of its own currency's clearing without any structural hold on global settlement, which still flows through dollar rails Tokyo does not govern.", "fieldReason": "US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "exclusion designations early2026", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "Japan holds no power to deny a counterparty access to the global settlement rails — that exclusion power sits with the US and, collectively, the EU. Its low score reflects a state that conforms to exclusions others author rather than directing access to the rail itself.", "fieldReason": "Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "alternative rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 7, "value": null, "reason": "Japan runs no alternative to US-controlled settlement; as a dollar-aligned economy it has no rail built to escape the mainstream and provides essentially none of this escape capacity. Its floor-level score reflects an actor fully inside the dollar settlement order with no independent route around it.", "fieldReason": "Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "sanctions": { "normalized": 6, "raw": 6, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "independent exclusion", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "Japan has effectively no independent capacity to deny others access to the financial rails; at a near-floor score it is a participant inside the dollar-clearing system, not a gatekeeper of it. When it acts it adopts designations originated elsewhere rather than wielding a denial lever of its own, leaving it bound by an exclusion architecture it neither built nor controls.", "fieldReason": "Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "extraterritorial compliance reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "Japan's sanctions reach only its own nationals and firms; it has no mechanism to force third-country conformity. It is, if anything, on the receiving end of US secondary pressure, making it a complier rather than a compeller on this lever.", "fieldReason": "Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "capital-allocation-ownership": { "normalized": 32, "raw": 32, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Asset-management concentration", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Japan houses sizeable institutional managers and a deep savings pool, but its firms are not where the world's cross-border allocation decisions are authored; they manage largely domestic capital and place abroad as takers into US-governed markets rather than governing the allocation function themselves.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Ownership of strategic firms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 29, "value": null, "reason": "Japanese institutions hold scattered cross-border stakes and substantial domestic ownership, but they are not the residual-claim holders on the world's critical firms; Japan's capital is a minority co-owner in a structure whose largest slices are taken by US holders.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Cross-border equity-allocation reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2023-12-31", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "Japan is a meaningful source of outbound portfolio-equity allocation but is not the destination the world's savings route into. It places capital abroad into US-and-UK-governed markets more than it draws the world's savings home — a participant on the using side of the allocative system rather than a hub.", "fieldReason": "US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "knowledge": { "standards-platform-control": { "normalized": 43.333, "raw": 43.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Standards-body authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 72, "value": null, "reason": "Clear second tier. Japan (JISC) holds a substantial bloc of secretariats and convenorships, well above the mid-pack, but sits a tier below the US/Germany/China pole. It co-authors in many committees without anchoring the structure overall.", "fieldReason": "Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Open-protocol foundation control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 38, "value": null, "reason": "Mid-tier. Japan has a real RFC-authorship record and engineering depth in protocols, contributing to the standards others use, but its shaping weight sits below the European cluster and far below the US custodial anchor.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Platform gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 20, "value": null, "reason": "Minor rule-influence. Japan has begun asserting some authority over the dominant platforms through domestic competition rulemaking, giving it a foothold in setting conduct conditions, but it largely conforms to a platform order owned and gatekept by the US.", "fieldReason": "Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technological-primacy": { "normalized": 38.667, "raw": 38.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Frontier-innovation origination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Japan sits in the research-strong second tier: real depth and a capacity to originate, but its frontier breakthroughs are fewer and narrower than the US-China pair. It contributes to the leading edge in selected domains rather than defining where that edge moves, placing it among the followers-with-capability rather than the sources.", "fieldReason": "US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Military-to-commercial spillover", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 52, "value": null, "reason": "Japan converts advanced research into commercial strength effectively but lacks a large defence-R&D feedstock to spill over, given its constrained military base. Its pipeline runs more from civil and industrial research than from defence, placing it at the top of the second tier rather than among the leaders on this specifically military-to-commercial lever.", "fieldReason": "US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Compute & frontier-model control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 22, "value": null, "reason": "Japan has limited frontier-model presence and no compute gatekeeping power; it accesses the frontier on terms set by the US-controlled stack. Its position is that of a capable adopter rather than an author or gatekeeper of the current AI frontier.", "fieldReason": "US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technology-denial-regimes": { "normalized": 48, "raw": 48, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Export-control regime leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 55, "value": null, "reason": "Japan authors meaningful national controls of its own rather than merely echoing US lists — it codified the 23-item advanced-chipmaking-equipment regime through METI, effective 23 July 2023, and operates within the EU-adjacent Wassenaar frame. It is a secondary regime author at the frontier of semiconductor-equipment denial, which earns it the strongest non-US score on this lever, well below Washington but clearly above the pure compliers.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement / extraterritorial reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 39, "value": null, "reason": "Japan scores as a compliant enforcer with some reach of its own — it implemented the 23-item equipment controls in July 2023 and licenses those exports through METI, giving it independent enforcement over a frontier category. It enforces largely in alignment with the allied denial frame rather than projecting its own extraterritorial rules, which places it as the strongest secondary enforcer below the US but well short of compelling third-party compliance.", "fieldReason": "US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Criticality of what can be denied", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "Japan can withhold technology that bites: it holds critical positions in semiconductor-manufacturing equipment and the specialty materials and tools feeding the leading-edge fab chain, several of which have few substitutes. That genuine non-substitutability in the equipment-and-materials layer earns it the strongest criticality score after the US — real bite at the frontier, though narrower than Washington's full-stack chokehold.", "fieldReason": "US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "ip-regime-authorship": { "normalized": 47.5, "raw": 47.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "IP rule-setting / regime authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "Japan is a high-standard adherent that helps sustain the rules rather than originate them. It aligns closely with the US-EU patentability and enforcement framework and participates actively in WIPO, so it shapes the regime at the margin but follows the architecture others set, placing it mid-table.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement & exclusion reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "Japan enforces IP effectively within its own large market but exercises that exclusion largely domestically, without the extraterritorial market-access leverage the US wields or the bloc-wide reach of the EU court system. It sits mid-table as a strong domestic enforcer with limited external reach.", "fieldReason": "US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "belief-ideological-authority": { "normalized": 29.333, "raw": 29.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Ideological / intellectual leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "Japan is a respected regional/heritage idea-voice rather than a paradigm-author. It contributes to economic and policy thinking but does not originate a living paradigm that others accept as the legitimate frame for debate the way the US default operates. Its conferred ideational authority is real but modest and case-specific, which keeps it in the lower band on this lever.", "fieldReason": "Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Lingua-franca & credential dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Japan has strong domestic institutions but does not provide a credential system others must operate in, and Japanese is not a working global language — a point Strange flagged directly. It functions largely within its own linguistic and academic sphere, so its conferral of language-and-credential authority is low.", "fieldReason": "The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Belief-transmission channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Japan's values diffuse mainly through admiration and aesthetic appeal rather than adopted civic or political norms. Others appreciate its model without operating by its value-set, so its belief-transmission is low — attraction more than norm-conferral.", "fieldReason": "Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "channel-control": { "normalized": 34, "raw": 34, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Knowledge-agenda channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Japan is a high-volume knowledge producer whose output is routed through Western indexing and ranking machinery it does not author. It sets none of the rules deciding which findings count and operates no rival channel, leaving it a sophisticated but channel-dependent content supplier.", "fieldReason": "US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Orbital & data-channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "Japan operates only a regional PNT capability, not a global orbital channel others depend on. It augments rather than substitutes the systems run by larger providers, leaving it a partial provider regionally and a dependent globally.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Channel rule-setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "Japan participates in ITU and spectrum processes but largely works within rules authored by the US and the larger blocs. It is an active and capable participant yet a marginal author — closer to a rule-taker than a rule-setter on the channels.", "fieldReason": "US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } } }, "Germany": { "security": { "nuclear-order-setting": { "normalized": 31.333, "raw": 31.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "nonproliferation rule authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "1970-03-05", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "A non-nuclear-weapon party bound by the regime: Germany is a rule-taker, accepting the NPT's prohibition on holding weapons and submitting to its constraints. It has voice in review conferences but no hand on the structural who-may-hold rule — it is shaped by the order, not an author of it.", "fieldReason": "NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "safeguards inspection leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 53, "value": null, "reason": "Structurally advantaged on the inspection lever despite holding no weapons: its advanced civil-nuclear and atomic technology earn it standing under the Art VI designation rule for the most atomic-advanced states, giving it real Board influence over the IAEA — a hand on the machinery, mid-tier.", "fieldReason": "Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "arms control agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-02-05", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "An NPT party with no seat in the bilateral strategic-arms regime: a non-nuclear-weapon state that can advocate restraint but neither sets nor blocks its terms. Minimal agenda power, outside the US-Russia treaty track entirely.", "fieldReason": "New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "provision-of-protection": { "normalized": 6.667, "raw": 6.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "extended deterrence guarantees", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "A recipient, not a provider: Germany is sheltered under NATO's Article 5 and physically hosts US nuclear-sharing weapons, making it a consumer of the umbrella rather than its author. In Strange's frame it is among those whose range of choices is shaped by the protector, so it scores at the recipient floor.", "fieldReason": "Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "terms of protection", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "A terms-taker: Germany hosts the US presence and accepts the basing and burden-sharing that are the price of its protection rather than extracting any from others. It is on the paying side of Strange's bargain, so it scores at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "hub centrality", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "A spoke, not a hub: Germany is an integrated and important NATO member, but it connects through the alliance's command rather than anchoring it. It is a node served by the hub, so it scores at the spoke level.", "fieldReason": "Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "chokepoint-route-control": { "normalized": 26.146, "raw": 26.146, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "maritime chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 2.439, "value": null, "reason": "No chokepoint command whatsoever. Germany's export economy depends utterly on straits it neither commands nor polices; it is a pure rule-taker at the world's maritime arteries, reliant on the protection the US-led order extends.", "fieldReason": "Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "sea lane security provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "A participant in the Combined Maritime Forces, contributing limited naval effort to the lanes its trade depends on. Provision is modest and embedded inside the US-commanded structure — a contributor, not an author, of route security.", "fieldReason": "Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "route regime rule setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 65, "value": null, "reason": "A second-tier rule-setter. Germany sits in IMO Council Category B, the tier for states with the largest seaborne trade — a real hand on the maritime ground rules, though below the Category A shipping-interest band.", "fieldReason": "IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "cyber-norms": { "normalized": 37, "raw": 37, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "cyber norm authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "A Budapest party — rule-taker, not rule-author. Germany ratified the US/Canada/Japan-drafted cybercrime treaty and operates inside it without a hand in authoring the regime. Structurally it adopts the rules others set rather than setting them.", "fieldReason": "Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "protective provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "A provider within the EU and NATO frameworks. Germany contributes cyber-defence capacity to the collective European and Atlantic structures partners depend on, supplying protection through those multilateral channels rather than originating its own broad shelter. That framework-bound provision — real but not self-anchoring — places it in the provider tier without the system-anchoring weight of the US.", "fieldReason": "Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "production": { "indispensable-input-control": { "normalized": 24.75, "raw": 24.75, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Critical-input chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "Germany supplies specialised inputs into the production chain but controls no broad non-substitutable chokepoint of its own; it is a contributor to others' methods more than a gatekeeper. The modest score marks a country that shapes some inputs but cannot deny access at scale.", "fieldReason": "China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Process & tooling gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 23, "value": null, "reason": "Germany supplies discrete process elements into the chain but does not gatekeep a full indispensable process; its tooling role is real yet narrow. The modest score marks a contributor to the method rather than a controller of it.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Denial / access-control leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 20, "value": null, "reason": "Germany gets a modest EU-regime-participant credit for shared export-control machinery, but the denial lever is national and it authors no input-denial of its own (D16: no full-bloc attribution). The score marks regime participation, not independently exercised exclusion.", "fieldReason": "US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Method-standard setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 24, "value": null, "reason": "Germany is a niche method-supplier: Trumpf authors the EUV light source and Zeiss the optics that the frontier lithography method depends on, conferring method-authorship in a narrow but indispensable slot. The modest score reflects narrow but genuine method-setting.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "gvc-governance": { "normalized": 56.75, "raw": 56.75, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Lead-firm governance power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 69, "value": null, "reason": "German automotive lead firms — Volkswagen and the OEM tier — govern extensive supplier networks, dictating production specifications, location, and delivery terms down multiple tiers, a strong exercised governance over supplier output that places Germany just behind Japan.", "fieldReason": "US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Chokepoint control in the chain", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Germany controls a cluster of high-end equipment and tooling nodes within specific chains, conferring genuine denial power that France, the UK, and Italy lack — but it remains far more interdependent than dominant, so its chokepoint control sits well below the US and China while clearly above the other Europeans.", "fieldReason": "Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Standards & governance authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 67, "value": null, "reason": "Germany co-authors the automotive supplier rulebook — VDA and IATF quality standards — and EU CE/REACH requirements enforced down the chain, so suppliers worldwide adopt rules Germany helped write, placing it just behind the US.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 61, "value": null, "reason": "Germany imposes adjustment within its supplier networks yet, as a high-foreign-value-added eurozone exporter, absorbs more of the chain's adjustment burden than the US — a partial imposer constrained by its own interdependence.", "fieldReason": "US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "transnational-firm-power": { "normalized": 77.25, "raw": 77.25, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Relocation leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 79, "value": null, "reason": "German lead firms — autos and industrials above all — site and shift production across Europe and beyond, wielding a genuine exit threat over their workforces. At 75 Germany sits just below the top tier: a strong net-relocator whose firms decide location, though without the extreme outward-only asymmetry of Japan.", "fieldReason": "Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Host-state bargaining dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 78, "value": null, "reason": "Germany's lead firms bargain effectively with host states across Europe and emerging markets, putting it at 70. As a net-controller economy its multinationals dictate terms more than they accept them, though without the treaty-authorship reach that lifts the US to the top.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Mode-of-production control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 78, "value": null, "reason": "German lead firms organize deep intra-firm and supplier networks across Europe, earning 72. They decide how cross-border production is structured in autos and industrials, sitting in the high net-controller band that organizes — rather than merely joins — the mode.", "fieldReason": "US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Outward control over foreign production", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 74, "value": null, "reason": "At 72 Germany's firms control a large share of production sited abroad, particularly across Europe and in autos. German capital holds a deep grip on foreign plant, placing it in the high net-controller tier just below Japan.", "fieldReason": "Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "trade-rule-authorship": { "normalized": 46.333, "raw": 46.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Rule-writing agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 31, "value": null, "reason": "Germany does not write trade rules in its own name: under exclusive EU competence the Commission is the chief WTO negotiator, and Germany's authorship is its divisible share of that bloc voice, keyed to its population weight in the Council's double-majority threshold (.396). It co-authors through Brussels rather than as a sovereign rule-writer, hence the fractional score.", "fieldReason": "US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "RTA template authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 34, "value": null, "reason": "Germany's template authorship is its population-keyed share (.396) of the EU's DCFTA/Association-Agreement and Brussels-effect regulatory models that diffuse globally. The template is authored in Brussels, not Berlin, so Germany co-owns a fraction of a powerful diffusing model rather than authoring one in its own name.", "fieldReason": "US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Market-access denial capability", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 74, "value": null, "reason": "Germany commands the full denial value of the EU single market — one of the largest import markets others must access — because market-access denial is exercised at bloc scale and attributed in full to each large EU member. That collective gatekeeping over an indispensable market gives it a high score.", "fieldReason": "Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "value-capture-adjustment-burden": { "normalized": 68, "raw": 68, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Surplus-capture terms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 74, "value": null, "reason": "Germany authors brand and engineering-standards rents that let its firms set the terms on which downstream value is retained, a clear instance of the EU brand/standards term-setting the basis attributes to Germany, France, and Italy. That standards-and-brand authorship, not export volume alone, earns it a high score below the US.", "fieldReason": "US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-burden imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 63, "value": null, "reason": "Germany imposes adjustment burden within the EU through conditionality and surplus-economy leverage, forcing deficit partners to adjust while resisting symmetric adjustment itself. That bloc-level imposition power, short of US structure-wide reach, places it high among the European peers.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Terms-of-trade setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 67, "value": null, "reason": "Germany shapes terms of trade through its weight as a large buyer and seller, influencing the relative prices that distribute gains among producers. Its score sits below the US and China demand-scale shapers the basis identifies, reflecting bounded rather than structure-wide price-regime authorship.", "fieldReason": "Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "finance": { "credit-markets": { "normalized": 49.333, "raw": 49.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "benchmark", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "The Bund is the euro area's risk-free curve — the reference off which euro-denominated credit and sovereign spreads across the union are priced, anchoring EUR's 40.3% of cross-border debt as the clear #2 global benchmark behind the UST. Per D19 the euro curve is the union's, set collectively, so Germany carries the full euro-bloc benchmark weight (48) as the issuer of the bloc's anchor bond.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "lolr swap reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "The ECB is both inside the C6 dollar-swap network and independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to other central banks — a real outward LOLR function for the world's #2 currency. Per D19 there is one euro central bank, pooled, so Germany carries the full euro-bloc backstop weight (42) as a core ECB member.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "gsib regulatory control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 58, "value": null, "reason": "Germany co-authors the Basel/FSB prudential rulebook through its euro Basel/FSB seats and shapes the single supervisory framework the bloc's banks operate under, while home-supervising 1 G-SIB (55). Its score rests on active rule-authorship weight in the government-bank bargain Strange centres credit creation on — Germany helps write the prudential terms — sitting just below France, which pairs the same euro authorship with the largest systemic-bank footprint in the bloc.", "fieldReason": "Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "reserves": { "normalized": 47.5, "raw": 47.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Trade & payments denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "As a core euro issuer, Germany shares in the euro's 21.3% of international payments and its #2 standing in FX and trade finance — the only currency bloc that meaningfully rivals the dollar as a settlement medium. Scored full-bloc per D19, the 45 reflects genuine co-authorship of a denomination rail a large share of world trade must run on, though still trailing the USD's grip.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Commodity & debt denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "As a core euro issuer, Germany shares in the euro's 40.3% of cross-border debt — nearly matching the dollar on the debt face — making the euro bloc a genuine co-author of how international debt is denominated. But the euro prices no commodities, so the dual lock is half-open: scored full-bloc per D19, Germany's 50 reflects strong debt-denomination provision that still trails the USD's combined debt-plus-commodity construct.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "institutional-influence": { "normalized": 32.704, "raw": 32.704, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Veto / blocking power", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 7.407, "value": null, "reason": "Germany is the largest European member of the IMF and World Bank, but its IMF voting share is only around 5 percent — far below the ~15% blocking threshold that the US alone clears. It cannot unilaterally veto institutional reform; its high score among the non-US states reflects heavyweight relational board sway, not a blocking stake, and remains structurally subordinate to the one member that can block reform.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Institution-as-agent (conditionality / programme leadership)", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 58, "value": null, "reason": "Germany sits in the European bloc that supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design — part of the transatlantic management duopoly. It is a genuine co-author of the conditionality the institutions impose, second only to the US in directing the agent.", "fieldReason": "US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "payment-systems": { "normalized": 33.667, "raw": 33.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "clearing rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "Germany co-governs the euro's clearing layer through TARGET2, the Eurosystem RTGS that gives the euro bloc a mid-tier rail of its own — the second real settlement layer after the dollar. As a core Eurosystem member Germany shares authorship of the rail euro counterparties must settle through, a genuine bloc-level provision below the US but well above currency-takers.", "fieldReason": "US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "exclusion designations early2026", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 40, "value": null, "reason": "Germany holds real but secondary exclusion power: acting collectively through the EU it can push for SWIFT de-designation and freeze access for targets, a genuine lesser version of the denial the US wields unilaterally. Its score reflects shared bloc-level capacity to exclude — meaningful, but exercised in concert and without the dollar's extraterritorial bite.", "fieldReason": "Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "alternative rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "Germany provides almost no alternative-rail capacity — the EU's INSTEX vehicle is defunct, and TARGET2 is a parallel euro rail rather than an escape from dollar settlement. Its low score reflects a bloc whose attempt at an alternative failed, leaving little structural escape capacity.", "fieldReason": "Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "sanctions": { "normalized": 22.5, "raw": 22.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "independent exclusion", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "Germany can act on the SWIFT chokepoint only in concert through the EU, never alone — a mid-tier collective capacity to deny access, not a unilateral one. It co-authors European exclusion measures but cannot independently cut a target off from the system, so its denial power is real but contingent on coalition.", "fieldReason": "Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "extraterritorial compliance reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "Germany cannot force third parties to conform — its measures are primary, binding only its own nationals, and the EU passed a blocking statute precisely to RESIST US secondary reach. Its modest score reflects an actor that has legislated against extraterritorial compulsion rather than one able to exercise it.", "fieldReason": "Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "capital-allocation-ownership": { "normalized": 30.333, "raw": 30.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Asset-management concentration", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "Germany's asset managers are mid-tier providers in the global pool — present but well below the US complex and the UK/France hub tier. German allocation capacity serves its own institutions and pension flows more than it sets the terms on which the world's investable capital is placed.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Ownership of strategic firms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "German capital holds dispersed stakes in foreign firms and concentrated domestic ownership, but does not hold the residual claim on the strategic firms the rest of the world depends on — a minority holder in a register the US complex dominates.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Cross-border equity-allocation reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2023-12-31", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "Germany shows mid-range cross-border equity reach — a routine participant in the integrated allocative system, neither the destination the world's savings flow into nor a commanding intermediation node. It uses the system on terms set elsewhere rather than providing the destination function.", "fieldReason": "US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "knowledge": { "standards-platform-control": { "normalized": 59.333, "raw": 59.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Standards-body authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 93, "value": null, "reason": "The rule-pen leader. DIN holds more ISO/IEC secretariats than any other body — the secretariat is the literal custody of a standard's text and revision — putting Germany at the apex of who codifies the technical rules others must conform to. Top tier on authorship.", "fieldReason": "Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Open-protocol foundation control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 55, "value": null, "reason": "Second-tier on authorship. German engineers contribute a substantial share of RFC authorship and reference work, making Germany a genuine shaping voice in internet protocol development — but it interoperates with a stack whose custody and origin remain American, far behind the US pole.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Platform gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Rule-setter, not owner. Through the EU's DMA/DSA and GDPR, Germany helps author binding access and conduct rules that the platforms others use must comply with — the Brussels effect — but it gatekeeps via regulation rather than owning the platforms or controlling access to them.", "fieldReason": "Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technological-primacy": { "normalized": 38.333, "raw": 38.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Frontier-innovation origination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "Germany has genuine research depth but originates comparatively few of the breakthroughs others must adopt; it is a strong second-tier contributor, not a frontier source. Its strength lies more in refining and applying advanced technology than in authoring the leading edge from which others draw.", "fieldReason": "US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Military-to-commercial spillover", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "Germany has a strong industrial-research pipeline but a comparatively modest defence-R&D base to convert, so its spillover from military to commercial is limited relative to the leaders. It is a capable second-tier converter whose strength flows from civil industry more than from a defence-origination engine.", "fieldReason": "US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Compute & frontier-model control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 20, "value": null, "reason": "Germany has little independent frontier-model presence and no control over compute chokepoints, accessing the frontier through infrastructure governed elsewhere. It is a taker on this lever despite its broader research strength, which the modest score reflects.", "fieldReason": "US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technology-denial-regimes": { "normalized": 34.667, "raw": 34.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Export-control regime leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "Germany authors real dual-use controls through the EU dual-use regulation and its own national licensing, giving it genuine standing as a regime co-author within the European frame rather than a list-taker. Its authorship is collective and EU-mediated rather than sovereign and frontier-defining, so it sits mid-tier — a meaningful European node in writing denial rules, not an originator of the binding lists the way the US is.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement / extraterritorial reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 24, "value": null, "reason": "Germany enforces denial within the EU dual-use frame, applying licensing and penalties inside its jurisdiction, but it cannot reach beyond it to compel third-party compliance. It is a within-bloc enforcer rather than an extraterritorial one — it makes its own exporters comply, not foreign ones — which fixes it in the lower-middle band of enforcement reach.", "fieldReason": "US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Criticality of what can be denied", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Germany controls some hard-to-substitute industrial inputs into the advanced-manufacturing chain, giving its potential denial real but bounded bite. It holds pieces of the critical-technology stack rather than a defining chokepoint, so its criticality sits in the mid band — denial that would sting in specific niches but not halt a frontier programme on its own.", "fieldReason": "US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "ip-regime-authorship": { "normalized": 57.5, "raw": 57.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "IP rule-setting / regime authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 60, "value": null, "reason": "Germany is a strong co-author rather than an originator. It carries substantial weight inside the EU negotiating bloc that bargains as a single high-standard voice in WIPO and TRIPS-related rule-making, so its authorship is real but exercised collectively through Brussels rather than as an independent regime-driver.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement & exclusion reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 55, "value": null, "reason": "Germany has strong but bloc-internal enforcement reach. It is the heaviest patent-litigation venue in Europe and a central forum in the Unified Patent Court that has operated since 2023, giving it real power to enforce exclusion across the EU market — but that reach is regional rather than the worldwide exclusion the US can impose.", "fieldReason": "US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "belief-ideological-authority": { "normalized": 46, "raw": 46, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Ideological / intellectual leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Germany carries a specific model-authority — Ordoliberalism and the social-market tradition — that others accept as a legitimate template, most visibly in shaping European economic-governance thinking. Its leadership is real but confined to a particular doctrinal lane rather than a society-wide alternative paradigm, so it sits just below France in the tradition tier.", "fieldReason": "Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Lingua-franca & credential dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "Germany is a credential magnet within its own sphere — a respected destination that draws substantial inbound students into its institutions. But others operate in English or their own systems for global purposes, not in German, so it provides a strong regional credential pull without lingua-franca authority. That mid-band position reflects a real but bounded provider, not a system the wider world must operate in.", "fieldReason": "The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Belief-transmission channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 51, "value": null, "reason": "Germany anchors a regulatory and social-market norm-set that diffuses, most clearly within Europe, where its standards and values shape what others adopt as good governance. Its transmission is real but concentrated in the regulatory lane and its regional neighborhood, giving it a mid-band score as a norm-anchor rather than a global value-author.", "fieldReason": "Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "channel-control": { "normalized": 50.333, "raw": 50.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Knowledge-agenda channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 58, "value": null, "reason": "Germany is the strongest agenda-channel actor outside the US-UK pair because Springer Nature gives it genuine ownership of a top-tier publishing channel, not just content flowing through one. That editorial control over which findings reach the highest-prestige venues is real channel authority, even if it sits below the Anglo-American indexing duopoly.", "fieldReason": "US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Orbital & data-channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 40, "value": null, "reason": "Germany shares the Galileo system as part of the EU bloc, giving it a genuine stake in a real global orbital channel rather than pure dependency. Its score reflects bloc-level provision — channel access it co-owns through Europe — short of the independent global reach the US and China command alone.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Channel rule-setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 53, "value": null, "reason": "Germany is a core author of the EU's channel rules: it carries bloc weight in spectrum coordination, co-owns Galileo standards, and helped author GDPR, which sets data-governance terms others must meet. That makes it a genuine rule-setter on the data and spectrum channels through European bloc authority.", "fieldReason": "US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } } }, "France": { "security": { "nuclear-order-setting": { "normalized": 57, "raw": 57, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "nonproliferation rule authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "1970-03-05", "score": 70, "value": null, "reason": "An NPT nuclear-weapon state and therefore a rule-author who may legitimately hold weapons under the regime — but it stood outside the treaty for two decades and only acceded in 1992, long after the architecture was set. That late accession leaves it authoring within rules it did not write, scoring below the depositary trio.", "fieldReason": "NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "safeguards inspection leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 69, "value": null, "reason": "One of the structurally-advantaged states with standing Board influence under the Art VI designation of the most atomic-advanced, giving it a hand on the IAEA safeguards lever. A major civil-nuclear power, it helps control the inspection machinery, just below the top trio.", "fieldReason": "Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "arms control agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-02-05", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "An NWS voice in multilateral nuclear fora but outside the bilateral US-Russia strategic-arms regime, so it neither sets nor blocks the terms of the lapsed treaty or its successor. Limited agenda power — heard, not decisive, on the central strategic-arms question.", "fieldReason": "New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "provision-of-protection": { "normalized": 25, "raw": 25, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "extended deterrence guarantees", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "A genuine provider, but a junior one: France is a NATO Article 5 co-guarantor and uniquely operates an independent nuclear deterrent that backs that commitment, so it formally protects others rather than only receiving protection. Its own umbrella is minor relative to the US principal guarantor, so it scores as a secondary provider, not the anchor.", "fieldReason": "Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "terms of protection", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 15, "value": null, "reason": "Runs an independent posture but extracts little from others: France maintains its own forces and external presence yet does not convert protection into basing or cost-sharing access over the states scored here. It sets terms for itself more than over others, so it scores low among the providers.", "fieldReason": "Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "hub centrality", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "Semi-peripheral within the Western network: France left and later rejoined NATO's integrated command and maintains an independent posture, so it sits at the network's edge rather than its core. It is more loosely tied than the UK, scoring as a partial hub.", "fieldReason": "Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "chokepoint-route-control": { "normalized": 32.772, "raw": 32.772, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "maritime chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 7.317, "value": null, "reason": "Residual chokepoint presence through its Djibouti base on the Bab-el-Mandeb approaches and its Indo-Pacific territories, but no command of a strait. France can position near the arteries; it does not set their terms of passage. A shaper at the margin, not an author.", "fieldReason": "Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "sea lane security provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "A leading allied contributor to the Combined Maritime Forces, with independent deployable reach from Djibouti and the Indo-Pacific. France genuinely provides route protection, but within the US-commanded coalition rather than as its author — a top-tier contributor, not the hub.", "fieldReason": "Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "route regime rule setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 65, "value": null, "reason": "A second-tier rule-setter. France holds an IMO Council Category B seat among states with the largest interest in seaborne trade, contributing to the authorship of the passage and freight regime, one tier below the top shipping-interest bracket.", "fieldReason": "IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "cyber-norms": { "normalized": 39.5, "raw": 39.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "cyber norm authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "A Budapest party — a rule-adopter, not an author. France operates within a digital-domain regime the US, Canada and Japan drafted; it ratified and complies but did not write the rules. In Strange's frame it takes the structure rather than designing it (1994, p.25).", "fieldReason": "Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "protective provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "A provider through its national cyber agency and the EU framework. France supplies cyber-defence capacity that European partners lean on via ANSSI and its weight in EU-level cyber-defence cooperation — sheltering others within a European structure rather than originating system-wide protection. Its reach is narrower than the US or UK, placing it in the provider tier below the Anglosphere anchors.", "fieldReason": "Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "production": { "indispensable-input-control": { "normalized": 14.75, "raw": 14.75, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Critical-input chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 19, "value": null, "reason": "France holds only narrow niche input positions and does not control any chokepoint others cannot route around; it is largely a taker of the inputs the apex refiners and foundries supply. The low score reflects participation without gatekeeping power.", "fieldReason": "China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Process & tooling gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "France holds only a slender process-tooling position and gatekeeps no step the frontier cannot obtain elsewhere; it is largely a process-taker. The low score reflects minimal control of the indispensable tooling.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Denial / access-control leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 20, "value": null, "reason": "France carries the same modest EU-regime-participant credit for shared export-control structures, without wielding production-input denial unilaterally. Its score reflects bloc participation rather than authored or exercised national denial power.", "fieldReason": "US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Method-standard setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "France retains a slim method-authorship position via Soitec's SOI substrate method, but sets no broad production method others must adopt. The low score reflects a single niche method-contribution rather than method-setting power.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "gvc-governance": { "normalized": 38.75, "raw": 38.75, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Lead-firm governance power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 53, "value": null, "reason": "French lead firms govern supplier networks within their own industrial chains, exercising real but more sectorally-bounded dictation over what suppliers produce and on what terms — meaningful governance, narrower in reach than the German or Japanese supplier-network systems.", "fieldReason": "US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Chokepoint control in the chain", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 14, "value": null, "reason": "France controls very few chain nodes others cannot bypass; its denial power over critical chain points is marginal, leaving it low on this lever.", "fieldReason": "Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Standards & governance authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 34, "value": null, "reason": "France authors niche but real private chain standards, notably GlobalGAP in agri-food supply, writing rules a slice of the chain must comply with rather than broadly adopting others'.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 54, "value": null, "reason": "France imposes some adjustment through its lead firms but, embedded in the interdependent eurozone with high foreign value added, eats a substantial share of chain adjustment itself, leaving it middling.", "fieldReason": "US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "transnational-firm-power": { "normalized": 63.75, "raw": 63.75, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Relocation leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 63, "value": null, "reason": "French multinationals carry a solid outward footprint and can move or contract production abroad, putting France at 60 as a real but second-rank wielder of the exit threat. Its firms author location decisions in their sectors without commanding the across-the-board relocation power of the US or German lead firms.", "fieldReason": "Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Host-state bargaining dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 67, "value": null, "reason": "French multinationals extract terms from host governments in their core regions and sectors, placing France at 60 in the net-controller band. Its bargaining leverage is solid but narrower than the German or Japanese reach, and well short of US treaty-backed dominance.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Mode-of-production control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 63, "value": null, "reason": "French multinationals organize meaningful intra-firm production across their footprint, placing France at 58. They shape the cross-border mode in their sectors as a solid net-controller, below the German and Japanese organizing reach.", "fieldReason": "US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Outward control over foreign production", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 62, "value": null, "reason": "French multinationals control a solid stock of foreign production, putting France at 60. Its firms govern plant abroad across their footprint as a clear net-controller, below the German and Japanese stock levels.", "fieldReason": "Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "trade-rule-authorship": { "normalized": 42.667, "raw": 42.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Rule-writing agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "France's agenda power over multilateral terms is exercised only through the EU's exclusive competence, where the Commission negotiates and France contributes its population-keyed slice of the bloc's authorship (.324 of the Council double-majority weight). It is a co-author inside Brussels, not an independent rule-writer, which sets its fractional score.", "fieldReason": "US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "RTA template authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "France contributes its population-weighted slice (.324) of the EU's template power — the Association-Agreement model and the Brussels-effect regulatory standards that other jurisdictions import. It is a co-author of the bloc's diffusing template rather than an independent model-setter, hence the fractional score.", "fieldReason": "US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Market-access denial capability", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 74, "value": null, "reason": "France carries the full EU single-market denial value: access to the bloc's market is a chokepoint others need, and that denial leverage is attributed in full to France as a major member rather than fractionally. Gatekeeping an indispensable market earns it a high score.", "fieldReason": "Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "value-capture-adjustment-burden": { "normalized": 61.667, "raw": 61.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Surplus-capture terms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 63, "value": null, "reason": "France holds EU brand and standards rents that let its firms set surplus-capture terms within their segments, the term-authorship the basis credits to the DE/FR/IT bloc. The score reflects genuine but bounded authorship rather than structure-wide control of who keeps the value.", "fieldReason": "US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-burden imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 61, "value": null, "reason": "France shares in EU conditionality-based adjustment imposition, helping set the terms on which weaker members bear adjustment cost. Its score reflects participation in bloc imposition rather than independent structure-wide capacity.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Terms-of-trade setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 61, "value": null, "reason": "France contributes to terms-of-trade setting through its premium-goods pricing power and EU price-regime participation, shaping how gains are allocated in those segments. The score marks bounded, segment-level authorship rather than broad price-regime control.", "fieldReason": "Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "finance": { "credit-markets": { "normalized": 51, "raw": 51, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "benchmark", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "France prices into and helps constitute the euro risk-free curve that anchors EUR's 40.3% of cross-border debt — the world's clear second benchmark. Scored full-bloc per D19 because the euro curve is the union's collective rate, not any one member's; France carries that shared benchmark authorship at 48.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "lolr swap reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "France shares the ECB's pooled backstop: the euro central bank is in the C6 dollar network and extends euro liquidity to others as lender of last resort for the bloc's currency. Scored full-bloc per D19 — one central bank, not twelve — so France carries the euro LOLR provision at 42.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "gsib regulatory control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 63, "value": null, "reason": "France is a Basel/FSB co-author through the euro seats and home-supervises 4 G-SIBs — the most of any euro member — combining real rule-authorship weight with the largest systemic-bank supervisory footprint in the bloc (60). It is a co-author of the government-bank bargain, not merely an adopter.", "fieldReason": "Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "reserves": { "normalized": 47.5, "raw": 47.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Trade & payments denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "France co-issues the euro, the world's #2 payments currency at 21.3% and #2 in FX and trade finance. Its 45 captures full-bloc structural standing per D19: a provider of a settlement unit that a substantial slice of cross-border trade is obliged to use, second only to the dollar in the denomination hierarchy.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Commodity & debt denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "France co-issues the euro, which carries 40.3% of cross-border debt issuance, rivalling the dollar as a unit international borrowers write in. Yet the euro does not price oil or metals, leaving the second rail unauthored; the 50 captures full-bloc co-authorship of debt denomination per D19, below the USD's commodity-plus-debt double lock.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "institutional-influence": { "normalized": 34.509, "raw": 34.509, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Veto / blocking power", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 6.019, "value": null, "reason": "France's voting weight gives it strong relational standing on the board but no blocking stake of its own — it cannot unilaterally veto institutional reform. Its position is influence inside the framework, not control over whether the framework can change.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Institution-as-agent (conditionality / programme leadership)", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 63, "value": null, "reason": "France is the strongest European voice in directing the institution, central to the convention by which Europe supplies the IMF Managing Director and co-authors programme design. Its preferences are encoded in conditionality alongside the US — a principal in the transatlantic management duopoly, not a recipient.", "fieldReason": "US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "payment-systems": { "normalized": 33.667, "raw": 33.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "clearing rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "France shares governance of the euro clearing layer via TARGET2 as a core Eurosystem state, co-owning the only mid-tier rail that rivals the dollar's. Its score mirrors Germany's: real authorship of a bloc settlement layer that euro counterparties route through, short of the dollar's universality but far above states with no own-rail control.", "fieldReason": "US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "exclusion designations early2026", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 40, "value": null, "reason": "France shares the EU's collective exclusion power, contributing to SWIFT de-designation decisions and asset freezes as a core member — a real-lesser denial capacity below the US's unilateral extraterritorial reach. Its score mirrors Germany's: authorship of bloc-level exclusion that binds, but only in concert and without the dollar's global compulsion.", "fieldReason": "Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "alternative rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "France provides no functioning alternative rail — the EU's INSTEX vehicle is defunct, and the euro bloc has no real route around dollar-controlled settlement today. Its low score reflects the absence of escape capacity despite the bloc's failed attempt.", "fieldReason": "Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "sanctions": { "normalized": 22.5, "raw": 22.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "independent exclusion", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "France's distinct exclusion weight runs through Paris's seat at the centre of EU sanctions design, where it has been the loudest member-state advocate for European financial-autonomy tools — yet even as a leading voice it cannot cut a target off from the rails alone, only secure a Council decision binding all 27. Its mid-tier score captures real agenda-setting influence over collective denial paired with zero unilateral chokepoint control.", "fieldReason": "Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "extraterritorial compliance reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "France's distinct position is that of a state actively building defences against extraterritorial compulsion rather than wielding it: French firms were prominent casualties of US secondary sanctions (the BNP Paribas penalty being the landmark case), which made Paris a driving advocate for the EU blocking statute and for euro-clearing alternatives. Its low score reflects an actor whose measures bind only its own and EU nationals while it organises resistance to others' secondary reach.", "fieldReason": "Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "capital-allocation-ownership": { "normalized": 34.667, "raw": 34.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Asset-management concentration", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 38, "value": null, "reason": "France is the strongest European asset-management domicile after the UK, anchored by the Crédit Agricole/Amundi complex. That gives it a genuine, if second-tier, slice of the global allocation function — a real provider role beneath the dominant US complex, but well short of authoring where the world's investable capital is placed.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Ownership of strategic firms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 29, "value": null, "reason": "France's managers and institutions own meaningful but scattered stakes in global firms, sitting marginally ahead of Germany in the holder rankings. Yet France does not hold the residual claim on the world's critical firms — it is a secondary co-owner taking minority slices, not the dominant holder, well beneath the American Big-Three.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Cross-border equity-allocation reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2023-12-31", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "France's cross-border equity allocation is mid-tier — a normal participant in the one integrated capital market, not the destination others' savings route into nor a primary intermediation centre. It places capital into the system rather than governing where the world's savings flow.", "fieldReason": "US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "knowledge": { "standards-platform-control": { "normalized": 45.667, "raw": 45.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Standards-body authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 64, "value": null, "reason": "Second tier. AFNOR carries real secretariat and convenor weight in ISO/IEC — France genuinely pens rules in its committees of strength — but ranks below Japan and the top pole, a respected co-author rather than a structural anchor.", "fieldReason": "Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Open-protocol foundation control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "Second-tier shaper. France contributes a solid body of RFC authorship and protocol engineering and sits in the European cluster of genuine influence, but interoperates with a foundational stack it neither originated nor governs.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Platform gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "Rule-setter, not owner. France co-authors and enforces the EU platform rulebook (DMA/DSA/GDPR) that constrains how the dominant platforms operate, exporting those rules via the Brussels effect, but it sets terms on platforms it does not own or gatekeep access to.", "fieldReason": "Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technological-primacy": { "normalized": 40.333, "raw": 40.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Frontier-innovation origination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "France is a research-strong second-tier originator, distinguished by genuine frontier-AI origination through its home-grown lab lineage rather than only adoption. It creates leading-edge work in pockets but does not set the frontier's direction at the scale of the US or China.", "fieldReason": "US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Military-to-commercial spillover", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 46, "value": null, "reason": "France maintains a real defence-R&D base and some conversion into commercial technology, giving it a functioning but mid-scale spillover pipeline. It is a second-tier player here: a genuine engine, but neither the efficiency nor the scale to approach the US-China pair.", "fieldReason": "US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Compute & frontier-model control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "France is the strongest of the rest on this lever, with a genuine home-grown frontier-model presence that puts it ahead of its European peers. It originates at the frontier in a narrow band but does not control compute chokepoints, so it is a real but minor participant rather than a gatekeeper.", "fieldReason": "US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technology-denial-regimes": { "normalized": 33, "raw": 33, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Export-control regime leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "France co-authors denial rules through the EU dual-use regulation and maintains its own national export-control apparatus, placing it alongside Germany as a European regime author. Its authorship is exercised collectively through Brussels and the Wassenaar frame rather than as an independent frontier list-writer, which fixes it at the mid-tier: a genuine rule-shaper within Europe, not a system-defining author.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement / extraterritorial reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 24, "value": null, "reason": "France enforces the EU dual-use regime through its own licensing and customs apparatus, with effective reach inside its borders but no extraterritorial mechanism to force outsiders to enforce its denial. Like Germany it is a domestic-and-EU enforcer rather than a projector of rules onto third parties, so it sits in the lower-middle band.", "fieldReason": "US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Criticality of what can be denied", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "France holds selective critical capabilities in the advanced-technology and equipment chain, but few are truly non-substitutable, so its denial would bite in narrow domains rather than decisively. It sits just below Germany — real but limited criticality, holding contributory rather than chokepoint positions.", "fieldReason": "US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "ip-regime-authorship": { "normalized": 55, "raw": 55, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "IP rule-setting / regime authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 60, "value": null, "reason": "France co-authors the IP regime through the EU bloc, lending its negotiating weight to the high-standard European position in WIPO and TRIPS forums. Its influence on what is patentable and enforceable is genuine but channelled through the collective EU stance rather than wielded as a standalone rule-setter, placing it alongside Germany below the US.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement & exclusion reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "France enforces IP robustly within the EU and is a participating member of the Unified Patent Court that began operating in 2023, giving it exclusionary reach across the unitary-patent area. That power is bloc-internal rather than extraterritorial in the US sense, placing it as a strong regional enforcer below Germany's litigation weight.", "fieldReason": "US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "belief-ideological-authority": { "normalized": 48.333, "raw": 48.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Ideological / intellectual leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "France holds a distinct tradition-authority: the Enlightenment inheritance and a self-consciously alternative intellectual model that others still treat as a legitimate source of ideas, carried partly through the Francophone sphere. It authors within its own tradition rather than defining the global default, which places it in the upper-middle band as a genuine but bounded idea-originator.", "fieldReason": "Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Lingua-franca & credential dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "France is a credential magnet within the Francophone sphere, where its language and institutions are the system to operate in for a defined set of countries. That confers real but bounded authority: outside that sphere others default to English, so France sits in the middle as a language-and-credential provider for its bloc rather than the world.", "fieldReason": "The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Belief-transmission channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 58, "value": null, "reason": "France actively transmits civic and rule-of-law norms with measurable diffusion through the Francophonie and its long institutional reach. Those values are adopted within that sphere as legitimate, making France a real norm-provider in the upper-middle band, bounded to its bloc rather than universal.", "fieldReason": "Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "channel-control": { "normalized": 45, "raw": 45, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Knowledge-agenda channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "France produces substantial research but routes it through Western indexing and venue machinery it does not control, holding no comparable publishing channel of its own. It is a credible content-producer whose findings flow through channels others own, leaving it a channel-taker on the question of which findings count.", "fieldReason": "US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Orbital & data-channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "France is the strongest European orbital actor within the Galileo bloc, giving it co-provider status in a real global PNT channel rather than pure dependency. Its channel reach is bloc-shared through Europe, not sovereign and worldwide, so it sits below the independent global providers but well above pure dependents.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Channel rule-setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 53, "value": null, "reason": "France co-authors the European channel-rule bloc — spectrum coordination, Galileo standards, and GDPR-style data governance — giving it real authorship over how channels are run. Its rule-setting power is bloc-mediated through the EU rather than sovereign, but it is a setter, not a taker.", "fieldReason": "US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } } }, "UK": { "security": { "nuclear-order-setting": { "normalized": 63.667, "raw": 63.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "nonproliferation rule authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "1970-03-05", "score": 90, "value": null, "reason": "A rule-author and one of the three depositary governments of the NPT, alongside the US and Russia. As an original nuclear-weapon state it helped write the who-may-hold rule and remains a government with which the regime's instruments are deposited — a hand on the order itself, not merely a holder of weapons.", "fieldReason": "NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "safeguards inspection leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 69, "value": null, "reason": "Among the structurally-advantaged with Art VI-secured Board influence as one of the most atomic-advanced states, it shares control of the IAEA inspection lever rather than submitting to it. A significant civil and military nuclear power on the safeguards machinery, level with France.", "fieldReason": "Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "arms control agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-02-05", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "An NWS voice in multilateral arms-control settings but, like France, outside the bilateral regime whose treaty has lapsed; it cannot set or block the successor's terms. Marginal agenda power on the strategic-arms question — present in the conversation, not steering it.", "fieldReason": "New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "provision-of-protection": { "normalized": 33.333, "raw": 33.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "extended deterrence guarantees", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "A genuine provider, but a junior one: the UK is a NATO Article 5 co-guarantor and, like France, fields an independent nuclear deterrent underwriting that pledge, placing it among the only three providers within the set. Its standalone umbrella is modest beside the US, so it sits as a secondary guarantor rather than the hub.", "fieldReason": "Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "terms of protection", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "The closest peer-ally and a modest terms-sharer: the UK pairs deep alignment with the US protector with its own limited external posture and basing reach, so it extracts something rather than nothing. It is far below the US as a setter of terms, scoring as a secondary participant in the bargain.", "fieldReason": "Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "hub centrality", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "A central junior hub: the UK is woven deeply into the US-anchored network through command integration and nuclear cooperation, making it the most connected node after the principal. It is a hub, not a spoke, but a subordinate one, so it scores as the leading junior center of the network.", "fieldReason": "Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "chokepoint-route-control": { "normalized": 43.585, "raw": 43.585, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "maritime chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 9.756, "value": null, "reason": "A residual presence junior to the US. Diego Garcia and a Gulf footprint give Britain standing near the chokepoints, but it operates inside the American command architecture rather than commanding any strait in its own right — a former authoring power now a contributing one.", "fieldReason": "Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "sea lane security provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "A leading allied contributor to the US-led Combined Maritime Forces with its own deployable reach. Britain provides meaningful sea-lane security, but as a senior partner inside the American command structure rather than as the hub — provision exercised, command lent to the provider.", "fieldReason": "Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "route regime rule setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "A top-tier author of the maritime ground rules. The UK holds an IMO Council Category A seat — largest shipping interest — keeping a senior hand on the rules of passage, the institutional legacy of the naval rule-regime Strange described, even as its command at the straits has become residual.", "fieldReason": "IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "cyber-norms": { "normalized": 45, "raw": 45, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "cyber norm authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "A Budapest party — adopter, not author. The UK ratified the cybercrime convention founded by the US, Canada and Japan and operates within it, but did not author the regime's rules. On Strange's structural line it takes the framework rather than designing it.", "fieldReason": "Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "protective provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 53, "value": null, "reason": "A genuine provider, second only to the US. The UK supplies cyber-defence guidance, threat intelligence and CERT-level support through the NCSC and its place in Five-Eyes intelligence-sharing — the two channels the score_basis names. Its distinct position is the bridge role: it is the only European state inside the Five-Eyes core, so it relays Anglosphere threat intelligence into European partners that the US shares with less directly. It shelters others within its framework rather than merely defending itself — provision in Strange's sense, at meaningful scale.", "fieldReason": "Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "production": { "indispensable-input-control": { "normalized": 16, "raw": 16, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Critical-input chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "The UK controls no physical critical-input chokepoint — it neither refines the scarce minerals nor supplies the non-substitutable materials others must buy. It sits among the lowest, a consumer of inputs whose terms are set elsewhere.", "fieldReason": "China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Process & tooling gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "The UK gatekeeps no leading-edge process or tooling step at scale; its strength lies upstream in design-method rather than in controlling the physical process. The low score marks near-absence from process gatekeeping.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Denial / access-control leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 17, "value": null, "reason": "The UK holds a small share of denial leverage through its own export-control regime but exercises no input-denial at the scale of the US, China, or Japan. The score marks limited independent exclusion capacity.", "fieldReason": "US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Method-standard setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 21, "value": null, "reason": "The UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base — a genuine production-method that much of the industry designs to — giving it method-setting weight above its size. The score reflects real authorship of a design method, concentrated in one platform.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "gvc-governance": { "normalized": 42.5, "raw": 42.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Lead-firm governance power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 58, "value": null, "reason": "UK lead firms exercise moderate governance over suppliers, leaning on demand-side and brand position more than a deep industrial supplier-network system; they dictate terms within their own chains but govern a thinner manufacturing supplier base than the continental OEMs.", "fieldReason": "US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Chokepoint control in the chain", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "The UK controls almost no irreplaceable chain nodes; it cannot deny downstream access at scale and sits near the bottom on exercised chokepoint power.", "fieldReason": "Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Standards & governance authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 39, "value": null, "reason": "The UK authors the BRCGS food-safety standard and related retail-supply codes — a genuine but sector-bounded authorship that suppliers in those chains must meet.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 61, "value": null, "reason": "The UK imposes adjustment mainly through demand-side and final-market leverage — as a large consuming market it can push cost and disruption back onto suppliers in chains where it sits at the demand end — which lifts it to the Germany line despite a thinner manufacturing base. That consumption-side imposition, not supplier-network depth, is why it edges above eurozone exporters like France that absorb more chain adjustment through high foreign value added.", "fieldReason": "US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "transnational-firm-power": { "normalized": 64.75, "raw": 64.75, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Relocation leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 63, "value": null, "reason": "UK firms hold a large outward stock and an open, services-and-finance-heavy corporate base that relocates production readily, placing it at 60. The exit threat is credible, but Britain is also an unusually open host, so it is as much relocated-into as relocating — a net-controller, not a dominant one.", "fieldReason": "Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Host-state bargaining dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 61, "value": null, "reason": "At 55 the UK extracts host-state terms through its large, internationally-oriented firms, but its own openness as a host moderates the score. Britain bargains as a net-controller, yet it concedes terms to inbound capital nearly as readily as its firms win them abroad.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Mode-of-production control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 63, "value": null, "reason": "At 58 the UK organizes a real share of the cross-border mode through its international firms, particularly in services and consumer sectors. It shapes how production is structured across frontiers as a net-controller, though less industrially dense than Germany or Japan.", "fieldReason": "US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Outward control over foreign production", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 72, "value": null, "reason": "The UK holds an unusually high outward-control stock for its size — 70 — a larger share of world stock than France (60) or Italy (40). British capital's grip on production sited abroad is one of its strongest structural assets, placing it well into the net-controller tier.", "fieldReason": "Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "trade-rule-authorship": { "normalized": 42.667, "raw": 42.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Rule-writing agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Post-Brexit the UK is an independent mid-tier voice that sets some terms in its own name for the first time since joining the EU, but it lacks the market leverage or bloc backing to author or block core multilateral terms. It participates and proposes as a sovereign actor without dominating the agenda.", "fieldReason": "US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "RTA template authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 38, "value": null, "reason": "The UK is an adopter-plus: it rolled over the EU agreement templates it inherited and acceded to the CPTPP template rather than authoring a distinctive model of its own. It carries and extends others' templates rather than setting the benchmark, scoring in the lower-middle band.", "fieldReason": "US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Market-access denial capability", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "Post-Brexit the UK has a moderately large standalone import market conferring real but mid-tier denial leverage, well below the EU bloc's combined gatekeeping power it once shared. It can condition access but cannot dictate terms at the scale of the dominant deniers.", "fieldReason": "Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "value-capture-adjustment-burden": { "normalized": 61.333, "raw": 61.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Surplus-capture terms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 65, "value": null, "reason": "The UK sets some surplus-capture terms where its firms author arrangements that allocate value, earning it a score in the EU brand/standards peer band. It holds real but bounded term-authorship rather than broad control of who retains the surplus across the production structure.", "fieldReason": "US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-burden imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 58, "value": null, "reason": "The UK can shift some adjustment cost through its financial-center position and creditor channels, exercising partial imposition power. It scores in the European band — real leverage via the City and policy weight, below the US system-level capacity.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Terms-of-trade setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 61, "value": null, "reason": "The UK shapes some relative prices through its demand weight and pricing-influence in select markets, giving it partial terms-of-trade authorship. It sits below the US and China demand-scale shapers the basis names, with real but limited reach over how gains are allocated among producers.", "fieldReason": "Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "finance": { "credit-markets": { "normalized": 45.667, "raw": 45.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "benchmark", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "The gilt curve plus sterling's 7.5% share of international debt give London a genuine third price-setting anchor — smaller than the UST or the euro curve but a real reference the world prices some credit off (28). Through London's market depth the UK authors a distinct, if narrower, benchmark rather than merely taking others'.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "lolr swap reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "The Bank of England sits in the standing C6 swap network and extends sterling swap lines, giving it real outward backstop capacity in its own currency (35) — above the other national central banks but well below the Fed's system-wide dollar reach.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "gsib regulatory control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 74, "value": null, "reason": "The UK is a Basel/FSB co-author and the global banking hub, home-supervising 3 G-SIBs; it punches above its bank count on rule-authorship, with London's centrality giving it outsized weight in writing the prudential terms the world's banks obey (70). Among national supervisors it ranks second only to the US on authorship.", "fieldReason": "Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "reserves": { "normalized": 35, "raw": 35, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Trade & payments denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 40, "value": null, "reason": "Sterling carries about 6.5% of international payments and ranks #3 in FX spot, amplified by London's role intermediating global currency markets. The UK provides a genuine third settlement currency and a venue others route through, earning a 40 — real provision below the euro bloc but well above the secondary G7 currencies.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Commodity & debt denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Sterling accounts for roughly 7.5% of cross-border debt issuance, a real third currency that international borrowers use, though it prices no major commodity. The UK provides a genuine but minor debt-denomination rail, earning a 30 — above the secondary G7 currencies, well below the euro bloc and the dollar.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "institutional-influence": { "normalized": 32.009, "raw": 32.009, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Veto / blocking power", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 6.019, "value": null, "reason": "The UK carries meaningful board weight but sits below the blocking threshold, so it cannot veto major decisions on its own. Its score captures relational influence as a senior member, not structural authority over what the institutions can and cannot do.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Institution-as-agent (conditionality / programme leadership)", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 58, "value": null, "reason": "The UK is part of the European bloc that supplies IMF leadership by convention and co-authors programme design, giving it real authority over the conditionality the institutions impose. It directs the agent as a senior member of the transatlantic management, not as a programme subject.", "fieldReason": "US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "payment-systems": { "normalized": 25.333, "raw": 25.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "clearing rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "The UK runs CHAPS, its sterling RTGS, giving it sovereign control of a real but modest clearing rail confined to its own currency's footprint. It governs the layer sterling must settle through, but sterling is a niche settlement unit beside the dollar and euro, so its provision is genuine yet limited.", "fieldReason": "US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "exclusion designations early2026", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "Post-Brexit the UK runs its own autonomous financial-sanctions regime through OFSI under SAMLA, designating and freezing access independently of the EU and US — a real, sovereign exclusion power. Its score reflects standalone capacity to deny financial access, a notch below the EU bloc's collective SWIFT leverage but genuinely its own to wield.", "fieldReason": "Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "alternative rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "The UK runs no alternative to US-controlled settlement; sterling's CHAPS is its own currency's rail, not an escape from the dollar order the UK is broadly aligned with. Its floor-level score reflects an actor inside the mainstream settlement system with no independent route around it.", "fieldReason": "Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "sanctions": { "normalized": 21, "raw": 21, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "independent exclusion", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Post-Brexit the UK runs its own OFSI sanctions regime, giving it genuine but mid-low independent designation capacity — it can name and freeze on its own authority. Yet it cannot deny access to a chokepoint others cannot route around the way the dollar issuer can, so its exclusion power is autonomous in form but limited in structural reach.", "fieldReason": "Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "extraterritorial compliance reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "The UK's OFSI regime gives it slightly more standalone enforcement weight than its EU peers, but its sanctions still bind primarily its own persons and lack the dollar-clearing leverage that makes third-country conformity compulsory. It can pressure but cannot compel global compliance, placing it just above the European pack and far below the US.", "fieldReason": "Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "capital-allocation-ownership": { "normalized": 50, "raw": 50, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Asset-management concentration", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 40, "value": null, "reason": "The UK is the leading non-US asset-management hub: London's managers and intermediation infrastructure place a substantial slice of the world's investable capital, making it the clearest secondary provider of the allocation service beneath the American Big-Three.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Ownership of strategic firms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 36, "value": null, "reason": "UK-domiciled and UK-intermediated capital holds the largest non-US ownership slices across global strategic firms, reflecting London's role in placing equity — a genuine but clearly subordinate residual-claim position beneath the American Big-Three.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Cross-border equity-allocation reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2023-12-31", "score": 74, "value": null, "reason": "The UK is the world's premier cross-border intermediation centre: London is where global equity allocation is routed and cleared, giving it the largest outbound portfolio-equity reach in the set. It is the clear secondary hub beneath the US — the channel through which much of the world's savings reaches global markets, a genuine provider role subordinate only to the American destination.", "fieldReason": "US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "knowledge": { "standards-platform-control": { "normalized": 47.333, "raw": 47.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Standards-body authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 62, "value": null, "reason": "Second tier. BSI holds a meaningful set of secretariats and convenorships and remains an influential drafting voice in ISO/IEC, but its share places it below the US/Germany/China pole — a co-author, not the rule-pen.", "fieldReason": "Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Open-protocol foundation control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 52, "value": null, "reason": "Second-tier shaper. The UK carries meaningful RFC-authorship weight and a long lineage in protocol engineering, contributing to the standards others build on, but it operates within a foundational stack governed and originated elsewhere rather than controlling it.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Platform gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "Rule-setter, not owner. The UK's DMCC regime gives it authority to set conduct and access conditions on the major platforms, a Brussels-effect-style rule projection — but it regulates platforms rather than owning them or controlling their access gates.", "fieldReason": "Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technological-primacy": { "normalized": 41.333, "raw": 41.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Frontier-innovation origination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "The UK is the strongest of the second tier on origination, anchored by the DeepMind research lineage that produced genuinely frontier breakthroughs others built upon. It is a real source in selected AI domains — above its peers — but originates across too narrow a band to contest the leaders.", "fieldReason": "US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Military-to-commercial spillover", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 46, "value": null, "reason": "The UK has a credible defence-research base and selective spillover into commercial technology, but its pipeline operates at second-tier scale. It converts some military innovation into commercial advantage without running the kind of dominant origination-to-market engine that defines the leaders.", "fieldReason": "US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Compute & frontier-model control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "The UK has a credible frontier-model footprint through its leading AI-research lineage, placing it just behind France among the rest. It contributes to the frontier without controlling the compute stack others must access, leaving it a capable participant rather than a gatekeeper.", "fieldReason": "US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technology-denial-regimes": { "normalized": 33, "raw": 33, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Export-control regime leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "The UK writes its own dual-use export-control lists post-Brexit and remains a Wassenaar member, so it authors denial rules in its own name rather than taking them. But its lists track the multilateral and allied frame closely and it commands no frontier chokepoint to write rules around, leaving it mid-tier — a real but derivative regime author, not an originator of the binding controls others must follow.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement / extraterritorial reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 24, "value": null, "reason": "The UK enforces its own export-control regime robustly within its jurisdiction and coordinates with allies, but post-Brexit it commands no extraterritorial instrument comparable to the FDPR to make third parties comply. It is a within-jurisdiction enforcer aligned to the allied frame, scoring in the lower-middle band — real enforcement, no third-party reach.", "fieldReason": "US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Criticality of what can be denied", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "The UK retains pockets of critical technology and IP whose denial would matter in specific niches, but it commands no non-substitutable chokepoint in the frontier stack. Its criticality is modest — denial that bites at the margins, not a lever that can halt anyone's frontier progress — placing it alongside France.", "fieldReason": "US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "ip-regime-authorship": { "normalized": 51.5, "raw": 51.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "IP rule-setting / regime authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 55, "value": null, "reason": "The UK is a high-standard authoring state that helped build the Western IP regime and continues to carry independent weight in WIPO rule-making, distinct from the collective EU position. It shapes patentability and enforcement norms as a co-author rather than adopting them, scoring below the EU heavyweights' combined bloc weight but clearly on the author side rather than among the takers.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement & exclusion reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "The UK runs a respected patent-enforcement judiciary whose courts have asserted jurisdiction to set worldwide licensing terms — most prominently the Unwired Planet v Huawei line in which the UK Supreme Court upheld setting a global FRAND rate as a condition of avoiding a UK injunction. That gives it exclusionary reach beyond purely domestic policing, though narrower than the US market-access lever, placing it just above the mid-tier European enforcers.", "fieldReason": "US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "belief-ideological-authority": { "normalized": 68.333, "raw": 68.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Ideological / intellectual leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 60, "value": null, "reason": "The UK punches far above its size as the anglophone co-author. Oxbridge, the LSE, and outlets like The Economist sit inside the agenda-defining circuit, so British-originated framing diffuses globally on the back of the shared English-language intellectual ecosystem. It does not set the paradigm alone, but it co-writes it rather than receiving it.", "fieldReason": "Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Lingua-franca & credential dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 80, "value": null, "reason": "The UK punches far above its size by riding the English lingua franca plus Oxbridge and the Russell Group, which together make it a destination system others operate in to be credentialled. It is the clear number two behind the US on this lever — a major provider of the language-and-credential standard rather than a taker of one.", "fieldReason": "The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Belief-transmission channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 65, "value": null, "reason": "The UK co-exports rule-of-law and civic norms with real diffusion, carried partly through Commonwealth ties and the shared anglophone channel. Those norms are adopted, not merely broadcast, which gives it a strong upper-middle score as a genuine value-transmitter alongside the US rather than a passive relay.", "fieldReason": "Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "channel-control": { "normalized": 56, "raw": 56, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Knowledge-agenda channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 90, "value": null, "reason": "The UK co-anchors the agenda channel alongside the US: Elsevier-RELX is UK-based and the top journals and venues concentrate heavily in the British academic ecosystem. It authors which knowledge counts through editorial and venue control, making it a channel-owner rather than a content-supplier.", "fieldReason": "US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Orbital & data-channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "The UK holds no independent global PNT channel and is not a member of the Galileo bloc that anchors the European orbital channel, leaving it more dependent than the EU bloc states on infrastructure it does not provide. Its score reflects channel-dependency, not authorship of a substitutable global system of its own.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Channel rule-setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "The UK retains meaningful channel rule-setting through its ITU presence, but as a non-member of the EU bloc it authors outside the European weight that amplifies Germany and France on spectrum and data-governance rules. It is a mid-tier rule-influencer — more than a taker, less than the bloc anchors that set the terms others must meet.", "fieldReason": "US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } } }, "Italy": { "security": { "nuclear-order-setting": { "normalized": 18, "raw": 18, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "nonproliferation rule authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "1970-03-05", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "A non-nuclear-weapon party bound by the NPT — a rule-taker that accepted the prohibition on holding weapons and submits to the regime. It has no authorship of the structural rule deciding who may hold; it is one of the states the order shapes.", "fieldReason": "NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "safeguards inspection leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 21, "value": null, "reason": "Sits on the IAEA Board only through rotating elected seats, not the Art VI designation reserved for the most atomic-advanced states. It is largely a subject of the safeguards regime rather than a controller of the inspection lever — periodic voice, not structural command.", "fieldReason": "Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "arms control agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-02-05", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "An NPT party but a non-participant in the bilateral strategic-arms regime: a non-nuclear-weapon state with no role in setting or blocking its terms. Negligible agenda power, especially in the post-New START void.", "fieldReason": "New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "provision-of-protection": { "normalized": 6.667, "raw": 6.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "extended deterrence guarantees", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "A recipient, not a provider: Italy receives Article 5 protection and hosts US nuclear-sharing on its soil, taking shelter rather than extending it. It guarantees no one, so it scores at the consumer floor alongside the other protected NATO members.", "fieldReason": "Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "terms of protection", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "A terms-taker: Italy hosts US forces and bears the host-nation and cost-sharing obligations that come with the umbrella, extracting nothing in return. It sits on the paying side of the protection bargain, scoring at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "hub centrality", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "A spoke, not a hub: Italy is a committed NATO member plugged into the integrated command but does not anchor the network. As a served node rather than a provider-center, it scores at the spoke level.", "fieldReason": "Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "chokepoint-route-control": { "normalized": 37.813, "raw": 37.813, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "maritime chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 2.439, "value": null, "reason": "No chokepoint command. Italy holds no standing naval command over any of the straits world trade must transit; like the other states without such command, it conforms to the passage regime others provide rather than setting or enforcing its terms, leaving it a rule-taker on this lever.", "fieldReason": "Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "sea lane security provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "An active CMF participant, contributing naval effort to the policing of the Mediterranean-Red Sea sea-lanes. Italy provides within the US-led coalition — a working contributor to route security, not its provider or commander.", "fieldReason": "Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "route regime rule setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 95, "value": null, "reason": "A top-tier rule-setter. Italy sits in IMO Council Category A among states with the largest shipping interest, giving it a seat in the highest tier where maritime ground rules are written — outsized influence on the regime relative to its negligible command at the straits.", "fieldReason": "IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "cyber-norms": { "normalized": 29, "raw": 29, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "cyber norm authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "A Budapest party that adopts rather than authors. Italy ratified the Budapest Convention and operates within its terms, but the founding text was drafted by others; it is a rule-taker shaped by the dominant regime, not one of its designers.", "fieldReason": "Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "protective provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 21, "value": null, "reason": "A framework participant rather than an originating provider. Italy takes part in EU and NATO cyber-defence structures but supplies little independent protection others depend on. It is more inside the shelter than extending it.", "fieldReason": "Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "production": { "indispensable-input-control": { "normalized": 9.25, "raw": 9.25, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Critical-input chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "Italy holds essentially no non-substitutable input chokepoint and depends on refiners and materials suppliers abroad for the inputs its production needs. The near-floor score marks a pure input-taker.", "fieldReason": "China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Process & tooling gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Italy controls essentially no indispensable process or tooling step and depends on foreign WFE and chemistry suppliers. The near-floor score reflects a pure process-taker.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Denial / access-control leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "Italy receives the modest EU-regime-participant credit for shared export controls and exercises no national production-input denial of its own. Its score reflects bloc-level participation, not authored exclusion.", "fieldReason": "US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Method-standard setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 6, "value": null, "reason": "Italy holds only a narrow niche method-position through STMicroelectronics and sets no broad production method others must follow. The near-floor score reflects minimal method-authorship.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "gvc-governance": { "normalized": 30, "raw": 30, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Lead-firm governance power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "Italy governs suppliers mainly through district-level lead firms that dictate terms to clustered local suppliers, but exercises limited governance over dispersed global chains — a regional governor more than a global one, hence the lower score.", "fieldReason": "US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Chokepoint control in the chain", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "Italy holds essentially no chokepoint nodes that downstream producers must pass through, giving it negligible denial power in the chain.", "fieldReason": "Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Standards & governance authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "Italy's authorship is confined to luxury-district governance — the codes and provenance rules of its fashion and craft clusters — a narrow but real rule-writing role for a specific chain segment.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "Italy absorbs more chain adjustment than it imposes, embedded in eurozone interdependence with limited lead-firm leverage to push costs onto others, so it sits below the mid-line.", "fieldReason": "US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "transnational-firm-power": { "normalized": 43.5, "raw": 43.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Relocation leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Italy's outward footprint is thinner and more concentrated in mid-sized firms, so at 40 its relocation leverage is modest. Some Italian champions move production abroad, but the country lacks the deep base of globe-spanning lead firms needed to wield the exit threat as a structural rather than occasional instrument.", "fieldReason": "Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Host-state bargaining dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "Italy scores 45: its firms can negotiate with host governments in select sectors, but a thinner roster of global champions limits how much they dictate. Italy's bargaining sits at the boundary between controller and host rather than commanding host-state terms.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Mode-of-production control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 41, "value": null, "reason": "Italy scores 38: its firms organize intra-firm production in pockets — luxury, machinery — but lack the scale of network needed to dictate the cross-border mode broadly. Italy participates in others' organizing structures more than it authors its own.", "fieldReason": "US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Outward control over foreign production", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 41, "value": null, "reason": "At 40 Italy controls a modest stock of foreign production, concentrated in a few sectors. Its firms govern some plant abroad but lack the broad, deep outward-control stock of the leading European controllers.", "fieldReason": "Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "trade-rule-authorship": { "normalized": 40, "raw": 40, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Rule-writing agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 22, "value": null, "reason": "Italy authors no trade rules sovereignly; under EU exclusive competence the Commission negotiates and Italy's contribution is its population-keyed share of the bloc's voice (.279 of the Council double-majority weight). It co-authors through Brussels rather than writing terms itself, giving it the smallest of the three EU fractional scores.", "fieldReason": "US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "RTA template authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 24, "value": null, "reason": "Italy's template authorship is its population-keyed fraction (.279) of the EU's DCFTA and Brussels-effect regulatory templates — authored collectively in Brussels, not by Rome. It co-owns the smallest of the three EU member shares of a diffusing model rather than authoring its own template.", "fieldReason": "US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Market-access denial capability", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 74, "value": null, "reason": "Italy holds the full EU single-market denial value, as access to the bloc's indispensable market is the chokepoint and that denial leverage is attributed in full to each large member rather than split. Collective gatekeeping over a market others need gives it a high score.", "fieldReason": "Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "value-capture-adjustment-burden": { "normalized": 45.667, "raw": 45.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Surplus-capture terms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "Italy commands brand and design rents that confer some authorship over surplus retention, the EU brand/standards term-setting the basis attributes to the DE/FR/IT group, but narrower than the larger EU economies. The mid-low score marks partial, segment-bound term-setting rather than structural surplus authorship.", "fieldReason": "US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-burden imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Italy is more often an adjustment-bearer than imposer within the EU, though its size gives it some defensive weight against conditionality. The mid-low score marks limited ability to push cost onto others and recurrent exposure to bearing it.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Terms-of-trade setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 47, "value": null, "reason": "Italy shapes terms of trade narrowly, through pricing power in premium and design-led segments, with limited reach over the broader price regime. The mid-low score reflects segment-bound influence over relative prices rather than structural authorship.", "fieldReason": "Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "finance": { "credit-markets": { "normalized": 44, "raw": 44, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "benchmark", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "Italy is one of the issuers that collectively constitute the euro risk-free curve anchoring EUR's 40.3% of cross-border debt, the world's clear #2 benchmark behind the UST. Per D19 the curve is the union's, set collectively rather than by any single member, so Italy carries the full euro-bloc benchmark-authorship weight (48) as a co-issuer of the bloc's sovereign-debt complex off which euro credit is priced. The score reflects shared authorship of the anchor, not membership alone.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "lolr swap reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Italy is part of the single-currency union whose central bank, the ECB, sits inside the C6 dollar-swap network and independently extends euro-liquidity backstop to other central banks. Per D19 the ECB is one pooled central bank scored full-bloc, so Italy carries the euro LOLR-provision weight (42) as a co-owner of the bloc's lender-of-last-resort capacity for the world's #2 currency — a real outward backstop function the union provides, not a passive entitlement.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "gsib regulatory control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Italy is a Basel/FSB member home-supervising 1 G-SIB and carrying euro-bloc rule weight through the single supervisory framework (40). It is a participant in the prudential bargain — a co-adopter via the euro seats — rather than a primary author of the global rulebook.", "fieldReason": "Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "reserves": { "normalized": 47.5, "raw": 47.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Trade & payments denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "Italy co-issues the euro and is scored full-bloc per D19, sharing the euro's 21.3% of international payments and #2 standing in FX and trade finance. Its 45 reflects participation in authoring the only credible rival to the dollar's denomination rail, a unit a large share of world trade must settle in.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Commodity & debt denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 50, "value": null, "reason": "Italy co-issues the euro, whose 40.3% of cross-border debt nearly matches the dollar, and is scored full-bloc per D19. Its 50 reflects co-authorship of the world's #2 debt-denomination rail; the euro's absence from commodity pricing keeps the bloc below the dollar's combined lock.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "institutional-influence": { "normalized": 20.815, "raw": 20.815, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Veto / blocking power", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 4.63, "value": null, "reason": "Italy's voting weight places it among the mid-tier Europeans, well short of any blocking stake. It exercises relational influence on the board but has no capacity to veto or unilaterally shape institutional reform.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Institution-as-agent (conditionality / programme leadership)", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "Italy holds a G7 board voice that contributes to programme design above the larger emerging economies but below the core European trio that supplies the institutions' leadership. It is a junior co-shaper of conditionality, not a principal author.", "fieldReason": "US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "payment-systems": { "normalized": 31.333, "raw": 31.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "clearing rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 40, "value": null, "reason": "Italy co-governs the euro clearing layer through TARGET2 as a core Eurosystem member, sharing authorship of the euro bloc's mid-tier settlement rail alongside Germany and France. The source groups the three as one TARGET2 bloc; Italy helps own and operate a real rail euro counterparties must route through, the second genuine settlement layer after the dollar.", "fieldReason": "US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "exclusion designations early2026", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 40, "value": null, "reason": "Italy exercises exclusion power collectively through the EU, contributing to SWIFT de-designation and asset-freeze decisions as a member state — a real-lesser denial capacity. Its score sits at the EU-core level, reflecting shared authorship of bloc exclusion that binds counterparties without the unilateral extraterritorial reach the dollar gives the US.", "fieldReason": "Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "alternative rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 14, "value": null, "reason": "Italy provides no functioning alternative rail and operates no independent route around dollar settlement. Its low score reflects a euro-bloc member with no real escape capacity beyond the collective EU attempt (INSTEX) that is now defunct.", "fieldReason": "Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "sanctions": { "normalized": 22.5, "raw": 22.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "independent exclusion", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "Italy's exclusion capacity is the most conditional of the EU mid-tier: heavily bank-exposed to sanctioned economies and historically the member-state most reluctant to sever financial ties, it can block or dilute a Council denial decision as readily as it can join one. Its mid-tier score reflects a veto-bearing seat at the EU exclusion table rather than any independent power to deny access to the rails.", "fieldReason": "Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "extraterritorial compliance reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "Italy's distinct posture is exposure rather than projection: with banks and exporters deeply tied to sanctioned markets, it has been among the EU members most exposed to US secondary pressure and most cautious about provoking it. Its low score reflects an actor whose primary measures bind only its own nationals while it shelters behind the bloc's blocking statute, navigating others' extraterritorial demands rather than issuing any of its own.", "fieldReason": "Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "capital-allocation-ownership": { "normalized": 19.667, "raw": 19.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Asset-management concentration", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 18, "value": null, "reason": "Italy's asset-management footprint is minor on the global allocation map — its managers run largely domestic and regional capital and do not author placement decisions over the world's investable pool, leaving it a small taker-tier slice.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Ownership of strategic firms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 15, "value": null, "reason": "Italy holds only minor, scattered cross-border stakes in the world's strategic firms; its ownership reach is largely domestic, leaving it a small holder far from the residual-claim position over the firms others depend on.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Cross-border equity-allocation reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2023-12-31", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "Italy sits on the using side of the allocative system: its savings flow abroad into markets governed elsewhere rather than the world's savings routing into Italy. It is a source of placed capital, not a destination or intermediation hub, scored low on the vintage-flagged reach signal — a bottom-tier taker, not a provider of allocation reach.", "fieldReason": "US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "knowledge": { "standards-platform-control": { "normalized": 26, "raw": 26, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Standards-body authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 31, "value": null, "reason": "Mid-tier. UNI participates and holds some convenor and secretariat roles, but Italy is more often shaping individual standards within committees others steer than holding the pen on the structure. Present in the room, rarely setting the agenda.", "fieldReason": "Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Open-protocol foundation control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "Low-mid. Italy contributes some RFC authorship and protocol engineering but holds a limited share of foundational shaping; it interoperates with protocols originated and governed by others rather than helping set them.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Platform gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 22, "value": null, "reason": "Rule-setter, not owner. As an EU member Italy applies and enforces the DMA/DSA/GDPR rulebook that binds the platforms others use — but it shapes terms on platforms it neither owns nor gatekeeps, a rule-influencer rather than an access-controller.", "fieldReason": "Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technological-primacy": { "normalized": 18.667, "raw": 18.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Frontier-innovation origination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 22, "value": null, "reason": "Italy has research capacity but originates few of the breakthroughs others adopt; it is mid-tier, drawing on the frontier far more than feeding it. On this lever it is largely a follower that applies leading-edge technology rather than a source that creates it.", "fieldReason": "US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Military-to-commercial spillover", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "Italy has a limited defence-R&D base and a weak conversion pipeline, so military-to-commercial spillover is modest. It sits low-mid: some defence-adjacent capability, but little of the engine that turns military innovation into commercial dominance.", "fieldReason": "US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Compute & frontier-model control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "Italy has negligible frontier-model presence and no compute control, drawing on AI infrastructure authored and gated abroad. It is firmly a taker on the current frontier, with the low score reflecting real absence rather than understatement.", "fieldReason": "US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technology-denial-regimes": { "normalized": 20.667, "raw": 20.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Export-control regime leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "Italy authors export controls only as an implementer of the EU dual-use regulation, with little independent regime-writing of its own. It is a participant in the European denial frame rather than a shaper of it, so it scores in the lower-middle band — present at the table where the lists are coordinated, but contributing little original authorship and holding no frontier lever to legislate around.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement / extraterritorial reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 15, "value": null, "reason": "Italy enforces the EU dual-use rules as an implementer, applying controls to its own exporters but projecting no reach beyond its borders. Its enforcement is administrative and bloc-bound rather than coercive over third parties, placing it low — a compliant enforcer of rules written collectively, with no extraterritorial leverage of its own.", "fieldReason": "US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Criticality of what can be denied", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "Italy holds little that is non-substitutable in the frontier-technology chain; what it could deny is readily sourced elsewhere, so the bite is slight. It scores low on criticality — present in the industrial base but holding no chokepoint whose withholding would genuinely constrain a target.", "fieldReason": "US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "ip-regime-authorship": { "normalized": 50, "raw": 50, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "IP rule-setting / regime authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 55, "value": null, "reason": "Italy contributes to EU rule-setting on IP as part of the bloc's high-standard negotiating position, sharing in the authorship Europe exercises in WIPO and TRIPS-related forums. Its individual weight in shaping the rules is somewhat lighter than Germany's or France's, so it sits just below them while still firmly on the author side.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement & exclusion reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "Italy provides credible IP enforcement and is among the founding participating states of the Unified Patent Court launched in 2023, with a local UPC division, so it can exclude infringers across the unitary-patent area. Its reach is regional and lighter than the bloc's heaviest venues, leaving it a solid mid-tier enforcer.", "fieldReason": "US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "belief-ideological-authority": { "normalized": 23.333, "raw": 23.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Ideological / intellectual leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 22, "value": null, "reason": "Italy carries heritage authority — a deep cultural and intellectual inheritance — but does not currently originate paradigms that others accept as the legitimate frame for economic or policy debate. It is a respected heritage voice rather than an agenda-setter, placing it in the lower band.", "fieldReason": "Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Lingua-franca & credential dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "Italy attracts students to its heritage and design strengths but does not provide a language or credential system others must operate in. Italian is not a working global language, and its institutions sit inside systems standardized elsewhere, leaving it in the lower band as a niche destination rather than a credential authority.", "fieldReason": "The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Belief-transmission channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 23, "value": null, "reason": "Italy's norm-transmission is largely aesthetic and heritage-based; its cultural appeal travels widely but does not carry an adopted civic or political value-set. It is a heritage-voice rather than a norm-provider, which keeps it in the lower band.", "fieldReason": "Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "channel-control": { "normalized": 34.333, "raw": 34.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Knowledge-agenda channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "Italy is a content-producer whose research must pass through Western indexing and ranking systems it neither owns nor authors. With no major indigenous indexing or top-venue channel, it sits low — bound to the standards others set for which findings count.", "fieldReason": "US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Orbital & data-channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "Italy participates in the Galileo bloc, giving it partial co-provider status within the European orbital channel rather than pure dependency. It co-holds a substitutable channel through the EU but commands no independent global system of its own, placing it in the bloc-provider tier below the sovereign global providers.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Channel rule-setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Italy contributes to channel rule-setting mainly as part of the EU bloc on spectrum and data governance, adding to European weight without anchoring it. It is a partial author through bloc membership rather than an independent rule-setter on the channels.", "fieldReason": "US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } } }, "India": { "security": { "nuclear-order-setting": { "normalized": 15.667, "raw": 15.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "nonproliferation rule authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "1970-03-05", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "An outsider that rejected the regime entirely: India never joined the NPT, refusing the bargain that would classify it as a non-nuclear-weapon state, and built weapons outside the order. By staying out it neither authors the who-may-hold rule nor is bound by it — a rejecter, not a taker. Its low standing in the regime's own terms reflects that it refused the order rather than complied with it; outside the framework, it forced accommodation rather than accepting subjection.", "fieldReason": "NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "safeguards inspection leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 21, "value": null, "reason": "Holds no permanent designated standing on the IAEA Board, reaching it only via rotating elected seats; as an NPT outsider it is more inspection subject than inspection authority. It does not control the safeguards lever that the Art VI-designated powers command.", "fieldReason": "Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "arms control agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-02-05", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "An NPT outsider that sits apart from the bilateral strategic-arms regime and its successor talks; it neither sets nor blocks those terms. Whatever leverage its arsenal gives is relational, not structural agenda power over the treaty order — minimal.", "fieldReason": "New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "provision-of-protection": { "normalized": 5, "raw": 5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "extended deterrence guarantees", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "A non-aligned outsider to the guarantee system: India neither extends nor formally receives an extended-deterrence commitment, standing apart from both the Western umbrella and rival blocs. Authoring no protection relationship, it scores at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "terms of protection", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Extracts no terms: India's non-aligned posture means it neither provides protection nor exacts a basing or alignment price for it. With no terms to set, it scores at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "hub centrality", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Peripheral and non-aligned: India stands outside the integrated provision network, anchoring no alliance command and keeping deliberate distance from the blocs. As a non-aligned outsider it scores at the floor on network centrality.", "fieldReason": "Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "chokepoint-route-control": { "normalized": 30.293, "raw": 30.293, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "maritime chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 4.878, "value": null, "reason": "A regional Indian-Ocean presence astride the routes between Hormuz and Malacca, but command of no chokepoint. New Delhi can patrol and watch its near seas, yet the terms of passage at the straits its trade depends on are still set by others — it is a rising regional actor, not a strait-commander.", "fieldReason": "Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "sea lane security provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 21, "value": null, "reason": "Provides sea-lane security both as a CMF contributor and through its own independent Indian-Ocean-region patrols. New Delhi polices routes others depend on in its near seas — real provision — but at regional scale and not as the coalition's command center.", "fieldReason": "Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "route regime rule setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 65, "value": null, "reason": "A second-tier rule-setter. India holds an IMO Council Category B seat among states with the largest interest in seaborne trade, a genuine hand on the maritime regime that transport must conform to, one tier below the Category A shipping-service bracket.", "fieldReason": "IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "cyber-norms": { "normalized": 12, "raw": 12, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "cyber norm authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "Near the floor, and below clean adopters, because India authors nothing and has not even settled which rulebook to live under. It is a Budapest non-party that has spent years 'reconsidering' accession without acceding, while leaning toward — but not driving — the rival UN process. That leaves it weaker than a country like Germany or the UK that at least cleanly adopts the dominant Budapest regime, and weaker than Brazil, which has actually acceded to Budapest while also working the UN track. India has neither helped write a digital-domain framework nor committed to operating within one; its distinctive position is sustained non-commitment, sitting outside both pens and shaped by rules it had no hand in setting and has not even chosen to accept.", "fieldReason": "Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "protective provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "A recipient, not a provider. India depends on partner cyber-defence cooperation and standards rather than supplying protection others rely on. Structurally it sits inside frameworks others provide — sheltered rather than sheltering (Strange 1994, p.45).", "fieldReason": "Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "production": { "indispensable-input-control": { "normalized": 5, "raw": 5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Critical-input chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "India controls no refining or materials chokepoint at scale and must obtain the indispensable inputs from foreign suppliers; it neither refines nor sets terms on the scarce inputs. Its score sits at the floor of the input-control lever.", "fieldReason": "China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Process & tooling gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "India holds no leading-edge process or tooling gatekeeping position and must source the indispensable equipment and chemistry abroad. Its score sits at the floor — no control of the method's process.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Denial / access-control leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "India wields essentially no production-input denial leverage: it neither supplies the tooling and processed inputs others depend on nor exercises export controls over frontier inputs at scale. It is not a party to the Wassenaar Arrangement that coordinates the relevant dual-use controls, so it sits outside that order rather than inside it as a compliant participant — an outsider to the denial regime, not a subject of it. The floor-level score marks near-absence from the exclusion lever.", "fieldReason": "US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Method-standard setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "India authors no production method others must adopt and designs by methods set abroad. Its floor-level score marks a pure method-taker.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "gvc-governance": { "normalized": 16, "raw": 16, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Lead-firm governance power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "India is largely a chain participant rather than a chain governor — its firms execute production to terms set by foreign lead firms more than they dictate supplier networks abroad, so it scores low on exercised lead-firm governance.", "fieldReason": "US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Chokepoint control in the chain", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 7, "value": null, "reason": "India controls virtually no critical chain nodes others depend on, leaving it without meaningful denial power and near the floor on this lever.", "fieldReason": "Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Standards & governance authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "India largely adopts the supplier standards others write to qualify for export chains rather than authoring its own, so it is a standards-taker on this lever, low score.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "India largely absorbs adjustment imposed from above, eating the cost of terms set by lead firms rather than forcing the burden onto chain partners — a low but non-trivial score reflecting that its sheer market scale lets it resist some imposed cost rather than eat all of it.", "fieldReason": "US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "transnational-firm-power": { "normalized": 15.25, "raw": 15.25, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Relocation leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "At 12 India is overwhelmingly a host, not a relocator: its firms hold little outward control stock and rarely wield an exit threat over foreign labour. Indian production is sited at home and increasingly absorbs others' plant — India is on the receiving end of the relocation lever, not its author.", "fieldReason": "Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Host-state bargaining dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "At 10 India scores low because its own firms extract little from host governments abroad — that is the lever measured here, and Indian multinationals barely wield it. India's capacity to set conditions on inbound investors at home is a different lever and lies outside this metric; on outward corporate bargaining over hosts, India is a marginal actor.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Mode-of-production control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "At 15 India largely supplies into production modes organized by foreign lead firms rather than structuring its own across borders. Its IT-services firms are an exception, but in goods production India joins others' intra-firm networks rather than authoring how the cross-border mode is organized.", "fieldReason": "US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Outward control over foreign production", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 21, "value": null, "reason": "India scores 20: its outward-control stock is small and rising slowly, so its firms govern relatively little production sited abroad. India remains primarily a host of others' controlled production rather than a controller of foreign plant.", "fieldReason": "Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "trade-rule-authorship": { "normalized": 30.333, "raw": 30.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Rule-writing agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "India is a defensive blocker rather than an author: it wields agenda power chiefly to obstruct terms it opposes — on agriculture and development-flexibility — rather than to write the affirmative rulebook others adopt. That blocking capacity is real structural power over what cannot pass, which is why it scores above the EU member-state fractions despite authoring little affirmatively.", "fieldReason": "US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "RTA template authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "India largely adopts others' agreement templates rather than authoring a model others copy; its negotiated deals follow externally-set chapter architectures rather than setting the benchmark. With little template-export power it scores near the floor as a template-taker.", "fieldReason": "US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Market-access denial capability", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "India's import market confers limited denial leverage: it is large in aggregate but not the indispensable market others cannot do without, so its capacity to shut partners out and dictate terms is modest. It conditions access defensively rather than wielding denial as dominant leverage.", "fieldReason": "Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "value-capture-adjustment-burden": { "normalized": 19, "raw": 19, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Surplus-capture terms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 15, "value": null, "reason": "India sits low: it is largely a margin-taker performing services and assembly on surplus-capture terms authored elsewhere, with limited ability to set who retains value across the production structure. Its scale of activity is realized outcome, not authorship of the allocating arrangements.", "fieldReason": "US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-burden imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "India scores very low: it is structurally an adjustment-bearer, historically pushed to absorb the cost of external imbalances rather than able to impose it on others. Its position is the developing-country burden-bearer Strange identifies (1994, p.81), not a setter of who adjusts.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Terms-of-trade setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 34, "value": null, "reason": "India has growing but still limited ability to shape the relative prices that allocate gains; as a large buyer in select markets it gains some leverage, but it remains largely a price-taker on the terms others set. Its modest score reflects emerging demand-side influence short of regime-shaping.", "fieldReason": "Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "finance": { "credit-markets": { "normalized": 7, "raw": 7, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "benchmark", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "India's sovereign curve prices domestic rupee credit and has effectively no benchmark role beyond its own borders; the world does not discount global credit against Indian yields (4). It is a price-taker on the global curve, setting terms only inside its own market.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "lolr swap reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "India has no Fed swap line and provides no meaningful outward lender-of-last-resort function; the RBI backstops its own banks domestically but cannot rescue others' (4). It is a recipient-class actor in the global backstop layer, not a provider.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "gsib regulatory control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "India holds an FSB seat nominally but home-supervises no G-SIBs and contributes negligible authorship to the global prudential rulebook (12). It is at the table as a rule-taker, adopting Basel standards rather than shaping the terms others write.", "fieldReason": "Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "reserves": { "normalized": 4.5, "raw": 4.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Trade & payments denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 6, "value": null, "reason": "The rupee is barely used for cross-border settlement, leaving India a taker in the trade-denomination order: it invoices and settles its own trade overwhelmingly in currencies others issue. Its 6 reflects the near-total absence of a structural role in authoring or providing the medium world trade must run on.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Commodity & debt denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 3, "value": null, "reason": "The rupee carries a negligible share of cross-border debt and prices no commodity, so India borrows internationally in currencies others issue and sources commodities priced in them. Its 3 marks a taker on both rails, with no structural role in authoring debt or pricing denomination.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "institutional-influence": { "normalized": 8.352, "raw": 8.352, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Veto / blocking power", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 3.704, "value": null, "reason": "India's quota gives it a modest relational voice on the board and no veto. As a large economy still far below the blocking threshold, it bargains within the existing framework rather than controlling its terms.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Institution-as-agent (conditionality / programme leadership)", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "India is peripheral to the design of IMF/World Bank conditionality — its quota buys a voice in debates, but the programme template is authored elsewhere. It is closer to a recipient/outsider to programme leadership than a co-author of the discipline the institutions impose.", "fieldReason": "US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "payment-systems": { "normalized": 7, "raw": 7, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "clearing rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "India authors no clearing rail the wider world must settle through; its systems serve the rupee and domestic flows, not a global settlement layer. Its near-floor score reflects own-currency control with no structural hold on the rails cross-border money routes through, which remain dollar rails New Delhi does not govern.", "fieldReason": "US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "exclusion designations early2026", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "India holds no power to deny a counterparty access to the global settlement rails — that denial sits with the dollar and the EU bloc. Its very low score reflects a state that neither authors nor wields exclusion at the layer that matters, settling on terms set elsewhere.", "fieldReason": "Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "alternative rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "India provides no established rail that lets others route around US-controlled settlement. Its low score reflects an actor with, at most, early and partial capacity rather than a real alternative — nothing that yet escapes the dollar order.", "fieldReason": "Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "sanctions": { "normalized": 4, "raw": 4, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "independent exclusion", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "India has effectively no capacity to deny others access to the financial rails; at a near-floor score it is a participant in a system it did not build and cannot gatekeep. Rather than wielding an exclusion lever it works to insulate its own trade from the dollar chokepoint, marking it an outsider routing around denial it cannot control, not an author of it.", "fieldReason": "Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "extraterritorial compliance reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 3, "value": null, "reason": "India cannot force any third party to conform to its sanctions; it has no extraterritorial mechanism and instead works to shield its own trade from others' secondary reach. Its floor score marks it as an actor navigating around induced compliance, not generating it.", "fieldReason": "Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "capital-allocation-ownership": { "normalized": 8.667, "raw": 8.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Asset-management concentration", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "India's asset-management industry allocates a fast-growing but almost entirely domestic savings pool; it does not provide a globally-allocating function and sits near the bottom of the manager-domicile slicing, a taker into externally-governed capital markets.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Ownership of strategic firms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "India's capital owns its own domestic firms but holds almost no residual claim on the world's strategic firms — its cross-border equity ownership is negligible, placing it near the bottom as a non-holder in the global ownership structure.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Cross-border equity-allocation reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2023-12-31", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "India is a disclosed CPIS gap and not a destination the world's equity savings route into; its market draws portfolio inflows under managed access rather than serving as a hub, leaving it near the bottom of cross-border allocation reach — a taker into externally-governed channels.", "fieldReason": "US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "knowledge": { "standards-platform-control": { "normalized": 29.333, "raw": 29.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Standards-body authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 23, "value": null, "reason": "Lower-mid. BIS is an active and growing participant in ISO/IEC, but India still holds few secretariats or convenorships relative to its size — it conforms to and feeds into standards the top poles pen, with authorship ambition outpacing current rule-writing authority.", "fieldReason": "Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Open-protocol foundation control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Lower-mid. India's RFC authorship is growing and it participates in IETF work, but its share of shaping the foundational protocols remains modest — a rising contributor that interoperates with a stack authored and governed elsewhere.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Platform gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "Market-gatekeeper over its own territory. India exercises real access-denial — app bans, data-localization mandates, court-ordered platform actions — that compels foreign platforms to conform on Indian terms. It sets and enforces access rules for its market without owning the platforms or projecting those rules globally.", "fieldReason": "Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technological-primacy": { "normalized": 17.667, "raw": 17.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Frontier-innovation origination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "India scores low on origination: substantial human capital and a growing research base, but very few frontier origins that others must adopt. It is overwhelmingly an adopter of the leading edge rather than a creator of it, and the score reflects genuine origination scarcity, not a measurement gap.", "fieldReason": "US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Military-to-commercial spillover", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 29, "value": null, "reason": "India has a growing defence-research effort but thin conversion into commercial dominance; the spillover pipeline is nascent rather than effective. It scores low-mid as a state building military R&D capacity that has yet to translate into the commercial frontier others adopt.", "fieldReason": "US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Compute & frontier-model control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "India has near-zero frontier-model presence and no compute gatekeeping; it accesses the AI frontier entirely on terms set elsewhere. Its low score is a genuine absence of frontier control, not a measurement gap — it is a taker dependent on the stack others govern.", "fieldReason": "US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technology-denial-regimes": { "normalized": 14.333, "raw": 14.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Export-control regime leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "India authors its own national export controls and is not a Wassenaar founding insider but a later adherent, so it is better read as an outsider that built a parallel national regime than as a taker of the Western one. Its controls are oriented to its own strategic posture rather than coordinated frontier-tech denial, and it holds no chokepoint technology to write rules around, so the score stays low — capability outside the regime, not authorship within it.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement / extraterritorial reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "India enforces its own national export controls within its jurisdiction but exercises no extraterritorial reach and compels no third party to enforce denial. As an outsider running a parallel national regime rather than a node in the allied enforcement chain, its reach is minimal — domestic licensing only, scored near the bottom.", "fieldReason": "US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Criticality of what can be denied", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "India commands essentially no non-substitutable frontier technology to withhold; as an outsider building its own capacity rather than holding a chokepoint, it has little denial bite. Its criticality score is near the bottom — nothing it could deny would meaningfully constrain another frontier holder.", "fieldReason": "US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "ip-regime-authorship": { "normalized": 20, "raw": 20, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "IP rule-setting / regime authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "India is a rejecter-style contester rather than a taker. Bound into TRIPS through WTO membership, it led the defensive push for TRIPS flexibilities and access-to-medicines carve-outs, using mechanisms like its patentability standards to resist the maximalist regime others wrote. That is a genuine but defensive agenda — shaping the rules at the edges from outside the author bloc — which lifts it modestly above pure takers.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement & exclusion reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "India's IP-enforcement reach is confined to its domestic market and is comparatively weak even there as an exclusion instrument: its courts do not bar rivals from third markets or set global licensing terms, and it has no extraterritorial mechanism comparable to US import exclusion or the worldwide-rate jurisdiction asserted by UK and Chinese courts. Its very low score reflects the absence of any outward projection of IP-denial power, independent of its rule-setting posture.", "fieldReason": "US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "belief-ideological-authority": { "normalized": 24.667, "raw": 24.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Ideological / intellectual leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "India is a rising civilizational voice rather than a paradigm-author. It increasingly projects ideas about development and order on its own terms, but those framings are not yet widely accepted as authoritative beyond its own sphere, leaving it as an emergent idea-originator whose conferred authority is still modest.", "fieldReason": "Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Lingua-franca & credential dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 14, "value": null, "reason": "India scores low here despite very high English use because English is an inherited operating language, not one India authored or controls — and the country is a pronounced credential importer, sending large student flows abroad to be certified. It operates in the anglophone system rather than providing one, which is a taker position on this lever.", "fieldReason": "The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Belief-transmission channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "India transmits some civic and civilizational norms within its own sphere, but these are not yet widely adopted as authoritative beyond it. It is an emerging value-voice whose norm-diffusion is real but modest, placing it in the lower-middle band rather than among the genuine norm-providers.", "fieldReason": "Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "channel-control": { "normalized": 23.333, "raw": 23.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Knowledge-agenda channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "India scores near the floor: it is a large content-producer whose researchers are wholly routed through Western indexing (WoS/Scopus) to gain recognition, with no indigenous channel that decides which findings count. It is a channel-taker, dependent on machinery it has no hand in authoring.", "fieldReason": "US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Orbital & data-channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "India operates a regional PNT system, not a global orbital channel others depend on. It provides for its own region and reduces its dependency, but on the global channel it remains largely a consumer rather than a provider others cannot substitute.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Channel rule-setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "India participates in ITU spectrum and orbital processes, giving it some rising authorship over the channels, but it sits among the lower-weight participants who largely work within rules authored by the leading powers and blocs. It is closer to a rule-taker than a setter on the global channel rules, with influence growing from a low base.", "fieldReason": "US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } } }, "Russia": { "security": { "nuclear-order-setting": { "normalized": 78.333, "raw": 78.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "nonproliferation rule authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "1970-03-05", "score": 90, "value": null, "reason": "A rule-author, not a rule-taker: as successor to the USSR, Russia is one of three NPT depositary governments and an original nuclear-weapon state. It co-wrote and sustains the regime deciding who may hold weapons, and others lodge accession with it — structural authorship of the nuclear order, slightly below the US only as primary depositary/architect.", "fieldReason": "NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "safeguards inspection leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 74, "value": null, "reason": "Holds permanent IAEA Board influence under the Art VI designation of the most atomic-advanced states, giving it standing over the inspection lever others submit to. A major civil and military nuclear power, it co-controls the safeguards machinery — below the US but firmly inside the structurally-advantaged group.", "fieldReason": "Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "arms control agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-02-05", "score": 71, "value": null, "reason": "A co-principal of the lapsed bilateral regime now diminished: after New START expired, Russia offered to keep observing limits voluntarily but was rebuffed, leaving it shaping the successor from a weakened position. Residual agenda power below the US, holding terms it can no longer impose.", "fieldReason": "New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "provision-of-protection": { "normalized": 20, "raw": 20, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "extended deterrence guarantees", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 20, "value": null, "reason": "A rival provider, not a recipient: Russia extends formal extended-deterrence guarantees through the CSTO, but those beneficiaries lie outside the twelve countries scored here. It authors protection for its own clients, which earns it a provider's standing above the pure recipients, yet that umbrella reaches none of the states in this set, capping the score.", "fieldReason": "Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "terms of protection", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 15, "value": null, "reason": "Extracts basing terms, but outside this set: Russia exacts the price of protection through basing arrangements within the CSTO, mirroring the provider-extracts-terms logic, yet those hosts fall outside the twelve countries scored. The terms it sets touch none of this set, so it scores low.", "fieldReason": "Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "hub centrality", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "A hub of a rival network: Russia is central to its own CSTO-centred provision structure, not the Western one scored here, so its centrality is real but oriented against this network. It scores as a rival hub rather than a node inside the provision system measured.", "fieldReason": "Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "chokepoint-route-control": { "normalized": 4.48, "raw": 4.48, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "maritime chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 2.439, "value": null, "reason": "No command over any of the world's primary maritime chokepoints. Russia holds no standing naval command at the straits others must transit; it falls in the bucket of states that cannot offer or deny passage at the arteries world trade and oil depend on, and so sits outside the structure of route control on this lever — a rule-taker accepting a passage regime others set.", "fieldReason": "Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "sea lane security provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Absent from the cooperative provision of sea-lane security. Russia is not part of the US-led Combined Maritime Forces and offers no contribution to the multinational policing of global shipping lanes — outside the structure of route provision entirely.", "fieldReason": "Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "route regime rule setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 6, "value": null, "reason": "Structurally excluded from the rule-setting table. Russia was voted off the IMO Council after 2022 — a rare instance of expulsion from the body that writes the maritime ground rules. It went from rule-setter to outsider, denied the seat where the terms of passage are authored, the sharpest security-structure datapoint in the metric.", "fieldReason": "IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "cyber-norms": { "normalized": 47.5, "raw": 47.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "cyber norm authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 69, "value": null, "reason": "Principal driver of the rival authorship venue. Russia never joined Budapest and instead led the push for the competing UN Convention against Cybercrime (UNGA res 79/243, adopted 24 Dec 2024, opened for signature in Hanoi 25 Oct 2025), a deliberate alternative to the Western-authored regime. It authors rules — just at a competing table — so it scores as a rule-setter contesting the dominant framework, not a rule-taker.", "fieldReason": "Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "protective provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "Provider of an alternative model to its sphere. Russia extends cyber-protection and a security architecture to aligned states, offering a counter-framework to the Western model. It shelters others on its own terms within a narrower sphere — the rival face of provision, below China's reach.", "fieldReason": "Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "production": { "indispensable-input-control": { "normalized": 11.5, "raw": 11.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Critical-input chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 24, "value": null, "reason": "Russia holds raw-mineral inputs but, critically, not the refining step that converts them into the non-substitutable processed input — so its chokepoint power is shallow. The score reflects possession of ore without control of the method that makes it indispensable, a recurring gap between raw stock and refined-input provision.", "fieldReason": "China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Process & tooling gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Russia controls no advanced WFE, EDA, or precursor-chemistry process step and is locked out of the frontier method entirely; it cannot provide or deny the process to anyone. The floor-level score reflects total absence from process gatekeeping.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Denial / access-control leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "Russia can attempt raw-material denial but holds no leverage over the processed inputs and advanced tooling that matter most at the frontier of the method. Its denial reach is shallow because the chokepoints it could threaten are upstream ore, not the non-substitutable refined inputs or equipment others actually gate on. The low score reflects an actor with marginal exclusion power over the production method, well below the US and China who wield input denial at scale.", "fieldReason": "US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Method-standard setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "Russia sets no frontier production method others adopt and produces, where it can, by methods authored elsewhere. The floor score reflects absence from method-authorship.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "gvc-governance": { "normalized": 19.5, "raw": 19.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Lead-firm governance power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "Russia exercises almost no lead-firm governance over global supplier networks; its firms participate in chains as input feeders rather than dictating what dispersed suppliers produce or where, placing it near the bottom.", "fieldReason": "US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Chokepoint control in the chain", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Russia's chokepoint power is confined to raw-input nodes where it can deny access — a real but narrow leverage limited to the input end of chains rather than the processing or design nodes that govern downstream production.", "fieldReason": "Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Standards & governance authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 9, "value": null, "reason": "Russia authors essentially no private chain standards others adopt; it complies with or is excluded from the codes others write, leaving it at the bottom of authorship.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "Russia's low foreign value added reflects isolation rather than governance leverage, so on the governance reading it cannot impose adjustment on a chain it is partly cut off from — scored down as an outsider, not an imposer.", "fieldReason": "US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "transnational-firm-power": { "normalized": 10, "raw": 10, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Relocation leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "Russia scores 8: its corporate base is resource-extractive and territorially fixed, with little firm-led outward production to move. Russian firms cannot credibly relocate production abroad to threaten labour; on this lever Russia is an absent actor, not a wielder of the exit threat.", "fieldReason": "Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Host-state bargaining dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "Russia scores 12: its firms have scant capacity to extract terms from host governments abroad, and the export-market reach they might bargain from is thin. Whatever leverage Russia exercises runs through state energy deals rather than autonomous corporate bargaining over hosts, leaving it a minor actor on this lever.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Mode-of-production control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 9, "value": null, "reason": "Russia scores 8: its resource-extractive economy organizes almost no cross-border intra-firm production mode. It feeds commodities into chains structured by others rather than authoring how production is organized across frontiers.", "fieldReason": "US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Outward control over foreign production", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "At 10 Russia's grip on foreign production is minimal: a small outward-control stock means Russian firms govern little production sited in others' territory. On this lever Russia sits near the floor, a host of foreign-controlled plant far more than a controller of plant abroad.", "fieldReason": "Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "trade-rule-authorship": { "normalized": 12.667, "raw": 12.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Rule-writing agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "Russia has minimal individual authorship of multilateral trade terms, participating in coalitions without shaping or blocking the core agenda. Marginalized within the system and lacking the market leverage to dictate terms, it sits near the floor as a near-pure rule-taker.", "fieldReason": "US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "RTA template authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "Russia authors no agreement template that others adopt, working within Eurasian arrangements of limited external diffusion. It is a template-taker with negligible model-export power, sitting at the floor.", "fieldReason": "US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Market-access denial capability", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "Russia's import market is too small and substitutable to deny others meaningful access or dictate terms; it cannot lock partners out of a market they need. With weak denial leverage it scores low.", "fieldReason": "Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "value-capture-adjustment-burden": { "normalized": 23.667, "raw": 23.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Surplus-capture terms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 23, "value": null, "reason": "Russia's position is that of a commodity exporter earning rents it does not author — prices and surplus-capture terms are set by buyers and benchmark regimes outside its control. Rent received is not terms-authorship, which is precisely why its score is low.", "fieldReason": "US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-burden imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "Russia can impose narrow, coercive adjustment via energy supply and bilateral leverage, but sanctions and exclusion from core financial arrangements cap its structure-wide imposition power. Its low-mid score reflects situational coercion outside, not authorship of, the adjustment regime.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Terms-of-trade setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 22, "value": null, "reason": "Russia, despite a high terms-of-trade index from commodity exports, scores low because that is a favorable outcome, not authorship — prices are set by external benchmarks and buyers, not by Russia. The metric scores who shapes the price regime, and Russia is a price-taker within it.", "fieldReason": "Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "finance": { "credit-markets": { "normalized": 4.333, "raw": 4.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "benchmark", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 3, "value": null, "reason": "Russia sets no global benchmark and, post-sanctions, prices even its own external paper at a deep isolation discount with no international reference function (3). It is wholly outside the price-setting layer of global credit.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "lolr swap reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "Russia has no access to the Fed network and, cut off post-sanctions, provides no outward LOLR and cannot draw crisis liquidity from the dollar system (4). It is excluded from the global backstop entirely.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "gsib regulatory control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 6, "value": null, "reason": "Russia has no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook, and is further isolated post-sanctions from the bodies that set prudential terms (6). It is effectively excluded from the government-bank bargain at the global level — neither author nor active participant.", "fieldReason": "Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "reserves": { "normalized": 3.5, "raw": 3.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Trade & payments denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "The ruble is almost absent from cross-border settlement and, since sanctions, increasingly excluded from the dollar- and euro-denominated rails entirely. Russia is neither author nor accepted provider here — a 4 marks an actor denied the denomination order rather than shaping it, forced into workaround currencies it does not control.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Commodity & debt denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 3, "value": null, "reason": "The ruble has negligible cross-border debt denomination and no commodity-pricing role despite Russia's standing as a major energy exporter — its oil and gas are still priced against dollar benchmarks it does not set. The 3 reflects an outsider that cannot impose its own unit even on the commodities it sells, denied the denomination rails rather than authoring them.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "institutional-influence": { "normalized": 7.352, "raw": 7.352, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Veto / blocking power", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 3.704, "value": null, "reason": "Russia's voting weight is small and sub-threshold, leaving it without any blocking power over IMF or World Bank decisions. Its influence is relational and marginal, exercised inside a framework it cannot author or veto.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Institution-as-agent (conditionality / programme leadership)", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "Russia is marginal to programme design and has no role in authoring the conditionality the institutions impose. Estranged from the institutions' leadership, it is effectively an outsider to the agent function rather than a director of it.", "fieldReason": "US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "payment-systems": { "normalized": 17.333, "raw": 17.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "clearing rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 6, "value": null, "reason": "Russia's clearing-rail control is minimal at the global layer — it settles domestically through its own systems but governs no rail the outside world must route through, and exclusion from dollar and euro clearing has confined it further. Its very low score reflects a state cut off from the rails it cannot author, holding only a domestic substitute.", "fieldReason": "US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "exclusion designations early2026", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Russia is the archetypal target of this component rather than a holder of it: cut off from SWIFT and dollar clearing by US and EU exclusion, it can deny access to nothing the outside world must use. Its very low score reflects an excluded state forced to build a substitute rail, not an author of denial.", "fieldReason": "Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "alternative rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 41, "value": null, "reason": "Russia runs SPFS, a domestic messaging-and-settlement substitute built under exclusion pressure, giving it the second-largest alternative-rail capacity after China's CIPS. Its score reflects a real but minor escape route — a genuine state-built workaround, far short of CIPS's reach.", "fieldReason": "Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "sanctions": { "normalized": 4.5, "raw": 4.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "independent exclusion", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 6, "value": null, "reason": "Russia is the archetypal target of the exclusion lever, not a wielder of it — the 2022 SWIFT cut-off demonstrated it cannot route around the chokepoint others control. Its near-floor score marks it as the excluded party scrambling for workarounds, structurally on the receiving end of denial rather than authoring it.", "fieldReason": "Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "extraterritorial compliance reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 3, "value": null, "reason": "Russia has no ability to make third parties conform to its measures — it is the prototypical object of secondary sanctions, with foreign banks conforming to US designations against it. Its floor score reflects a target of extraterritorial compliance pressure, structurally unable to project any of its own.", "fieldReason": "Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "capital-allocation-ownership": { "normalized": 5.333, "raw": 5.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Asset-management concentration", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 6, "value": null, "reason": "Russia is effectively absent from the global allocation function — sanctions and isolation have severed its managers from the integrated capital market, so it neither provides nor meaningfully participates in where the world's investable capital is placed; it scores lowest as an excluded outsider.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Ownership of strategic firms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Russian capital has been cut out of the equity registers of the world's strategic firms by sanctions and forced divestment; it neither holds nor can build a residual claim on the global set, scoring lowest as an excluded outsider rather than a quiet co-owner.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Cross-border equity-allocation reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2023-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Russia's cross-border equity reach has collapsed to near-zero under sanctions and market closure. It is neither a destination for the world's savings nor a participant with outbound reach — cut out of the integrated allocative system entirely, an excluded outsider scored lowest.", "fieldReason": "US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "knowledge": { "standards-platform-control": { "normalized": 14.667, "raw": 14.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Standards-body authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "Low. GOST/Rosstandart participates in ISO/IEC but holds very little secretariat or convenor weight — Russia is a participant and standards-taker in the international bodies, not a codifier of the rules others adopt.", "fieldReason": "Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Open-protocol foundation control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 14, "value": null, "reason": "Low. Russia's RFC-authorship footprint is small and it does not shape the foundational stack — it interoperates with protocols set abroad, and its sovereign-internet posture is a defensive walling-off rather than a claim to author the global protocols.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Platform gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 18, "value": null, "reason": "Sovereign-walled-minor. Russia asserts access control over its own market through platform blocking, sovereign-internet measures, and localization mandates — defensive gatekeeping of its territory — but it neither owns globally relevant platforms nor sets rules others must adopt.", "fieldReason": "Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technological-primacy": { "normalized": 21, "raw": 21, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Frontier-innovation origination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 18, "value": null, "reason": "Russia retains pockets of deep scientific capability but produces few commercial frontier origins others draw from; its strength is legacy and defence-adjacent rather than leading-edge creation. It sits mid-low as a state with capacity but little current frontier authorship in the technologies others now adopt.", "fieldReason": "US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Military-to-commercial spillover", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 33, "value": null, "reason": "Russia scores above its overall research rank specifically on the military side, with genuinely strong defence R&D — but its commercial spillover is weak, so military innovation rarely converts into commercial dominance. It is the clearest case of strong defence origination decoupled from a working commercial pipeline.", "fieldReason": "US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Compute & frontier-model control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "Russia has minimal frontier-model presence and is largely cut off from the leading compute stack by export controls and isolation. It is neither an author nor a gatekeeper here — an outsider to the current frontier, reliant on what it can develop or acquire under constraint.", "fieldReason": "US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technology-denial-regimes": { "normalized": 14.333, "raw": 14.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Export-control regime leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 20, "value": null, "reason": "Russia is a Wassenaar member on paper but has no frontier technology left to deny, which hollows out any regime-authorship role — membership without leverage. It is effectively an outsider to the live denial dynamic, neither writing the binding lists nor commanding anything others would need licensed access to, so its authorship score is near the floor despite formal participation.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement / extraterritorial reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "Russia has essentially no enforcement reach in this regime: with no frontier technology to deny and a position outside the live Western denial chain, it can neither compel allies nor reach third parties. Its score sits near the floor — a nominal member with no instrument to make anyone enforce anything.", "fieldReason": "US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Criticality of what can be denied", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 15, "value": null, "reason": "Russia's denial criticality is low: it has lost frontier-technology positions and what it could withhold is largely substitutable, so its denial does not bite in the technology layer. The modest score reflects residual niche materials rather than any genuine chokepoint — withholding power without non-substitutable weight.", "fieldReason": "US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "ip-regime-authorship": { "normalized": 12, "raw": 12, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "IP rule-setting / regime authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "Russia exercises almost no authorship over the global IP regime: it adopted the TRIPS framework on WTO accession and has neither led rule-setting nor mounted the kind of organized TRIPS-flexibilities challenge the access-to-medicines bloc did. Its posture is passive convergence at best, and its standing in WIPO and TRIPS forums carries little weight in shaping what is globally patentable or enforceable, leaving it at the floor of this provision lever.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement & exclusion reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "Russia enforces IP only within its own jurisdiction and projects no extraterritorial exclusion. Since 2022 its enforcement posture toward foreign rights-holders has weakened sharply, with measures stripping compensation for patent use by unfriendly-state owners, so its capacity to deny rivals market access through IP enforcement abroad is effectively nil, leaving it near the bottom.", "fieldReason": "US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "belief-ideological-authority": { "normalized": 28.333, "raw": 28.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Ideological / intellectual leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "Russia's ideational position is that of a spoiler-narrator. It does not author a constructive paradigm others adopt by conviction; it propagates a counter-narrative aimed at contesting the dominant order. That is influence by negation rather than belief-conferral, so it scores low as a rejecter-voice rather than an idea-author.", "fieldReason": "Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Lingua-franca & credential dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "Russia retains some inbound students into its own institutions, mainly from neighboring and aligned states, but it does not provide a language or credential system the wider world operates in. Russian functions within a regional bloc, so its conferral of lingua-franca authority is low and largely affinity-based.", "fieldReason": "The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Belief-transmission channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity, not authority — states already inclined to contest the liberal order echo its framings rather than adopting them through conferred legitimacy. That is influence by alignment rather than belief-transmission, which keeps it low as a counter-norm voice rather than a value-provider.", "fieldReason": "Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "channel-control": { "normalized": 32.667, "raw": 32.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Knowledge-agenda channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "Russia is largely an outsider-producer here — sanctioned and increasingly cut off from Western indexing channels, yet without a globally accepted rival index of its own. Its low score reflects exclusion from the agenda channel rather than authorship of an alternative; it neither sets the rules nor commands a substitute that others accept.", "fieldReason": "US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Orbital & data-channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "Russia provides GLONASS, a genuinely global PNT channel, which keeps it a real orbital provider rather than a dependent — but the system is degraded, weakening the dependency it can impose on others. It scores as a substitutable-channel provider whose leverage is eroding.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Channel rule-setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Russia is an ITU member that authors around the GLONASS standard and pushes a sovereign-internet data-governance model, giving it residual rule-setting capacity on the channels. It is a partial author and rejecter of Western internet-governance norms rather than a compliant taker, though its weight is constrained.", "fieldReason": "US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } } }, "Canada": { "security": { "nuclear-order-setting": { "normalized": 27, "raw": 27, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "nonproliferation rule authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "1970-03-05", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "A non-nuclear-weapon party and rule-taker: despite an advanced civil-nuclear and uranium base, Canada accepted the NPT's bar on holding weapons and is bound by the regime. It is shaped by the who-may-hold rule, not an author of it.", "fieldReason": "NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "safeguards inspection leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "Structurally advantaged through its major uranium production and civil-nuclear technology, qualifying under the Art VI designation of the most atomic-advanced states for standing Board influence — a hand on the IAEA inspection lever, though of smaller weight than the larger nuclear powers.", "fieldReason": "Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "arms control agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-02-05", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "An NPT party but outside the bilateral strategic-arms regime: a non-nuclear-weapon state that can voice positions yet cannot set or block the terms of restraint. Negligible structural agenda power over the arms-control order.", "fieldReason": "New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "provision-of-protection": { "normalized": 6.667, "raw": 6.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "extended deterrence guarantees", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "A recipient and junior co-member: Canada is covered by NATO's Article 5 and bound to the US through NORAD, but it extends no extended-deterrence guarantee of its own. It is sheltered, not a sheltering power, so it sits at the recipient floor.", "fieldReason": "Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "terms of protection", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Extracts no terms: Canada provides protection to no one and so exacts no basing or burden-sharing price; its NORAD tie runs the other way. With nothing to extract, it scores at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "hub centrality", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "A spoke, not a hub: Canada is tied into NATO and bilaterally into NORAD with the US, but it occupies a served position rather than the center of the provision network. It scores at the spoke level.", "fieldReason": "Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "chokepoint-route-control": { "normalized": 26.146, "raw": 26.146, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "maritime chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 2.439, "value": null, "reason": "No command over any primary maritime chokepoint. Canada's naval reach does not extend to the straits others must transit; on this lever it is a beneficiary of the order, not an author of it.", "fieldReason": "Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "sea lane security provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "A participant in the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, contributing periodic naval effort to coalition patrols. Canada helps police the routes but at the contributing tier, well inside the American command architecture.", "fieldReason": "Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "route regime rule setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 65, "value": null, "reason": "A second-tier rule-setter. Canada holds an IMO Council Category B seat among states with the largest interest in seaborne trade, contributing to the authorship of the maritime regime one tier below the top shipping-interest bracket.", "fieldReason": "IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "cyber-norms": { "normalized": 53, "raw": 53, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "cyber norm authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 74, "value": null, "reason": "A founding author of the Budapest regime alongside the US and Japan. Canada participated actively in drafting CETS-185, helping write the rules of digital-domain conduct that some 81 parties later adopted. It sits on the authoring side of Strange's structural line — designing the regime, not taking it.", "fieldReason": "Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "protective provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "A Five Eyes provider. Canada contributes to the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement and supports allied cyber-defence, supplying protection into a shared framework. It provides within the alliance structure rather than originating an independent shelter of its own.", "fieldReason": "Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "production": { "indispensable-input-control": { "normalized": 7, "raw": 7, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Critical-input chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "Canada has raw-mineral endowment but no refining chokehold and no materials-provision lock, so it cannot deny others access to a processed input they need. The low score marks ore-holder, not input-gatekeeper.", "fieldReason": "China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Process & tooling gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 6, "value": null, "reason": "Canada gatekeeps no indispensable process or tooling step and consumes the equipment and chemistry others supply. The low score marks a process-taker with no provision power over the method.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Denial / access-control leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 7, "value": null, "reason": "Canada exercises minimal production-input denial and aligns with allied regimes rather than authoring exclusion of its own. The low score marks a regime-follower with little independent denial power.", "fieldReason": "US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Method-standard setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 2, "value": null, "reason": "Canada authors no production method others must follow and is a taker of the design-rules and process-methods set abroad. Its floor score marks no method-setting power.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "gvc-governance": { "normalized": 29.5, "raw": 29.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Lead-firm governance power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "Canada governs suppliers chiefly as the senior tier inside deeply US-integrated chains — energy, autos, and resource processing physically interlocked with American lead firms — where its firms set terms to a domestic supplier base even while taking direction from US chain leads. That embedded co-governance role, rather than independent chain authorship, places it above purely district-bound or commodity-feeding participants like Italy.", "fieldReason": "US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Chokepoint control in the chain", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "Canada's node control is limited to a few raw inputs; it can deny little that cannot be sourced elsewhere, so its chokepoint power is small.", "fieldReason": "Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Standards & governance authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "Canada writes few private chain standards of its own and mostly aligns to US and international codes to participate, a standards-taker more than an author.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 45, "value": null, "reason": "Canada absorbs much of the adjustment set by the US-led chains it participates in, with limited leverage to push the burden back onto others — below the mid-line.", "fieldReason": "US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "transnational-firm-power": { "normalized": 60, "raw": 60, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Relocation leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 58, "value": null, "reason": "Canadian multinationals — in resources, finance, and engineering — hold a meaningful outward footprint and can site production abroad, putting Canada at 55. It is a genuine net-controller whose firms author some location decisions, though its corporate base is smaller and more sectorally narrow than the top relocators.", "fieldReason": "Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Host-state bargaining dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 61, "value": null, "reason": "Canadian firms in resources and finance bargain meaningfully with host governments, placing Canada at 55 in the net-controller band. Its multinationals extract terms abroad, though from a smaller and more sector-specific base than the leading controllers.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Mode-of-production control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 54, "value": null, "reason": "Canadian firms organize cross-border production in resources and finance, placing Canada at 50. It authors part of the mode in its sectors as a net-controller, though its intra-firm networks are narrower than the leading organizers'.", "fieldReason": "US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Outward control over foreign production", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 67, "value": null, "reason": "Canada holds a relatively high outward-control stock for its size — 65 — through its resource, finance, and engineering multinationals. Canadian firms govern a meaningful share of foreign production, placing it among the stronger mid-tier controllers.", "fieldReason": "Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "trade-rule-authorship": { "normalized": 39, "raw": 39, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Rule-writing agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Canada exercises agenda power as a coalition-builder, convening the Ottawa Group among WTO members rather than acting as a unilateral author or blocker. It shapes the terms of debate by assembling middle-power consensus, a real but mid-tier form of rule-writing influence.", "fieldReason": "US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "RTA template authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 38, "value": null, "reason": "Canada co-shapes templates as a partner inside CPTPP and CETA rather than authoring a benchmark unilaterally, contributing chapters and provisions to models stewarded by larger players. That partner co-authorship is real but secondary, giving it a lower-middle score.", "fieldReason": "US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Market-access denial capability", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 37, "value": null, "reason": "Canada's mid-sized import market gives it limited denial capability — it can condition access at the margins but cannot shut indispensable partners out or dictate terms. Its denial leverage is modest, placing it in the lower-middle band.", "fieldReason": "Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "value-capture-adjustment-burden": { "normalized": 40.333, "raw": 40.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Surplus-capture terms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 40, "value": null, "reason": "Canada captures resource and supply-chain value but largely on terms it does not author, consistent with the basis treating commodity-leaning economies as low because rent received is not terms-authorship. The low-mid score reflects a price- and terms-taker rather than a setter of surplus allocation.", "fieldReason": "US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-burden imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Canada has modest ability to shift adjustment cost and more often adjusts within US- and IMF-anchored arrangements it does not author. The low-mid score marks a participant that bears or absorbs adjustment more than it imposes it.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Terms-of-trade setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 39, "value": null, "reason": "Canada is largely a commodity and integrated-supply price-taker whose relative prices are set by external benchmarks and its dominant trading partner. The low-mid score reflects limited authorship over the prices that allocate its trading gains.", "fieldReason": "Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "finance": { "credit-markets": { "normalized": 25.667, "raw": 25.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "benchmark", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "Canada's GoC curve anchors a deep, well-run domestic market but carries a sub-1% international debt share and little price-setting reach beyond Canadian paper (10). It is a benchmark at home, not for global credit.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "lolr swap reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "The Bank of Canada is inside the standing C6 swap network and provides the Canadian-dollar backstop to that network (25) — genuine outward LOLR provision in its own currency, ranking just below the BoJ within the standing network and far below the Fed.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "gsib regulatory control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Canada is a Basel/FSB member home-supervising 2 G-SIBs, giving it solid standing as a participant in the prudential bargain (40) — a respected co-adopter of the rulebook with a real if modest systemic-bank footprint, ranking alongside Italy and just below Japan.", "fieldReason": "Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "reserves": { "normalized": 16.5, "raw": 16.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Trade & payments denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "The Canadian dollar handles about 3.0% of international payments and ranks #6 in FX, punching above the country's size as a commodity-linked G7 currency. Canada provides a modestly used settlement unit at the edges of world trade without obliging others to invoice in it; its 25 reflects limited provision, not rule-authorship.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Commodity & debt denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "The Canadian dollar holds a low single-digit share of cross-border debt and, despite Canada's commodity exports, those commodities are priced in dollars rather than in CAD. Its 8 marks a secondary provider on the debt rail and a taker on pricing — no structural authorship of either denomination.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "institutional-influence": { "normalized": 14.62, "raw": 14.62, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Veto / blocking power", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 3.241, "value": null, "reason": "Canada holds a small voting share that affords a relational seat at the table but no blocking capacity. It participates in board decisions without any structural ability to veto reform.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Institution-as-agent (conditionality / programme leadership)", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "Canada carries a meaningful G7 board voice that gives it some say in programme design, above the emerging economies but well below the bloc that supplies the institutions' leadership. It is a contributing co-shaper of conditionality, not a principal author.", "fieldReason": "US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "payment-systems": { "normalized": 9.667, "raw": 9.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "clearing rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "Canada has sovereign clearing for its own currency but governs no rail the wider world is bound to. Its low score reflects competent domestic settlement with no structural reach over global clearing, which flows through dollar rails Ottawa does not control.", "fieldReason": "US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "exclusion designations early2026", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "Canada holds no power to deny a counterparty access to the global settlement rails — that capacity rests with the US and the EU. Its low score reflects a state that conforms to exclusions others author rather than directing access to the rail itself.", "fieldReason": "Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "alternative rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 7, "value": null, "reason": "Canada runs no alternative to US-controlled settlement; as a dollar-integrated economy it has no rail built to escape the mainstream and provides essentially none of this capacity. Its floor-level score reflects an actor fully inside the dollar settlement order with no independent route around it.", "fieldReason": "Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "sanctions": { "normalized": 7.5, "raw": 7.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "independent exclusion", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "Canada maintains its own sanctions listings but cannot unilaterally deny access to the settlement system anyone must use; its measures gain force only by aligning with US dollar-clearing reach. It is a coordinating follower, holding nominal designation authority without independent chokepoint control.", "fieldReason": "Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "extraterritorial compliance reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Canada's sanctions bind its own persons and gain extraterritorial force only by aligning with US designations, not through any independent secondary-compliance lever. It is a coordinating follower whose measures travel only on American rails, holding negligible compulsion of its own.", "fieldReason": "Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "capital-allocation-ownership": { "normalized": 32.667, "raw": 32.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Asset-management concentration", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Canada's large institutional managers give it a credible mid-tier slice of the global allocation function — more than its size would suggest, but well below the US complex and the UK/France hub tier. It is a modest provider that places capital into the system rather than setting the terms on which the world's investable capital is allocated.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Ownership of strategic firms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "Canada's pension and asset managers hold real cross-border equity stakes, giving it a modest residual-claim footprint in global firms — more than its size implies, but scattered minority positions rather than the dominant holdings the US complex commands.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Cross-border equity-allocation reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2023-12-31", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Canada has solid outbound cross-border equity allocation driven by its institutional funds placing capital abroad — a genuine participant with real reach, but a source of placed savings rather than the destination the world's savings route into.", "fieldReason": "US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "knowledge": { "standards-platform-control": { "normalized": 28.333, "raw": 28.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Standards-body authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 29, "value": null, "reason": "Mid-tier. The SCC engages actively in ISO/IEC and holds a modest set of roles, but Canada largely works within frameworks the larger poles author rather than codifying rules others conform to. A contributor more than a pen-holder.", "fieldReason": "Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Open-protocol foundation control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "Mid-tier authorship. Canadian engineers contribute respectably to RFCs and protocol work, an established shaping presence, but Canada is a participant in protocol development rather than a custodian of the stack others must conform to.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Platform gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 14, "value": null, "reason": "Minor rule-influence. Canada has asserted some authority over how platforms operate within its borders through domestic platform-facing legislation, but it largely takes the access rules set by the US-owned platforms it routes through rather than gatekeeping access itself.", "fieldReason": "Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technological-primacy": { "normalized": 32, "raw": 32, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Frontier-innovation origination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 40, "value": null, "reason": "Canada is a research-strong second-tier originator with notable depth in foundational AI research that seeded breakthroughs others built on. It creates real leading-edge work in select areas but originates too narrowly, and at too small a scale, to sit among the frontier-defining sources.", "fieldReason": "US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Military-to-commercial spillover", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 31, "value": null, "reason": "Canada has a small defence-R&D base and limited military-to-commercial conversion, so its spillover engine is modest. Its technological strength runs through civil research rather than a defence-origination pipeline, placing it low among the converters here.", "fieldReason": "US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Compute & frontier-model control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "Canada has a modest frontier-model presence rooted in its deep AI-research base but no control over the compute chokepoints that gate access. It participates at the edge of the frontier and depends on infrastructure others govern, placing it low-mid among the rest.", "fieldReason": "US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technology-denial-regimes": { "normalized": 21.333, "raw": 21.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Export-control regime leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 35, "value": null, "reason": "Canada authors export controls through its own legislation and Wassenaar membership, but its lists closely follow the allied and multilateral frame rather than originating coordinated denial. It is a compliant co-author within the Western club — real standing, minimal independent regime-shaping — which places it in the lower-middle band alongside Italy.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement / extraterritorial reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 17, "value": null, "reason": "Canada enforces export controls within its own jurisdiction and in close coordination with US and allied measures, but it projects no independent extraterritorial reach. It is a reliable within-bloc enforcer that complies with and applies allied denial domestically, scoring just above the EU mid-tier floor — cooperative, not coercive over outsiders.", "fieldReason": "US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Criticality of what can be denied", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "Canada holds little non-substitutable frontier technology to deny; its critical contributions sit in upstream inputs that have alternative sources, so the bite of any denial is limited. It scores low on criticality — a reliable supplier rather than a holder of chokepoints whose withholding would constrain a target.", "fieldReason": "US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "ip-regime-authorship": { "normalized": 27.5, "raw": 27.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "IP rule-setting / regime authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 30, "value": null, "reason": "Canada is a high-standard adopter that internalizes the patentability and enforcement norms the US and EU author, including through its trade agreements, rather than contesting or rewriting them. It is not part of the access-to-medicines contesting bloc, so its score reflects faithful convergence on the authored standard rather than either active rule-setting or the defensive push that distinguishes India, Brazil, and South Africa — placing it level with the contesters on overall weight but for the opposite reason.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement & exclusion reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 25, "value": null, "reason": "Canada enforces IP within its domestic market but has little extraterritorial exclusion reach; it cannot bar rivals from major third markets or set global licensing terms through its courts. Its modest score reflects competent domestic enforcement without outward projection.", "fieldReason": "US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "belief-ideological-authority": { "normalized": 32.333, "raw": 32.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Ideological / intellectual leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 22, "value": null, "reason": "Canada is a competent participant in anglophone intellectual life but not an originator of the paradigms others adopt. It works largely inside frameworks authored elsewhere, contributing without setting the agenda, which is a low-authorship position on this lever.", "fieldReason": "Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Lingua-franca & credential dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 48, "value": null, "reason": "Canada is a meaningful credential magnet, drawing large inbound student flows into its anglophone (and partly francophone) institutions. It benefits from and adds to the English-language system rather than originating it, so it scores in the mid-band as a strong destination operating within an order authored chiefly by the US.", "fieldReason": "The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Belief-transmission channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 27, "value": null, "reason": "Canada carries liberal and civic norms with positive reception, but it largely relays a value-set authored within the broader anglophone-Western order rather than originating one others adopt as distinctly Canadian. That makes it a low-band transmitter, additive but not authoring.", "fieldReason": "Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "channel-control": { "normalized": 25.333, "raw": 25.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Knowledge-agenda channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "Canada is a strong research producer fully integrated into, but not authoring, the Anglo-American indexing and venue machinery. It benefits from proximity to the channel without owning it, leaving it a high-quality content-supplier that takes the rules deciding which findings count.", "fieldReason": "US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Orbital & data-channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 18, "value": null, "reason": "Canada operates no independent global orbital channel and depends substantially on US PNT and comms infrastructure it does not provide. On the core dependency question it is largely a consumer of channels others run, imposing no global PNT dependency that others cannot escape.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Channel rule-setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "Canada participates in ITU and spectrum coordination but largely adopts rules authored by larger players and blocs. On channel governance it is closer to a rule-taker, contributing technically without authoring the terms others must follow.", "fieldReason": "US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } } }, "Brazil": { "security": { "nuclear-order-setting": { "normalized": 9.667, "raw": 9.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "nonproliferation rule authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "1970-03-05", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "A rule-taker that came to the regime late: Brazil long resisted the NPT and only acceded in 1998, accepting the prohibition on holding weapons after the architecture was fixed. Its late entry confers no hand on the rule — it is bound by an order built by others, scoring at the floor among non-NWS parties.", "fieldReason": "NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "safeguards inspection leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "A peripheral inspection subject: Brazil sits on the IAEA only through rotating elected seats, not the Art VI designation of the most atomic-advanced, and is more an object of safeguards than a controller of them. Little hand on the inspection lever.", "fieldReason": "Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "arms control agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-02-05", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "An NPT party with no seat in the bilateral strategic-arms regime or its successor talks: a non-nuclear-weapon state that neither sets nor blocks the terms of restraint. Negligible agenda power on this lever.", "fieldReason": "New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "provision-of-protection": { "normalized": 5, "raw": 5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "extended deterrence guarantees", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Effectively a non-participant: Brazil is a nominal party to the dormant 1947 Rio Treaty but extends no active guarantee and shelters no one. With no live protection relationship to author, it scores at the floor as neither provider nor meaningful recipient.", "fieldReason": "Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "terms of protection", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Extracts no terms: Brazil exacts no basing, burden-sharing or alignment price because it provides no active protection. With nothing to extract, it scores at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "hub centrality", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Peripheral: Brazil holds no central position in any active provision network, with the Rio Treaty long dormant. As an outsider to the integrated structure it scores at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "chokepoint-route-control": { "normalized": 24.146, "raw": 24.146, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "maritime chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 2.439, "value": null, "reason": "No chokepoint command. Brazil holds no standing naval presence at any of the straits world trade must transit and neither sets nor enforces the terms of passage where they bind; on this lever it is a rule-taker, outside the structure of chokepoint control that others command.", "fieldReason": "Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "sea lane security provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "A nominal participant only. Brazil's contribution to the policing of the world's key sea-lanes is marginal; it is listed among CMF participants but provides little real route security, sitting near the bottom of the provision tier.", "fieldReason": "Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "route regime rule setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 65, "value": null, "reason": "A second-tier rule-setter. Brazil sits in IMO Council Category B among states with the largest interest in seaborne trade, giving it a real if not top-tier hand on the rules transport must conform to.", "fieldReason": "IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "cyber-norms": { "normalized": 21.5, "raw": 21.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "cyber norm authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 32, "value": null, "reason": "A Budapest party by accession that also works the rival venue. Brazil acceded to the Western-authored treaty (adopting, not authoring) while remaining engaged in the UN process, leaving it straddling two regimes without authoring either — a hedged rule-taker rather than a rule-setter.", "fieldReason": "Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "protective provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "A recipient, not a provider. Brazil draws on external cyber-defence standards and CERT cooperation rather than extending protection to others. In Strange's provision frame it is on the receiving end of the structure, not supplying it.", "fieldReason": "Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "production": { "indispensable-input-control": { "normalized": 6.5, "raw": 6.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Critical-input chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil holds raw-mineral inputs but not the refining or materials-processing step that confers non-substitutable provision power; it supplies ore others process elsewhere. The modest score reflects raw stock without chokepoint control.", "fieldReason": "China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Process & tooling gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil holds no advanced process or tooling position and must obtain the indispensable equipment from gatekeepers abroad. Its floor-level score reflects no control of the process.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Denial / access-control leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil wields no production-input denial leverage and participates in none of the export-control regimes governing frontier inputs. Its floor-level score reflects absence from the exclusion lever.", "fieldReason": "US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Method-standard setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 2, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil sets no production method others adopt and produces by methods authored elsewhere. The floor-level score reflects absence from the method-standard lever.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "gvc-governance": { "normalized": 15, "raw": 15, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Lead-firm governance power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil is predominantly a chain participant, supplying inputs and assembling to terms set elsewhere rather than governing dispersed supplier networks, which keeps its exercised lead-firm power near the floor.", "fieldReason": "US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Chokepoint control in the chain", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 14, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil holds only raw-input nodes — ores and agricultural commodities — giving it marginal denial power confined to the extraction end of chains.", "fieldReason": "Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Standards & governance authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil adopts the chain standards set elsewhere to qualify its exports rather than authoring rules others must meet, keeping it low on this lever.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 20, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil predominantly eats the adjustment imposed by lead-firm economies, with little capacity to force the burden onto chain partners, keeping it near the floor.", "fieldReason": "US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "transnational-firm-power": { "normalized": 16.75, "raw": 16.75, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Relocation leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "At 12 Brazil is a host economy: a few champions invest abroad, but the bulk of relevant production is sited domestically and Brazil absorbs far more foreign plant than its firms relocate. The exit threat over labour is something Brazilian workers face from inbound multinationals, not something Brazilian firms wield abroad.", "fieldReason": "Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Host-state bargaining dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 9, "value": null, "reason": "At 8 Brazil is firmly a host: foreign investors negotiate with Brasília over access, while Brazilian firms rarely dictate terms to other governments. Brazil sets conditions on inbound capital but does not project corporate bargaining power outward.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Mode-of-production control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 24, "value": null, "reason": "At 22 Brazil organizes a modest cross-border mode — a handful of multinationals in agribusiness, mining, and aerospace run intra-firm networks — but most Brazilian production is fed into modes structured abroad. It shapes the mode marginally rather than dictating it.", "fieldReason": "US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Outward control over foreign production", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 21, "value": null, "reason": "At 20 Brazil's outward-control stock is small: a few champions in agribusiness, mining, and aerospace govern production abroad, but the bulk of relevant plant is foreign-controlled within Brazil. It controls little production sited in others' territory.", "fieldReason": "Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "trade-rule-authorship": { "normalized": 18, "raw": 18, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Rule-writing agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 26, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil participates in trade-rule coalitions, historically on agriculture and development, but exercises limited individual authorship and cannot block or set the core multilateral agenda on its own. Its influence is coalition-mediated rather than self-authored, placing it in the lower-middle tier.", "fieldReason": "US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "RTA template authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil largely adopts externally-authored agreement templates rather than producing a model others copy, with Mercosur arrangements exerting little template pull beyond the region. It is essentially a template-taker, scoring near the floor.", "fieldReason": "US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Market-access denial capability", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 15, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil's import market is not large or essential enough to deny others access or dictate terms, leaving it with little market-access denial leverage. It scores near the floor.", "fieldReason": "Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "value-capture-adjustment-burden": { "normalized": 16.333, "raw": 16.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Surplus-capture terms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil is a near-pure surplus-capture taker: commodity and assembly value flows on terms authored by buyers and external pricing regimes, with negligible authorship of who retains the surplus. Its low score is the rent-is-not-terms point applied directly.", "fieldReason": "US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-burden imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil scores very low as a recurrent adjustment-bearer subject to external financing conditions and conditionality rather than an imposer of burden on others. It carries the cost the structure allocates to it; it does not allocate that cost.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Terms-of-trade setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 28, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil has some buyer and seller weight in specific commodity markets but remains mainly a price-taker on terms set by external benchmark regimes. Its low-mid score reflects marginal price-shaping rather than authorship of the terms allocating gains.", "fieldReason": "Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "finance": { "credit-markets": { "normalized": 6.333, "raw": 6.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "benchmark", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil's sovereign curve prices domestic real credit and sets no reference the world discounts external credit against (4). With no meaningful international debt share, its yields function only inside its own market and carry no global benchmark role; Brazil is a price-taker on the global curve, not an author of it.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "lolr swap reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil has no Fed swap line and offers no crisis-grade outward backstop; the central bank's reach stops at domestic real liquidity (4). It is a backstop-taker dependent on others in a dollar crunch, not a provider.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "gsib regulatory control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil holds an FSB seat but home-supervises no G-SIBs and authors little of the global prudential rulebook (10). It is a rule-taker at the table, adopting Basel standards rather than writing the terms.", "fieldReason": "Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "reserves": { "normalized": 4.5, "raw": 4.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Trade & payments denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "The real is scarcely used for cross-border settlement, so Brazil denominates its own trade in currencies issued elsewhere and exercises no grip on the unit world trade must run through. Its 5 marks a taker in the denomination order, dependent on rails others author.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Commodity & debt denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "The real has a negligible cross-border debt share and no commodity-pricing role, so Brazil — a major commodity exporter — still sells and borrows against benchmarks denominated in others' currencies. Its 4 reflects a taker on both rails, denominating in units it does not issue.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "institutional-influence": { "normalized": 8.12, "raw": 8.12, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Veto / blocking power", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 3.241, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil's modest quota gives it a relational voice far below the blocking threshold. It is a participant in institutional deliberations, not a state that can block or author reform.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Institution-as-agent (conditionality / programme leadership)", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 13, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil is peripheral to the design of IMF/World Bank conditionality and historically a programme recipient rather than an author. Its preferences are not the ones encoded in programme design; it sits near the bottom as a taker, not a director of the agent.", "fieldReason": "US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "payment-systems": { "normalized": 6.333, "raw": 6.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "clearing rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil clears the real and its domestic flows through its own infrastructure, but neither is a rail the outside world must settle through. Its near-floor score reflects sovereign control of its own currency's clearing with no structural hold on the rails cross-border money routes through.", "fieldReason": "US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "exclusion designations early2026", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil holds essentially no power to exclude others from global settlement; it neither participates in collective Western exclusion regimes nor controls a rail others must use. Its very low score reflects a state outside the denial machinery entirely, settling on terms set by the dollar and the EU rather than shaping access for anyone.", "fieldReason": "Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "alternative rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 7, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil operates no functioning rail that lets others escape US-controlled settlement. Its floor-level score reflects aspiration rather than provision — no established alternative capacity exists today.", "fieldReason": "Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "sanctions": { "normalized": 3.5, "raw": 3.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "independent exclusion", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil has no capacity to exclude others from the financial rails — it neither owns nor governs a chokepoint and exercises no structural denial. Its floor score reflects a state that is shaped by others' exclusion power rather than possessing any of its own.", "fieldReason": "Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "extraterritorial compliance reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 3, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil has no capacity to compel third-country compliance with any sanction it issues; it neither owns the clearing leverage nor legislates secondary reach. Its floor score reflects a state that conforms to others' extraterritorial demands rather than imposing its own.", "fieldReason": "Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "capital-allocation-ownership": { "normalized": 10.333, "raw": 10.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Asset-management concentration", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil's managers run a domestic savings pool and do not provide a globally-allocating function; its slice of the world's manager-domicile pool is small, placing it firmly in the taker tier of the allocation structure.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Ownership of strategic firms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil's capital owns its domestic champions but holds little of the residual claim on the world's strategic firms; its cross-border ownership is small, leaving it a minor holder in the global ownership structure.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Cross-border equity-allocation reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2023-12-31", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil's cross-border equity reach is minor; it is neither a destination the world's savings route into nor a significant outbound allocator, sitting near the bottom as a taker in the integrated allocative system.", "fieldReason": "US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "knowledge": { "standards-platform-control": { "normalized": 13.333, "raw": 13.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Standards-body authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "Lowest. ABNT participates in ISO/IEC but holds a negligible share of secretariats and convenorships; Brazil is a standards-taker in these bodies, present as a member but not authoring the technical rules others must conform to.", "fieldReason": "Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Open-protocol foundation control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "Very low. Brazil has a minimal RFC-authorship record and does not shape the foundational protocols; it is an interoperator with a stack authored and custodied by others.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Platform gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 24, "value": null, "reason": "Market-gatekeeper over its own market. Brazil has exercised access-denial through court actions and data-localization pressure against foreign platforms, compelling them to conform domestically. It enforces access rules for its territory without owning the platforms or setting rules beyond its borders.", "fieldReason": "Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technological-primacy": { "normalized": 10, "raw": 10, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Frontier-innovation origination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil scores at the floor on origination: it adopts the leading-edge technology others create and originates almost none of it. Its position here is that of a taker drawing from frontiers authored elsewhere, with negligible breakthrough creation of its own.", "fieldReason": "US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Military-to-commercial spillover", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 15, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil has a small defence-research base and negligible conversion into commercial dominance; the spillover pipeline is largely absent. It scores near the floor, drawing on technology developed elsewhere rather than running its own military-to-commercial engine.", "fieldReason": "US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Compute & frontier-model control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil has effectively no frontier-model presence and no compute gatekeeping power, accessing AI through stacks controlled elsewhere. It sits near the floor as a pure taker of the current frontier, dependent on chokepoints it has no hand in setting.", "fieldReason": "US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technology-denial-regimes": { "normalized": 5.333, "raw": 5.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Export-control regime leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil has negligible authorship of any technology-denial regime: it is outside the core export-control clubs at the frontier and writes no controls others must coordinate around. With no chokepoint technology and no regime-writing role, it sits at the floor — neither author nor enforcer, simply absent from the denial architecture.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement / extraterritorial reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil has negligible enforcement reach in the technology-denial regime: no extraterritorial mechanism, no frontier exports to license, and no role in compelling compliance. It scores at the floor — neither enforcer nor reliable node, simply outside the enforcement architecture.", "fieldReason": "US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Criticality of what can be denied", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil has essentially nothing non-substitutable to deny in the technology-denial regime: no frontier chokepoint, no critical-technology lever. Its criticality is at the floor — any withholding would be absorbed elsewhere with no structural bite.", "fieldReason": "US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "ip-regime-authorship": { "normalized": 14, "raw": 14, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "IP rule-setting / regime authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 20, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil is part of the contesting bloc that led the TRIPS-flexibilities and access-to-medicines pushback alongside India and South Africa. Bound into TRIPS as a WTO member, it pursued a genuine but defensive agenda to widen public-health exceptions rather than to author the regime itself, which places it modestly above pure rule-takers but well below the architects.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement & exclusion reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil enforces IP domestically but exercises virtually no extraterritorial reach: it cannot exclude rivals from external markets or shape global licensing through its courts. Its very low score reflects the near-total absence of outward exclusionary capacity.", "fieldReason": "US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "belief-ideological-authority": { "normalized": 17.333, "raw": 17.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Ideological / intellectual leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 18, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil is a regional idea-voice with reach across Latin America but limited conferral of authority beyond it. It receives and adapts globally-authored frameworks more than it originates ones others treat as legitimate, leaving it near the bottom on intellectual leadership.", "fieldReason": "Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Lingua-franca & credential dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 15, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil does not provide a language or credential system others operate in; Portuguese is regionally bounded and its institutions sit inside externally-set standards. It is a credential importer and a taker on this lever, which places it near the bottom.", "fieldReason": "The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Belief-transmission channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 19, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil transmits some regional and cultural norms with reach across Latin America, but limited adoption of a distinct value-set beyond it. It receives globally-authored norms more than it provides ones others adopt, placing it near the bottom on this lever.", "fieldReason": "Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "channel-control": { "normalized": 12.667, "raw": 12.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Knowledge-agenda channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil's research is routed through Western indexing systems it does not control, and it operates no globally accepted channel of its own that decides which findings count. It sits just above the floor as a content-producer dependent on external machinery to have its findings counted, authoring none of the rules itself.", "fieldReason": "US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Orbital & data-channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 6, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil is a pure orbital dependent: it provides no PNT or global comms channel of its own and relies entirely on infrastructure run by others. It scores near the floor because it imposes no dependency anyone cannot escape — it is the one that cannot escape.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Channel rule-setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "Brazil engages in ITU spectrum and orbital processes but, on the core channel rules, remains predominantly a rule-taker rather than an author. It works within the spectrum, orbital, and data-governance terms set by the leading powers and blocs, adopting more than it shapes.", "fieldReason": "US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } } }, "South Africa": { "security": { "nuclear-order-setting": { "normalized": 7.667, "raw": 7.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "nonproliferation rule authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "1970-03-05", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "A floor-tier rule-taker. South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state, the only country to give up an arsenal it had built rather than enter the regime. That history is morally distinctive but structurally empty for rule-authorship: it acceded under the who-may-hold rule written by others, it had no hand in setting it, and it sits outside the depositary-and-NWS core that defines the order. Its standing is that of a compliant outsider, not a co-author.", "fieldReason": "NPT rule-authorship: US/UK/Russia are the 3 depositary governments AND original NWS → top tier (US 95 as primary depositary/architect, UK/Russia 90); France/China are NWS rule-authors but acceded late (1992) → 70; non-NWS parties are rule-takers bound by the regime → 20-25 (Germany/Japan/Italy/Canada 25; Brazil late accession 1998 and South Africa uniquely disarmed before acceding → 20); India is an NPT non-party that rejected the regime entirely → rejecter/outsider, not a rule-taker: outside the framework, neither authoring nor bound by it → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "safeguards inspection leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "The most peripheral of the twelve on the inspection lever: having disarmed and with a limited atomic-technology base, South Africa reaches the IAEA Board only via rotating elected seats and is essentially an inspection subject, not a controller of the safeguards machinery.", "fieldReason": "Control of the IAEA safeguards/inspection lever via the Art VI designation rule (the 10 'most advanced in atomic-energy technology' get permanent Board influence). The 8 structurally-advantaged of our 12 are US/Russia/China/France/UK/Germany/Japan/Canada → US 90 (regime leader/largest civil+military nuclear base), Russia/China 70, France/UK 65, Germany/Japan 50, Canada 45 (major uranium/civil-nuclear but smaller weight); Italy/India sit only via rotating elected seats → 20; Brazil/South Africa peripheral inspection subjects → 15.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "arms control agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-02-05", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "A disarmed non-nuclear-weapon state, party to the NPT but with no seat in the bilateral strategic-arms regime: moral voice, no power to set or block the terms of restraint. Negligible structural agenda power.", "fieldReason": "New START EXPIRED 2026-02-05 (before the cutoff) → strategic-arms regime is a VOID at the edition date, so agenda power is suppressed across the board (no holder scores high — there is no live regime to set terms of). Residual agenda power = who shapes the contested successor: US sets the terms (demands a China-inclusive treaty) → 60; China holds blocking power by refusing to join → 50; Russia was co-principal but offered voluntary adherence and was rebuffed → 45; France/UK are NWS voices in multilateral fora but outside the bilateral regime → 20; non-NWS states are NPT parties but non-participants in the bilateral strategic-arms regime, so they shape no terms → 5-10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "provision-of-protection": { "normalized": 5, "raw": 5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "extended deterrence guarantees", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Extends no formal guarantee and receives none: South Africa neither shelters others nor sits under a treaty umbrella, standing outside the provision relationship entirely. With no protection to author, it scores at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Who FORMALLY protects others. US is the principal provider (NATO Art 5 anchor + Japan/Korea/Philippines bilateral + hemispheric Rio umbrella) → 95; France/UK are NATO Art-5 co-guarantors AND independent nuclear-umbrella providers but minor own-deterrents relative to the US → 35; Russia is a rival provider via CSTO (beneficiaries outside our 12) → 20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are recipients/consumers of the umbrella, not providers → 5; China/India/Brazil/South Africa extend no formal extended-deterrence guarantee → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "terms of protection", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Extracts no terms: South Africa provides no protection and therefore sets no basing or burden-sharing conditions on anyone. With no bargain to author, it scores at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Who EXTRACTS terms (basing, burden-sharing, alignment) in exchange for protection. US is the net provider of terms — converts protection into forward basing in Germany/Italy/Japan/UK + cost-sharing → 95; UK is the closest peer-ally and terms-sharer with its own modest external posture → 30; France runs an independent posture but extracts little from others → 15; Russia extracts basing terms within CSTO (outside our 12) → 15; Germany/Italy/Japan are terms-takers hosting US presence → 5; the rest extract nothing → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "hub centrality", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Peripheral: South Africa anchors no security network and sits outside the integrated provision structure entirely. As a non-aligned periphery it scores at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Network centrality as provider, not summed allied force. US is the indispensable hub — SACEUR is always a US officer; anchors NATO integrated command, NORAD, and the Pacific bilateral spokes → 95; UK is a central junior hub (deep US integration, nuclear cooperation) → 35; France is semi-peripheral (left/rejoined integrated command, independent posture) → 25; Russia/China are hubs of RIVAL networks (not the Western provision network) → 25/20; Germany/Italy/Canada/Japan are spokes not hubs → 10; India/Brazil/South Africa non-aligned/peripheral → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "chokepoint-route-control": { "normalized": 16.48, "raw": 16.48, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "maritime chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 2.439, "value": null, "reason": "No chokepoint command. South Africa holds no standing naval command over any of the world's primary straits and cannot offer or deny passage at the arteries others must use; it is wholly a rule-taker on this lever, accepting the terms of passage that others set rather than shaping them.", "fieldReason": "Command of the straits others must transit. US is the only one of the 12 with standing naval command across multiple chokepoints (5th Fleet/Bahrain over Hormuz+Bab-el-Mandeb; 7th Fleet over the Malacca approaches) → 90; China is the sole contender, building blue-water reach but commands no strait yet → 35; UK has residual presence (Diego Garcia, Gulf), junior to US → 20; France has residual presence (Djibouti, Indo-Pacific territories) → 15; India regional Indian-Ocean presence → 10; others have no chokepoint command → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "sea lane security provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "Absent from sea-lane security provision. South Africa is a non-participant in the multinational forces that police the world's key shipping lanes — it neither contributes deployable escort effort to those operations nor commands any of them. On this lever it is a pure rule-taker: the security of the lanes its own trade moves through is provided by others, and South Africa sits outside the table where that provision is organised.", "fieldReason": "Who polices the sea-lanes others depend on (provision, not tonnage). US leads and commands the 47-nation Combined Maritime Forces (HQ Bahrain, US officer commands, 5 task forces over ~3.2m sq mi) → 90; China provides outside the US structure via its own independent Gulf of Aden escort task force → 30; UK/France are leading allied CMF contributors with own deployable reach → 25; India contributes and runs independent IOR patrols → 20; Japan/Italy active CMF participants → 15; Canada/Germany participate → 10; Brazil nominal participant, Russia/South Africa absent → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "route regime rule setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 42, "value": null, "reason": "A third-tier rule-setter, present on geographic representation. South Africa holds an IMO Council Category C seat — the tier elected for geographic representation rather than shipping or trade weight — a seat at the rule-setting table, but the most marginal of the 12 that hold one.", "fieldReason": "IMO Council seats set the maritime ground rules, tiered by category. Category A (largest shipping interest) — China/Italy/Japan/UK/US → top rule-setting tier 80; Category B (largest seaborne trade) — Brazil/Canada/France/Germany/India → 55; Category C (geographic representation) — South Africa → 35; Russia was voted OFF the Council after 2022 (structural exclusion) → 5.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "cyber-norms": { "normalized": 9.5, "raw": 9.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "cyber norm authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "The floor of this component: South Africa neither authors a digital-domain regime nor cleanly adopts one. It signed the Budapest Convention but never ratified it — the weakest possible engagement, below a clean party — and merely leans toward the rival UN framework without driving or co-authoring it. Signing-not-ratifying is not backing; it is the gesture of accession without the commitment, leaving South Africa more disengaged than any clean Budapest adopter and far short of the rule-makers. It is a pure rule-taker, shaped by digital-domain rules others write, with no hand on either pen and no settled allegiance to either text.", "fieldReason": "Who writes the rules of the digital domain (Budapest Convention/CETS-185 vs the rival UN Cybercrime Convention). US/Canada/Japan are founding authors of the dominant Budapest regime → US 90 (lead author), Canada/Japan 70; Russia is principal driver of the rival UN framework (a competing authorship venue) → 65, China co-driver → 60; France/Germany/Italy/UK are Budapest parties = rule-adopters, not authors → 35; Brazil acceded to Budapest but also works the UN process → 30; India is a Budapest non-party that leans toward the UN process without committing → 12; South Africa signed-not-ratified Budapest and merely leans to the UN framework → 8 (the floor: neither authors nor cleanly adopts, below all clean adopters).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "protective provision", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-06-04", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "A recipient, not a provider. South Africa relies on externally-sourced cyber-defence capacity and standards rather than supplying protection others depend on. It is sheltered within frameworks others build, with no protective provision of its own to offer (Strange 1994, p.45).", "fieldReason": "Who supplies cyber-defence others depend on. US is the primary provider — NATO cyber-defence-pledge anchor, CISA standards exported, allied CERT support → 90; UK provides via NCSC + Five Eyes sharing → 50; France provides via ANSSI + EU framework → 40; Germany provides within EU/NATO → 35; China provides an alternative model (surveillance-stack exports) to its sphere → 35; Japan regional provider and Canada Five Eyes provider → 30; Russia provides an alternative model to its sphere → 25; Italy is a framework participant → 20; India/Brazil/South Africa are recipients/non-providers → 10.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "production": { "indispensable-input-control": { "normalized": 8.5, "raw": 8.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Critical-input chokepoint control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 19, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa holds significant raw-mineral inputs but, like the other ore-holders, lacks the refining chokehold that would let it set terms on a processed input. Its score sits just above the floor — endowed in ore, absent from the refining method.", "fieldReason": "China high on rare-earth refining chokehold; US high on tooling/inputs upstream; Japan on materials (photoresist, silicon wafers); Russia/Brazil/SA on raw-mineral inputs but NOT refining. Leading-edge foundry/litho chokepoints sit with TW/KR/NL (outside set), depressing all 12's absolute scores here.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Process & tooling gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa controls no leading-edge process or tooling step and is a pure consumer of the equipment and chemistry others provide. The floor score marks absence from process gatekeeping.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelming via EDA (>85%) + WFE leadership. Japan strong (Tokyo Electron WFE, JSR/Shin-Etsu precursor chemistry & resists). China near-zero at leading-edge process despite SMIC volume.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Denial / access-control leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 9, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa exercises only marginal denial leverage tied to its raw-mineral position and authors no input-exclusion regime of its own. The low score reflects an ore-holder without real denial power over processed inputs.", "fieldReason": "US + China are the two actors who actually wield production-input denial at scale (semiconductors / rare earths respectively). Japan joined US-aligned WFE controls. EU members get a modest shared EU-regime-participant credit (D16: lever is national, not bloc — euro-style full-bloc attribution does NOT apply).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Method-standard setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 2, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa authors no production method others must produce by and takes the methods set abroad. Its floor score marks no method-setting authorship.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant production methods (EDA Big-3 >85% share + 95% lock-in, design-rule/WFE method via Synopsys/AMAT; SIA: US firms 50.4% of global design/sales). Japan co-authors process-chemistry/equipment methods (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu, JSR). Germany niche method-supplier (Trumpf EUV source, Zeiss optics); UK retains Arm ISA design-method authorship in its R&D base; France (Soitec SOI), Italy (ST niche). China authors only domestically enforced GB standards with limited frontier adoption; rest negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "gvc-governance": { "normalized": 11.5, "raw": 11.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Lead-firm governance power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa governs almost no global supplier networks; it sits at the receiving end of chains as a participant and input supplier rather than a lead firm dictating others' production, the lowest score on this lever.", "fieldReason": "US dominant lead-firm governance (outward FDI + brand/platform lead firms). Japan/Germany strong (Toyota/VW supplier-network governance). China rising lead-firm power but more state-directed. Russia/Brazil/SA low — chain participants, not governors.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Chokepoint control in the chain", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-01-31", "score": 18, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa's chokepoint leverage rests narrowly on raw mineral inputs where its concentrated share gives it a real but single-node denial capacity — slightly above the other commodity feeders because that concentration is genuine, but still input-end only.", "fieldReason": "Mirrors input-control chokepoint distribution (US tooling/design nodes; China refining/rare-earth nodes; Japan materials nodes; Russia/Brazil/SA raw-input nodes only).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Standards & governance authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-19", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa is overwhelmingly a standards-taker, meeting the supplier codes written by lead-firm economies to access their chains rather than authoring any, the lowest authorship score.", "fieldReason": "US authors the dominant private chain standards (Apple/Walmart supplier codes, UL, platform/retail rules others must meet to supply). Germany co-authors automotive supplier standards (VDA, IATF) + EU CE/REACH enforced down-chain; Japan co-authors keiretsu/TPS supplier-governance + JIS. France (GlobalGAP), UK (BRCGS), Italy (luxury district governance) niche. China domestic-plus (BYD/CATL sourcing, GB, growing BRI reach). India/Russia/Canada/Brazil/SA chain participants adopting others' standards.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 9, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa absorbs adjustment imposed from above and has essentially no leverage to push the burden onto others in the chain, the lowest score on this lever.", "fieldReason": "US imposes adjustment (demand-side leverage + lead-firm position + low input dependence for governance reasons). Eurozone members eat more adjustment (high FVA, interdependent). Russia low-FVA but as isolation, scored down on the governance reading.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "transnational-firm-power": { "normalized": 9.5, "raw": 9.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Relocation leverage", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa scores 8 — its outward corporate reach is small and regionally bounded, and it functions as a host far more than a relocator. South African firms do not command the cross-border exit threat; production decisions over them are largely authored elsewhere.", "fieldReason": "Outward stock magnitude + lead-firm relocation capacity. Japan very high (9x out/in ratio = relocates abroad, little inbound). China large stock but more recent/state-directed.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Host-state bargaining dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa scores 10 — a host economy whose firms extract little from foreign governments. It negotiates as a recipient of investment rather than a source of corporate leverage over host states.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (largest firms + treaty-network authorship). Net-controller economies (JP/DE/FR/CA) score high; net-host economies (BR/IN) low. China's bargaining is state-mediated, mid.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Mode-of-production control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 9, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa scores 8: its firms organize little cross-border intra-firm production, and the regional networks they run are small. It supplies into modes structured elsewhere rather than authoring how production is organized across borders.", "fieldReason": "US organizes the largest cross-border intra-firm mode (Apple/auto/pharma networks). Mirrors outward-stock control distribution.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Outward control over foreign production", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-09-30", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa scores 10 — a small outward-control stock concentrated in regional mining and retail. Its firms govern modest production abroad while the economy remains a host of foreign-controlled plant.", "fieldReason": "Pure outward-stock magnitude (% of world stock). US dominant; China rising; advanced economies high; BR/IN/RU/ZA low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "trade-rule-authorship": { "normalized": 12.667, "raw": 12.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Rule-writing agenda power", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 19, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa is a coalition participant with little individual capacity to write or block multilateral trade terms, contributing to development-bloc positions rather than authoring rules others adopt. It is largely a rule-taker, scoring near the floor.", "fieldReason": "US authors and blocks multilateral terms (Appellate Body block 2019-, drives plurilaterals). EU is WTO chief negotiator under exclusive competence — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24: authorship is divisible, keyed to the double-majority QMV population threshold; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP custodian; China rising rule-shaper via accession/plurilateral leverage; India defensive blocker (agric/development); UK post-Brexit independent mid voice; Canada coalition-builder (Ottawa Group); Russia/Brazil/SA coalition participants with limited individual authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "RTA template authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2025-06-30", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa adopts others' agreement templates and exports no model that others benchmark against, its regional arrangements lacking diffusion power. It sits at the floor as a pure template-taker.", "fieldReason": "US authors the high-standard template others benchmark (NAFTA/USMCA + TPP: IP, labour, ISDS, digital). EU DCFTA/Association-Agreement + Brussels-effect regulatory templates diffuse globally — DE/FR/IT split by EU Council population share (DE .396/FR .324/IT .279) per D24; was full-bloc D19. Japan CPTPP template steward; China rising template via RCEP/BRI; UK rolls over EU templates + CPTPP (adopter-plus); Canada co-shapes via CPTPP/CETA as partner; India/Russia/Brazil/SA largely adopt others' templates.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Market-access denial capability", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa's small import market gives it almost no capacity to deny others access or dictate terms; partners are not dependent on entry to it. With negligible denial leverage it sits at the floor.", "fieldReason": "Denial = leverage of a large import market others need access to. US dominant (Section 301/232, tariff weaponization). EU large single market (DE/FR/IT = full EU denial value, D19). China large + uses access as leverage. Small/developing markets cannot deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "value-capture-adjustment-burden": { "normalized": 8, "raw": 8, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Surplus-capture terms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa scores lowest: a commodity and resource economy receiving rents priced and termed entirely by external benchmarks and buyers, with no authorship of the arrangements that allocate surplus. The realized take is outcome; the term-setting power is absent.", "fieldReason": "US sets surplus-capture terms (IP rents, platform economics, design margin). EU brand/standards rents (DE/FR/IT). China captures volume but sets fewer terms (margin-taker at frontier). Commodity economies low — rent ≠ terms-authorship.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Adjustment-burden imposition", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa is the clearest adjustment-bearer: small, externally financed, and structurally positioned to absorb the cost of global adjustment with no capacity to push it onto others. Its lowest score is Strange's developing-country burden falling heaviest, made literal.", "fieldReason": "US dominant (IMF veto + dollar system forces others to adjust). EU bloc imposes via conditionality (DE/FR/IT). China rising via bilateral creditor leverage. Adjustment-BEARERS (IN/BR/ZA) score low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Terms-of-trade setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa scores lowest: a small commodity exporter whose terms of trade are dictated entirely by external benchmarks and buyers, with no capacity to shape the relative prices that allocate gains. Any favorable terms it sees are outcome, not authored regime.", "fieldReason": "Price-regime SHAPERS score high (US/China large demand sets benchmarks; USD invoicing). Commodity price-TAKERS (RU/BR/ZA) low despite high ToT index — outcome not authorship (the metric's whole point).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "finance": { "credit-markets": { "normalized": 4.667, "raw": 4.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "benchmark", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 3, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa's curve prices domestic rand credit only and has no global benchmark function; the world does not price external credit off South African yields (3). It is a pure price-taker on the global curve.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the UST curve is THE global benchmark others price credit off, USD 45.7% of international debt issuance; no rival on price-setting reach. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 48 — the euro risk-free curve (Bund) anchors EUR 40.3% of cross-border debt, the clear #2 benchmark, scored full-bloc per D19 (the curve is the union's, set collectively). UK 28 — gilt curve + GBP 7.5% of international debt, a real third anchor via London. Japan 14, Canada 10, China 10 — domestic curves, sub-1% international debt shares, little price-setting reach beyond their own paper. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no global benchmark role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "lolr swap reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 3, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa has no Fed line and no outward LOLR capacity; the SARB can backstop only its own banks in rand (3). It sits outside every standing swap network as a recipient-class actor.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — the Fed is the world's dollar lender of last resort; its swap lines backstopped the entire global banking system in 2008 and 2020, the decisive Mexico-vs-Poland capacity Strange identifies. Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 42 — the ECB is inside the C6 AND independently provides euro-liquidity backstop to others; scored full-bloc per D19 (one central bank, pooled). UK 35 — BoE in the C6 and extends sterling swaps. Japan 28, Canada 25 — BoJ/BoC inside the standing network, provide their currency's backstop. China 18 — extensive PBoC bilateral RMB swap network, but RMB is not a crisis-grade backstop and China is outside the dollar network. India/Russia/Brazil/South Africa 3-4 — no Fed line, no meaningful outward LOLR provision.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "gsib regulatory control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-11-30", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa sits at the FSB nominally but has no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (8). It is a rule-adopter on the prudential bargain, with the smallest systemic-bank footprint among the table's members.", "fieldReason": "Scored on two provision levers: authorship of the Basel/FSB rulebook the world's banks adopt, plus home-supervisor status of the 29 G-SIBs. US 90 — leads Basel/FSB AND home-supervises 8 G-SIBs, the most of any state; the dominant but not exclusive rule-author. UK 70 — Basel/FSB co-author, the global bank hub, 3 G-SIBs (punches above its bank count on rule-authorship). France 60 / Germany 55 — euro Basel seats; France home to 4 G-SIBs, Germany 1, both carry euro-bloc rule weight. Japan 45, Canada 40, Italy 40 — Basel/FSB members with 3/2/1 G-SIBs respectively. China 35 — 4 G-SIBs and a Basel/FSB seat, but a rule-taker more than rule-author on the global prudential bargain. India 12, Brazil 10, South Africa 8, Russia 6 — at the FSB table nominally but no G-SIBs and negligible authorship of the global rulebook (Russia further isolated).", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "reserves": { "normalized": 3.5, "raw": 3.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Trade & payments denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "The rand is negligible in cross-border settlement, leaving South Africa fully reliant on externally issued currencies to invoice and settle its trade. A 4 reflects the absence of any structural role in providing or shaping the medium world payments must occur in.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 50.5% of intl payments and 80.7% of trade finance, the #1 settlement currency by a wide margin (the denomination rail). Euro nations (DE/FR/IT) 45 — euro 21.3% of payments / #2 in FX and trade finance, full-bloc per D19. UK 40 — GBP 6.5% payments + #3 FX spot + London intermediation. Japan 22 — JPY 3.5% payments, #5 FX. Canada 25 — CAD 3.0% payments, #6 FX (punches above size as a commodity/G7 currency). China 18 — CNY 3.1% payments but rising and #2 in trade finance (8.0%), a real but still-minor settlement role concentrated in its own trade. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 4-6 — currencies barely used for cross-border settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Commodity & debt denomination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 3, "value": null, "reason": "The rand carries negligible cross-border debt denomination and prices no commodity, leaving South Africa dependent on externally issued units for both international borrowing and commodity pricing. A 3 reflects the absence of any structural role in authoring debt or pricing denomination.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — USD 45.7% of international debt issuance AND the commodity-pricing currency (oil, metals), the dual lock the metric is built around. Euro nations 50 — euro 40.3% of cross-border debt (nearly matching USD on the debt face), full-bloc per D19; but the euro does not price commodities, so it trails USD on the combined construct. UK 30 — GBP 7.5% of debt, a real third currency. Japan/Canada 8-10, China 8 — sub-1% debt shares; commodities not priced in their currencies. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa 3-4 — negligible debt-denomination and no commodity-pricing role.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "institutional-influence": { "normalized": 4.694, "raw": 4.694, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Veto / blocking power", "scoring_basis": "positional", "calibration": "positional", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 1.389, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa's voting share of roughly 0.63% is among the smallest of the twelve, placing it deep below the blocking threshold. It is effectively a marginal participant in board decisions — relational presence only, with no capacity to shape or veto institutional reform.", "fieldReason": "US 95 — sole holder of the blocking veto in both the IMF and the IBRD (the only member above the 15% threshold); structurally it alone can veto reform. All others are sub-threshold → relational influence only, scored on voting weight as a proxy for board sway: Japan/China ~6% → 18, the larger Europeans 13-16, down to South Africa 0.63% → 3. The gap from US to next is the structural fact.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Institution-as-agent (conditionality / programme leadership)", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa is the most peripheral of the twelve to programme leadership, neither supplying the institutions' leadership nor authoring conditionality. It is a programme recipient with negligible influence over the discipline the institutions impose — the agent acts on others' preferences, not its own.", "fieldReason": "US 90 — sets the template for conditionality and holds the World Bank presidency by convention. France/UK/Germany 55-60 — the European bloc supplies the IMF Managing Director by convention and co-authors programme design (the transatlantic management duopoly). Japan 30, Canada 25 — meaningful G7 board voice. China 22 — large quota but a programme TAKER, building rival institutions (AIIB) outside this one. India/Brazil/Russia/South Africa low — programme recipients/peripheral to design.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "payment-systems": { "normalized": 5.333, "raw": 5.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "clearing rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa clears the rand domestically but authors no rail the wider world must settle through. Its lowest score among the twelve reflects a small own-currency clearing footprint and no structural control over the global settlement layer, which passes through rails it does not govern.", "fieldReason": "US dominant: CHIPS (~$1.8tn/day, US-governed via The Clearing House) + Fedwire ($1,148tn annual) clear the dollar — the rail the world routes through. Euro RTGS (TARGET2, Eurosystem) gives DE/FR/IT a mid-tier bloc rail. China (CIPS) building but smaller; UK (CHAPS, GBP) modest; others minimal own-rail control. Positional: a fixed pool of world settlement sliced by who owns the clearing layer.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "exclusion designations early2026", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa holds no structural power to deny a counterparty access to the global settlement rails and sits outside the collective Western exclusion regimes. Its lowest-tier score reflects a state that neither authors nor wields exclusion, with access to settlement determined entirely by rails it does not govern.", "fieldReason": "Power to cut access to the settlement system. US overwhelming — it directs exclusions with full extraterritorial reach (OFAC/SDN, SWIFT de-designation; tier: 'full extraterritorial exclusion'). EU secondary — can act collectively on SWIFT (DE/FR/IT 'real-lesser'); UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime (real-lesser). Others none. Positional: who can deny others access to the rail.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "alternative rails", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 7, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa runs no alternative to US-controlled settlement and provides none of this escape capacity. Its floor-level score reflects a state with no independent rail to route around the dollar order.", "fieldReason": "Who runs an independent rail escaping US control. China (CIPS) the main one — 194 direct + 1597 indirect participants, 126 countries, ~5100 banks reached (Mar 2026); the only state with a real alternative dollar-rail. Russia (SPFS) minor domestic substitute. EU (INSTEX) defunct/nil. US scored low BY DESIGN — it IS the mainstream rail, not an alternative — so China leads this provision-of-escape component. Positional: share of the capacity to route around US-controlled settlement.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "sanctions": { "normalized": 3.5, "raw": 3.5, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "independent exclusion", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa cannot deny anyone access to the financial system; it holds no chokepoint and exercises no independent exclusion. Its floor score places it firmly as a rule-taker, subject to denial mechanisms it has no hand in operating.", "fieldReason": "Capacity to exclude others from the financial system unilaterally. US overwhelming — full unilateral exclusion of the dollar/SWIFT chokepoint (Iran 2012, Russia 2022). EU collectively secondary (DE/FR/IT mid — can act on SWIFT in concert). UK post-Brexit own OFSI regime, mid-low. Others minimal. Positional: who controls denial of access to the chokepoint others cannot route around.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "extraterritorial compliance reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-06-03", "score": 3, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa cannot force any third party to conform to its measures — it holds no secondary-sanctions tool and no clearing leverage. Its floor score places it as a complier with others' extraterritorial reach, with no authorship of compliance of its own.", "fieldReason": "Whose sanctions force THIRD-country compliance (secondary sanctions, dollar-clearing leverage). US uniquely extraterritorial — forces global third-country conformity. EU/UK far behind: no concept of secondary sanctions, EU passed a blocking statute to RESIST US secondary reach (measures bind only own nationals = primary). Others negligible. Positional: share of the capacity to make third parties conform.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "capital-allocation-ownership": { "normalized": 10.333, "raw": 10.333, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Asset-management concentration", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa allocates inward and regionally rather than governing where the world's investable capital is placed. Its managers run a domestic and regional pool, leaving it a small taker-tier slice of the global allocation function rather than any provider role over the world's capital.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant (63% of global AUM, the Big-Three). Positional: a fixed pool of the world's investable capital sliced among manager-domiciles — US holds the majority slice. UK (asset-mgmt hub) + France (Crédit Agricole/Amundi) the next tier. China's AUM is large but domestically-bound, not globally-allocating. Others minor.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Ownership of strategic firms", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 10, "value": null, "reason": "South African institutions hold some outbound equity through their developed pension sector, but their residual-claim stakes in the world's strategic firms are slight — a small holder owning largely inward and regionally rather than across the global set.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — the Big-Three are the largest or near-largest holders of most global strategic firms (the D18 attribution: TSMC/ASML power resolves to US capital). Positional: a firm's equity is a fixed pool sliced among holders; US holders take the largest slices. China owns its OWN champions (state + domestic funds) = a self-contained ownership bloc, scored modestly (owns inward, not the world's firms). Others hold scattered stakes.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Cross-border equity-allocation reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2023-12-31", "score": 11, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa shows modest outbound portfolio-equity reach through its developed institutions, but it is a small participant rather than a destination the world's savings route into — a minor node on the using side of the global allocative system.", "fieldReason": "US + UK are the cross-border equity hubs (savings worldwide route into US markets; London the intermediation centre). SUPPORTING signal only — CPIS vintage spread (US 2011 vs JP 2022, India GAP) bars it from a clean cross-section, so it is weighted lightly and the score leans on the US-market-depth + AUM picture. India GAP flagged.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } }, "knowledge": { "standards-platform-control": { "normalized": 8.667, "raw": 8.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Standards-body authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 14, "value": null, "reason": "Low. SABS engages with ISO/IEC and leads regionally in Africa, but at the global level South Africa holds almost no pen-holding roles — it conforms to standards authored elsewhere rather than writing them.", "fieldReason": "Composite of secretariat-holding (the rule-pen) and convenorship (working-level steering). Germany/China/US form the top tier (DE leads secretariats, US leads convenorships, CN second on both — the rise of SAC is the standout structural fact). Japan/France/UK a clear second tier. Italy/Canada/India mid. Russia/Brazil/S.Africa low — participants, not pen-holders.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Open-protocol foundation control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 6, "value": null, "reason": "Lowest. South Africa's protocol-authorship footprint is negligible; it conforms to and interoperates with foundational protocols set entirely abroad, with no shaping role in the stack.", "fieldReason": "US overwhelmingly dominant — both by RFC authorship (6180, ~10x the next) AND by historical/custodial control of the foundational protocol stack (IETF origin, IANA/ICANN, root governance). Europe (DE/UK/FR) and China form a second tier on authorship volume; China rising. Basis note: the metric doc asks who *shapes*, not who *counts* — historical custody of the protocol stack (not author volume alone) anchors the US top score.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Platform gatekeeping", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 6, "value": null, "reason": "Rule-taker. South Africa neither owns relevant platforms nor sets meaningful access rules for them; it conforms to gatekeeping conditions established by the platform owners and the major regulatory blocs abroad.", "fieldReason": "Anchored to the per-nation authority_tier below (rule-setting / access-denial, NOT user share). US is the structural platform gatekeeper — owns and sets access rules for the app stores, cloud, and mobile OS the world must route through, plus export-control-linked access denial. China second: a sovereign-walled parallel platform sphere (super-apps, HarmonyOS, domestic cloud) that gatekeeps the China market but is not yet globally gatekeeping. India/Brazil are market-gatekeepers (app bans, data-localization, court actions) over their own markets. EU states (DE/FR/IT) + UK are rule-setters-not-owners (DMA/DSA/GDPR / DMCC 'Brussels effect'), scored individually per D16. Russia sovereign-walled-minor; Canada rule-influence-minor; South Africa rule-taker.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technological-primacy": { "normalized": 6.667, "raw": 6.667, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Frontier-innovation origination", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa is at the bottom of the origination scale, an adopter of frontier technology rather than a source of it. It draws on leading-edge work created elsewhere and contributes virtually none of the breakthroughs others must take up, which the score reflects honestly.", "fieldReason": "US is the origination frontier across domains (AI, biotech, internet, space). China the clear #2 and rising fast (frontier-model origination near-parity). UK/Germany/France/Japan/Canada a research-strong second tier (UK DeepMind-lineage, France Mistral, Canada AI-research depth). Italy/India/Russia mid (capacity but few frontier origins). Brazil/S.Africa low. This is where the metric surfaces 'leader vs follower' honestly.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Military-to-commercial spillover", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 1, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 8, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa is at the bottom on this lever, with minimal defence R&D and no meaningful pipeline converting military innovation into commercial advantage. It neither originates nor spills over at scale, and the score reflects that absence rather than an undercount.", "fieldReason": "US top — uniquely effective defence→commercial spillover engine (DARPA archetype,). China high on both spend scale AND a deliberate civil-military-fusion pipeline. Russia scores above its GERD rank on the MILITARY side (strong defence R&D) but weak commercial spillover. The score weights spillover EFFICIENCY + scale, not GERD alone — so China's spend lead does not flip the #1.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Compute & frontier-model control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa is at the bottom on this lever, with no frontier-model presence and no control over the compute others must access. It is a complete taker of the current AI frontier, reliant on infrastructure and models authored and gated abroad.", "fieldReason": "US controls the frontier-model + compute stack (top labs + the chip-design/cloud chokepoints it can deny — see technology-denial-regimes). China the only near-peer on frontier-model output (192 vs 210 since 2023) but compute-constrained by US export controls. France (Mistral) the strongest of the rest. Brazil/S.Africa/India/Italy near-zero frontier presence — genuine, not gaps.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "technology-denial-regimes": { "normalized": 7, "raw": 7, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Export-control regime leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa maintains a national export-control framework but plays no authoring role in the frontier-technology denial regime and commands nothing the system must coordinate to deny. It is effectively outside the live denial architecture, scoring just above the floor — a formal control apparatus with no structural authorship behind it.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — authors the binding entity/chip-control lists others react to; Wassenaar is its multilateral frame. Japan/NL-tier (DE/FR/UK) author meaningful national controls + EU dual-use reg. China NON-member of Wassenaar but builds its OWN counter-denial (rare-earth/gallium export controls) — scored low here on WESTERN-regime authorship but note: China's denial capacity lives in indispensable-input-control (Production). Russia a member but no frontier tech to deny. Brazil/SA negligible.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement / extraterritorial reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 4, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa enforces a national export-control framework only over its own limited trade and projects no reach beyond its borders. With nothing critical to deny and no role in the allied compliance chain, its enforcement reach is at the floor — administrative presence without structural enforcement weight.", "fieldReason": "US near-monopoly on extraterritorial enforcement (FDPR + market access leverage). Japan scores as a COMPLIANT enforcer (implemented the 23-item SME controls July 2023) with some own reach. EU states enforce within EU dual-use frame. China has counter-enforcement (its own export-control law, unreliable-entity list) but limited extraterritorial bite — scored modest. Most others are rule-TAKERS who comply, not enforcers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Criticality of what can be denied", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa holds no non-substitutable frontier technology whose denial would bite; aside from some raw-mineral positions that sit in other metrics, it has nothing critical to withhold in this regime. Its criticality scores at the floor — outside the chokepoint geography entirely.", "fieldReason": "US holds the most non-substitutable chokepoints (EDA, GPU design, key SME). Japan strong (SME). China scores MODEST here despite being the TARGET — because it now wields its OWN bite via rare-earth/gallium/germanium controls (non-substitutable inputs), a genuine counter-denial; but its advanced-tech denial capacity is limited. NL (the EUV monopoly) is the single most critical non-12 node. Most nations: nothing non-substitutable to deny.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "ip-regime-authorship": { "normalized": 17, "raw": 17, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "IP rule-setting / regime authorship", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 22, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa was a leading voice in the defensive coalition contesting the maximalist IP regime, most visibly on access to medicines, and helped drive the TRIPS-flexibilities agenda within the WTO. That is a real but reactive position — resisting rules written elsewhere rather than setting them — which lifts it slightly above pure takers while keeping it far below the authoring states.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — TRIPS architect + ongoing regime-driver (Special 301, TRIPS-plus). EU bloc strong co-author (DE/FR/IT carry EU-negotiation weight on rule-setting). Japan high-standard adherent. China/India/Brazil/SA = the rule-TAKER / contesting bloc (India+Brazil+SA led the TRIPS-flexibilities / access-to-medicines pushback — genuine but DEFENSIVE agenda, scored modestly above pure takers). Russia low.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Enforcement & exclusion reach", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa enforces IP only within its own market and has no extraterritorial exclusion reach, unable to bar rivals from third markets or set global terms. Its low score reflects domestic-only enforcement with no projection of denial power.", "fieldReason": "US near-unique extraterritorial exclusion (Section 337 import bans + market leverage). EU strong but bloc-internal (UPC from 2023 — DE the heaviest patent-litigation venue). China scores notably here — growing enforcement + anti-suit injunctions setting global FRAND rates (a real counter-reach). Most others enforce only domestically.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "belief-ideological-authority": { "normalized": 17, "raw": 17, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Ideological / intellectual leadership", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 16, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa is a regional/heritage idea-voice rather than a paradigm-author. It does not originate economic or policy frameworks that others accept as authoritative beyond its own sphere; its ideational influence is region-bound rather than agenda-setting. That places it lowest on this lever as a regional voice, not an idea-originator.", "fieldReason": "Scored from the per-nation authority_tier below (belief-conferral, NOT export volume). US is the paradigm-author — originates the dominant economic/policy paradigms and the agenda-defining academic + think-tank ecosystem (the modern Adam-Smith lever). UK is the anglophone co-author (Oxbridge/LSE, The Economist), punching above size. China is the rising counter-paradigm — the only state offering a coherent alternative belief-model at scale (state-led development, 'Chinese modernization'), though adopted more by dependency than voluntary conviction. France/Germany hold distinct tradition/model authority (Enlightenment/Francophonie; Ordoliberalism). India rising-civilizational; Russia spoiler-narrative; the rest regional/heritage voices.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Lingua-franca & credential dominance", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2025-12-31", "score": 18, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa's universities serve as a regional hub within Africa and operate in English, but it provides credentials inside a system authored elsewhere rather than setting one. Its draw is regional and language-borrowed, giving it a low score as a sub-regional destination rather than a lingua-franca provider.", "fieldReason": "The anglophone US-UK axis dominates — English as lingua franca + the top credential institutions + the student magnet. The US is the clear #1; UK punches far above size (language + Oxbridge/Russell Group). Canada/France mid (credential magnets in their language spheres). China scores modestly DESPITE rising universities — it is a net credential IMPORTER (Mandarin not a lingua franca; sends 1M+ students out). India high English-use but credential IMPORTER. The metric rewards whose system others OPERATE IN.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Belief-transmission channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 17, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa is a narrow regional norm-voice rather than a value-transmitter others broadly adopt. Its norm-influence is region-bound and heritage-derived, carried within Africa rather than diffused as an adopted value-set beyond it. That makes it the lowest here — a respected regional voice, not a provider of norms others operate by.", "fieldReason": "Scored on belief ADOPTION, not media volume, from the per-nation authority_tier below. US is the default global value-set exporter (liberal-democratic, market, individual-rights norms). UK/France co-export rule-of-law / civic norms with real diffusion (Commonwealth, Francophonie). China is the genuine alternative-norm pole — development-without-conditionality and sovereignty-over-intervention norms adopted across parts of the BRI-linked Global South. Germany a regulatory/social-market norm-anchor; Russia diffuses sovereigntist counter-norms by affinity not authority; the rest narrower regional or aesthetic norm-sets.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] }, "channel-control": { "normalized": 8, "raw": 8, "source": "hand-sourced-assembler", "components": [ { "area": "Knowledge-agenda channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 3, "vintage": "2024-12-31", "score": 12, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa is a small content-producer near the floor, wholly dependent on Western indexing and ranking machinery to have its research counted. It authors none of the rules and operates no rival channel, leaving it a pure channel-taker on the knowledge agenda.", "fieldReason": "US + UK dominate (Clarivate/WoS + Elsevier-RELX's UK base + the top journals/venues). Germany strong (Springer Nature). The rest are content PRODUCERS routed through Western channels, not channel-owners. China building rival indices (CNKI, its own journals) — rising but its researchers still chase WoS/Scopus indexing = channel-dependency. The metric scores who DECIDES which findings count.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Orbital & data-channel control", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 5, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa sits at the floor as a pure orbital consumer, providing no PNT or global data channel and depending wholly on infrastructure operated by larger powers. It exercises no substitutable dependency over anyone; the dependency runs entirely the other way.", "fieldReason": "US dominant — GPS (the default the world depends on) + Starlink's 65% LEO share. China #2: BeiDou (full global) + rising constellations. Russia: GLONASS (global but degraded). EU (DE/FR/IT) share Galileo = real bloc orbital channel. Japan/India regional PNT only. Brazil/SA = pure dependents, no orbital channel.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] }, { "area": "Channel rule-setting", "scoring_basis": "provision", "calibration": "comparative", "tier": 2, "vintage": "2026-03-31", "score": 7, "value": null, "reason": "South Africa sits at the floor on channel rule-setting: it participates in ITU as a member but authors none of the spectrum, orbital, or data-governance rules that bind the channels. It is a rule-taker, adopting terms set entirely by others.", "fieldReason": "US leads (internet governance + heaviest ITU/orbital presence + GPS standard). EU bloc strong on spectrum + data-governance rules (Galileo + GDPR — DE/FR/IT bloc weight). China rising ITU influence + sovereign data rules + BeiDou standard. Russia ITU member with GLONASS standard. Others = rule-takers.", "benchmark": null, "citationIds": [] } ], "citations": [] } } }, "__aggregates": { "structures": { "security": { "US": 90.742, "China": 45.589, "Japan": 32.203, "Germany": 25.287, "France": 38.568, "UK": 46.396, "Italy": 22.87, "India": 15.74, "Russia": 37.578, "Canada": 28.203, "Brazil": 15.078, "South Africa": 9.662 }, "production": { "US": 93.8, "China": 57.2, "Japan": 61.967, "Germany": 54.617, "France": 44.317, "UK": 45.45, "Italy": 33.683, "India": 17.117, "Russia": 15.467, "Canada": 35.167, "Brazil": 14.517, "South Africa": 10.033 }, "finance": { "US": 86.082, "China": 21.222, "Japan": 19.028, "Germany": 36.006, "France": 37.307, "UK": 34.835, "Italy": 30.969, "India": 6.586, "Russia": 7.059, "Canada": 17.77, "Brazil": 6.52, "South Africa": 5.338 }, "knowledge": { "US": 95, "China": 52.917, "Japan": 40.139, "Germany": 47.694, "France": 44.556, "UK": 49.583, "Italy": 28.833, "India": 21.556, "Russia": 20.5, "Canada": 27.806, "Brazil": 12.111, "South Africa": 10.722 } }, "headline": { "US": 91.406, "China": 44.232, "Japan": 38.334, "Germany": 40.901, "France": 41.187, "UK": 44.066, "Italy": 29.089, "India": 15.25, "Russia": 20.151, "Canada": 27.237, "Brazil": 12.057, "South Africa": 8.939 }, "headlineShare": { "US": 22.14, "China": 10.714, "Japan": 9.285, "Germany": 9.907, "France": 9.976, "UK": 10.674, "Italy": 7.046, "India": 3.694, "Russia": 4.881, "Canada": 6.597, "Brazil": 2.92, "South Africa": 2.165 }, "universe": [ "US", "China", "Japan", "Germany", "France", "UK", "Italy", "India", "Russia", "Canada", "Brazil", "South Africa" ] } }